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Israel's campaign against Hamas in Gaza, in response to the massive terrorist attack on October 7, has raised tensions across the Middle East and fears that the war could spread beyond Israel's borders. It is extremely unlikely that we will see the involvement of any Sunni state – Egypt, Jordan, the Gulf countries – or even a Shia-dominated country like Iraq. Even Syria, the most hostile Arab state towards Israel and with the best relations with its adversaries, Iran and Hezbollah, has no reason to get involved in a conflict in the Golan Heights area, given that most of the country was destroyed by war, and the north and east are under the control of Bashar al-Assad's opponents. The danger of a wider conflict comes primarily from non-state players.
Worrying signs have been there for more than a month already. There have been quasi-daily clashes between Hezbollah militants and Israeli forces on the Israeli-Lebanese border. From Yemen, the Houthi Shia militia launched rockets in the direction of Israel. In Iraq and Syria, bases where US troops are stationed have been the target of at least forty missile and drone attacks bearing the signature of the United States' old adversaries in the Shiite militias; moreover, Washington responded with several airstrikes targeting the respective militias. Attacks against Americans are caused by their support for Israel. It is not only about the almost unconditional support shown in the current crisis, but about the special relationship that the two countries have had for decades, a relationship that, to a good extent, has triggered the hostility of some Muslims, especially the radical ones, towards the United States.
All the Shiite groups that have tensed up during this period are coordinated or supported by Iran. It appears that Tehran is pushing its allies to war and is ready to become involved in the conflict itself. In reality, most actors in the region have little interest in a full-scale war with Israel and/or the United States, but that doesn't mean the situation can't get out of hand.
Iran, an expert in knife-edge situations. Why Tehran does not want war
Iran has a long history of playing a knife-edge game, up to the brink of war , but without actually starting it, particularly in its relationship with the United States over the past four decades. In 1983, Shia suicide terrorists attacked the United States embassy and barracks of the US Marines and the French military in Beirut. More than 350 people were killed in the attacks claimed by a ghost group, the Islamic Jihad (distinct from the terrorist organization of the same name in Gaza), but which were apparently behind elements of the then still forming Hezbollah, supported by Iran. Tehran's involvement, which it vehemently denied, could never be proven, so no American retaliation followed.
Between 2003 and 2011, while the Americans had a massive presence in Iraq, Iran armed and trained Iraqi Shia militias that engaged in a guerrilla warfare against American forces; Tehran is believed to be responsible for the deaths of more than 600 American soldiers , but managed to manipulate the situation in such a way as to avoid an attack by Washington.
Even closer to the present day, Iran shot down a US military drone in the Gulf in 2019, and in 2020, after the Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani was killed in an airstrike in Baghdad, bombed with ballistic missile bases where American soldiers were located in Iraq, injuring more than 100 of them. War was, however, averted even then.
These are just a few examples, as the number of incidents has been higher, from terrorist attacks and hijackings to direct clashes, as happened in 1988 when, after an American warship in the Gulf area was hit by a mine, the United States destroyed a significant part of the Iranian war fleet.
Iran has, over time, also avoided a direct conflict with Israel. Various militias associated with Tehran have launched attacks directly targeting Israeli territory (notably Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad) or Israeli interests/targets around the world. Israel also attacked Iran through sabotage, assassinations of scientists involved in the Iranian nuclear program, bombing of Iranian targets in Syria. Tempers have flared more than once, but Iran has never, until now, directly attacked Israel, although it boasts that it has missiles capable of reaching its territory.
Iran is currently in a complicated situation. The economy is suffering from the long-standing embargo imposed by the United States and its allies in response to Iran's nuclear program, and a war would deepen that crisis. From a technological point of view, Tehran is outranked in almost all chapters by its opponents. Of course, Iran also has a number of advantages - it can block the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20% of the crude oil sold globally is transported , it can try to attack Saudi Arabia's oil fields again, its Houthi allies can threaten naval traffic in the Red Sea etc. But the benefits are less than the potential costs of a conflict with Israel, and especially with the United States. After all, Washington did not send two aircraft carriers to the eastern Mediterranean to defend Israel against Hamas or even Hezbollah—Jerusalem can handle those two very well on its own—but to signal to Iran that it is not the case to push things too far.
Do Hezbollah, Houthi and the Iraqi militias really want a war with Israel and the US? Do they have the capability to wage such a war?
Hezbolah has been hostile to Israel since its founding in the 1980s amid the civil war in Lebanon and the Israeli intervention in that country. The Islamist group fought two wars against the Jewish state that it claims to have won, the first in 2000 when Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon, the second in 2006. Both wars were a source of legitimacy in the Muslim world for Hezbollah, the Shiite group becoming popular even among Sunnis, despite the differences between these two branches of Islam, which are fueled mostly by radical groups in both camps; moreover, Hezbollah also came into conflict with Sunnis during the Syrian civil war, when it fought alongside the forces of Bashar al-Assad, which led to a decline in its popularity among Muslims.
Involvement in the Syrian war, however, did not make Hezbollah abandon its anti-Israeli rhetoric, so the Lebanese group was practically forced to show that it was ready to intervene in support of the Palestinians and launched a series of attacks across the border. However, these were generally limited attacks (the first targeted the Sheba farms, which are also claimed by Lebanon; basically, from Hezbollah's point of view, no Israeli territory was attacked), which suggests that the Shiite group does not want an escalation of the conflict. The situation is extremely complicated right now in Lebanon, a semi-failed state on the brink of economic collapse, so a war is the last thing Hezbollah would actually need.
Moreover, the Shia group cannot be sure that, in the event of a conflict with Israel, the Lebanese state or the other important communities of the country - primarily the Sunnis and the Christians, but also the Druze - will provide it with support; historical experience shows that, on the contrary, they will pursue their own interests and may even come into conflict with Hezbollah.
However, the situation in the area is so fluid and tense that an escalation can occur d at any time. It is enough for a salvo fired by Hezbollah across the border to cause too many casualties, Israel to respond forcefully and hit a nerve, the Islamists to seek revenge and so on, until the situation gets in a downward spiral impossible to control. Another factor that could push Hezbollah to act forcefully is the humanitarian situation in Gaza. The destruction and loss of human life in the Strip is already very high, and this only fuels the indignation of the Muslims - especially the Arabs - and the desire for revenge among some of them.
If a conflict were to break out, Hezbollah would be a far more dangerous adversary than Hamas, given that it has the experience of the brutal Syrian war, is backed by Iran, is not isolated like the Gaza Strip, and has an impressive arsenal that includes one hundred and fifty thousand rockets that it can launch on Israeli cities.
Somewhat further from the epicenter of the conflict, in Yemen, the Houthi militia lacks the ability to truly threaten Israel or the United States, despite its rhetoric (one of the group's slogans reads "death to America, death to Israel, damn the Jews") and the attacks it has already launched. After years of civil war and war between the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition, Yemen is a failed state marked by a deep humanitarian and economic crisis. It could, however, pose problems in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
Finally, the Shia militias active in Syria and Iraq do not pose that much of a danger either. In Syria, they also have to take into account the Kurdish forces, who control the area where the Americans are also located. Furthermore, when they attempted to confront Washington's forces directly, the result was disastrous for the militias. The situation is not too different in Iraq either; yes, militias can fire volleys of rockets at bases where US troops are also stationed, but it's hard to believe that a massive assault on the bases would be successful - that's if the authorities in Baghdad would allow such massive assaults, which is hard to believe.
The fact that the major Shiite players would not have any strategic gain if they went to war with Israel does not mean that within these groups, or in Tehran, there are no promoters of a total war. Basically, we are not talking about rational and pragmatic state players, but about religious extremists.
