Romanians in the Republic of Moldova overwhelmingly voted for Nicușor Dan, even though the ruling party, PAS, supported Crin Antonescu. Directly threatened by Moscow, the Moldovans rejected George Simion who, although he declared himself a unionist, is perceived as pro-Russian across the Prut. On the other hand, George Simion got most of the votes of the Romanian diaspora in Europe, which until recently preferred candidates and parties defined as pro-European and reformist.
A record number of voters in the Republic of Moldova. Fear of Russia, an important mobilizing factor
The first round of the presidential elections in Romania was also accompanied by a new election participation record for the Republic of Moldova, with over 90,000 voters, compared to the autumn elections when less than 85 thousand Moldovans with dual citizenship participated. Preliminary results show a large discrepancy between the preferences of the Romanians living between the Prut and the Dniester compared to those in the country and those living in Western countries with large Romanian communities. In the Republic of Moldova, Nicușor Dan won the first round with over 50% of the votes.
At the 64 polling stations set up in the Republic of Moldova for the presidential elections, 90,851 Romanians cast their vote, the largest number so far and constantly increasing over the last two decades. For example, in the 2019 elections, approximately 43,000 people voted in the first round and over 52,000 in the second, and in November 2024, voter turnout had almost doubled, reaching 85,000 people. However, the number of Moldovans who voted in the Romanian presidential elections was certainly higher, considering that there are large communities of Moldovans with Romanian citizenship not only in Romania, but also in Western European countries.
There are several factors that explain this increase in interest in Romania. On the one hand, better conditions for Romanians abroad; they have 3 days to exercise their right to vote, plus a larger number of polling stations where they can do that. For example, in the Republic of Moldova, 64 stations were established for this election, while in the fall there were 59. In 2019, there were 37 stations. At the same time, the interest of the Romanian citizens living in the Republic of Moldova in the Romanian elections has increased in the current geopolitical context, especially because of the war in Ukraine, and many of them fear that the Republic of Moldova will get back under Russia’s influence and hope that the West and Romania will prevent this.
Approximately one million citizens of the Republic of Moldova have regained Romanian citizenship and it is no secret that the vast majority requested it to enjoy the benefits – first the right to work in the EU, and then the benefits they have as Romanian citizens, from pensions to welfare programs for children.
Not all those who regained Romanian citizenship chose to go abroad. There is also a significant number that chose to stay in the Republic of Moldova. This group includes voters who are visible in statistics, those who exercise their right to vote in Romanian elections on the territory of the Republic of Moldova. Many are representatives of the intelligentsia, relatively wealthy, with decent salaries and pensions (at least) in the Republic of Moldova. They are better informed, pro-European (and probably most are also unionists) and oppose Putin's expansionist policy.
These voters see in George Simion a politician with pro-Russian sympathies, who as a president could weaken Romania's positions in NATO and the EU. Moreover, he has openly spoken out against supporting the Republic of Moldova, says Valeriu Pașa, an expert with the WatchDog Center in the Republic of Moldova: "In the person of Nicușor Dan, the Republic of Moldova will have in Romania a leader who is quite dedicated to its cause, while if George Simion comes, Romania will face strong instability, Romania's positions in the EU and NATO will be weakened, and the bilateral relationship will also be very complicated. Don’t forget that George Simion is banned from entering the Republic of Moldova. Don't forget that George Simion urged Romania to interrupt any economic program for the Republic of Moldova. From my point of view, he effectively acts as an agent of Russia."
At the beginning of his political career, George Simion tried to portray himself as a unionist and was involved in organizing numerous pro-union demonstrations in Chisinau. However, even then he failed to attract a large number of supporters in the Republic of Moldova, where the type of unionism promoted by Simion is considered aggressive and provocative, given the conflicts with law enforcement and anti-unionists.
It should be noted that, over time, voters in the Republic of Moldova have generally opted for the Romanian right, perceived as pro-European, reformist and open towards Bessarabia. The Social Democratic Party (PSD) has never won elections there, not even when it benefited from the support of the government, such as the one led from the shadows by oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc, whose Democratic Party had close ties to the PSD led by Victor Ponta.
The Democratic Party is not the only one in Chisinau that has failed to ensure the victory of its allies in Romania. A similar problem has befallen the current ruling party, PAS. The candidates it supported, Nicolae Ciucă in November 2024 and Crin Antonescu in May 2025, lost the elections in the Republic of Moldova. Romanians there have shown that they do not opt for whom they are told to, but for those they believe will act most promptly and clearly in case they find themselves in trouble.
Despite increasing voter turnout from one cycle to the next, the diaspora has rarely influenced the final outcome
Like Moldovans, Romanian emigrants in other countries have increasingly mobilized to vote over the years, their numbers increasing from 45,000 in 1992 to 945,000 in the second round of the 2019 presidential elections. Like Moldovans, Romanians in the diaspora have generally opted for parties and candidates that were on the right, perceived as reformist and pro-European. Recently, however, the diaspora has begun to reorient itself, and this was clearly seen in the latest elections, when the diaspora (excluding the Republic of Moldova) preferred the sovereignists.
The vote from abroad, even though it has been talked about a lot in recent years, has long had too little weight to matter. For instance, between 1990 and 2000, only a few tens of thousands of Romanians abroad voted in the presidential election. In 1992, for example, 45,000 people voted in the diaspora and 63% of them opted for Emil Constantinescu, but their vote did not count – Constantinescu obtained only 38.5 percent of the total votes cast. In 1996, similarly, Emil Constantinescu clearly won the diaspora, with almost 78% of approximately 85,000 votes, but the final result recorded only 54 percent winning in his favor. In 2000, the only time a leftist candidate won an election in the diaspora, approximately 33,000 votes were recorded in the first round, won by Mugur Isărescu, with 39%, followed by Theodor Stolojan with 21.5%, but in the second round, when the voters had to choose between the leftist candidate Ion Iliescu and the extremist Corneliu Vadim Tudor, only 16,000 Romanians showed up to vote, less than half of those present in the first round. Ion Iliescu won 70% of the diaspora votes.
In 2004, the right-wing candidate Traian Băsescu was supported by 72% of the 40,000 Romanians who voted abroad, winning the presidential election with over 51 percent of the total. It was not until 2009 that the vote of Romanians abroad tipped the balance in favor of the same Traian Băsescu, who won 79% of the votes of the almost 147,000 citizens present at the polls. At home, his and his left-wing opponent Mircea Geoană's votes were roughly the same, with a slight advantage for the Social-Democrat.
A relatively large share of the diaspora in the total number of votes for the president occurred in 2014, when Romanians abroad literally crowded into the polling stations. But even under these conditions, the approximately 377,000 Romanians who voted in the second round represented only 3.25% of the total votes cast in that election. Therefore, although Klaus Iohannis got almost 90% of the votes in the diaspora, the final score indicated, in his favor, only a little over 54 percent.
In 2019, over 650,000 Romanians in the diaspora (almost 7.5% of the total votes cast) overwhelmingly chose a right-wing candidate (Klaus Iohannis – 53%, Dan Barna – 27.5%, and Theodor Paleologu – 6.4%) and only 2.75% opted for the left-wing candidate Viorica Dăncilă. In the second round, the number increased significantly, and 94% of the almost 945,000 diaspora voters (almost 10% of those present at the polls) re-elected Klaus Iohannis for a new five-year presidential term.
The diaspora's transition from the reformist right to sovereigntism
The increase in the number of Romanian citizens voting abroad is primarily due to the massive migration of Romanians to the West, but also to the freedom of movement, especially in the European space, acquired with the accession to the European Union. Thus, many of those who vote abroad are there only temporarily, either for seasonal work, or on a trip or visiting relatives settled across the border. Another factor, no less important, is represented by the scale that the nationalist movement took, during the COVID pandemic and exacerbated by propaganda messages on social media in the years that followed. Therefore, even those who had been abroad for decades felt the need to have a voice as Romanians, and because returning home was not yet an option for them, it was reflected in their very strong desire to make their political options known.
The year 2024 brought a 180-degree turn in the diaspora voting option, amid the radicalization of a significant part of the electorate abroad, disappointed that, despite the previous mobilization, their situation had hardly changed at all. The turnout, however, was not as high as experts had expected, with only approximately 822,000 Romanians expressing their option in polling stations abroad. The result, however, already well-known, brought the pro-Russian extremist and legionary Călin Georgescu 43% of the diaspora votes, a score that placed him in first place with almost 23 percent of the total votes. The big winner of the diaspora vote, however, was Elena Lasconi, who, with the 216,000 votes from abroad (27% of the total diaspora), surpassed Marcel Ciolacu in the end, by approximately 2,700 votes, given that the Social-Democrat won, abroad, only 23,000 votes. However, if we add to Georgescu's score George Simion's 12 percent, we notice that the extremist option reached, in the diaspora, a percentage of 55, in flagrant contradiction with Romania's European and pro-Western path.
The subsequent cancellation of the 2024 presidential elections, however, created an even greater wave of revolt among sympathizers of the nationalist-extremist trend in the diaspora, and although it did not lead to the "unprecedented" mobilization announced by them on social media, in the three days of voting abroad, only slightly less than 970,000 Romanians expressed their electoral option (below the threshold expected by the nationalist parties). George Simion, the candidate of the extreme right, obtained 61% of the votes, and Nicușor Dan, approximately 25.5%. The next two ranked candidates, Crin Antonescu and Elena Lasconi, obtained together approximately under ten percent, proving, once again, that in the diaspora, the vote is extremely polarized, leaving very little room for "center" electoral options.
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