
Having won the first round of the presidential election with a landslide, George Simion seems to be starting to get what he wanted but never managed to get so far: international recognition – at least from the right-wing extremists in the European Union. Mateusz Morawiecki, the former Polish Prime Minister on behalf of PiS (“Law and Justice”), who has become vice-president of the ECR (the European Conservatives and Reformists Group), congratulated him on the result, as did Marion Maréchal from Eric Zemmour’s Reconquête! (Reconquest) in France, whereas Matteo Salvini of Italy’s Lega also addressed him a “bravo”.
The days when Simion was not welcome to attend any of the meetings of European radicals in Spain are gone. Obviously, the AUR (Alliance for the Union of Romanians) candidate seeks legitimacy in the global vein of extremist movements, overtly embracing Trump's ideology, as much as it is, as well as the red cap associated with his movement, along with the descriptor “MAGA Man” assigned by Politico.eu. The kisses waved to Giorgia Meloni did not go unnoticed either.
Simion has also been known to foster an external rhetoric quite different from the one promoted at home: less incense, less hot-blooded outbursts and fewer corny messages addressed to people in trouble, and more committed to positioning himself on the global map, at least at declarative level.
The European establishment is watching the election in Romania with great concern
As expected, the centrists in power in Europe are concerned with what Politico.eu has called “fears that a victory for Simion could destabilize a key NATO and EU member of 19 million people”. Perhaps, all it took was what we see today happening in Romania for our country to be viewed in a way which, until now, we never really managed to convey in diplomatic exchanges.
On the eastern flank of the EU and NATO, Romania had the advantage of being perceived as a pro-European and pro-Western country, without any illiberal slippages as in Orbán's Hungary or Kaczyński's Poland, until Tusk's pro-Europeans took power. This was perceived less as an advantage at home, amid accusations of corruption and lack of vision from the centrist governing coalition, which was otherwise Brussels’ trusted partner, at least to a point.
As the candidate of PNL (National Liberal Party) and PSD (Social-Democratic Party) failed to reach the second round of the election, Romania's turn towards extremism is seen as sudden and spectacular, somewhat foreshadowing what could happen, or could continue to happen in European politics. Curiously enough, the one who best captured this state of mind was Viktor Orbán himself, who, after the (annulled) first round in fall, described Călin Georgescu's campaign as an “example of how technology meets the needs of the electorate”, a “lab experiment made for us”.
Brussels could respond to Bucharest’s sovereignist drive by cutting EU funding
Orbán's opinion is worth considering as coming from the most consistent, successful and ideologically sophisticated representative of Euroscepticism. Starting from the idea of a “laboratory”, in the event of a victory for George Simion in the second round and, possibly, of a snap parliamentary election, the establishment of liberal democracies in Europe could be tempted to respond to the developments in Romania with other “experimental” measures, especially since the geopolitical pressure associated with the war in Ukraine and the USA’s antagonistic attitude have pushed Europe into taking unprecedented political initiatives, from the “coalition of the willing” proposed by British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, to ideas like Macron's “Europe of concentric circles”, which is coming increasingly into shape, albeit imperceptibly.
Of course, the hypothesis of Romania's withdrawal from the European Union would be catastrophic, to a different degree than the result of the first round of the presidential election. The experience of Hungary and Poland proves that Brussels is not very tempted to decide the exit of any country by its own, if only for one simple reason: that a big problem inside the EU would become an even bigger problem outside. What we can predict, however, is the conditioning of EU funding on democratic performance, a pressure point that has already been used in the case of countries like Hungary. EU countries that endanger their own rule of law will remain members of the European Union all but in title, but will not benefit from its advantages. At the same time, cooperation with non-EU countries, inscribed in a broader European concept, will be strengthened, as is already happening with Norway or the United Kingdom.
What Romania needs to do, but would not have done anyway
What is essential for Romania is how it will position itself towards the new EU political initiatives, such as sending peacekeeping troops to Ukraine, once we have an end to hostilities in one form or another. Both George Simion and his opponent, Nicușor Dan, opposed this idea, as did the interim president, Ilie Bolojan. As I’ve said before, such attitudes exclude Romania from geopolitical decision-making – in this case, from the “Coalition of the Willing”, which it has been invited to join, for the time being.
Of course, keeping the peace in Ukraine is just one topic of discussion, which does not disqualify a country in itself. But Romania will not be able to remain a “key member of the EU” in the long run if it does not get involved geopolitically. And Brussels already knows that the polls-favorite to win the second round of the presidential election is a unionist militant who is banned in one of the countries it wants to unite and has contacts with Russian intelligence.
Beyond any kind of information circulated in the media or rhetorical political positions, the European Union itself has a tendency to keep a bureaucratic history of compliance with a long series of principles and rules, on a case-by-case basis. Whatever its political landscape will look like after May 18, Romania will be treated according to its response to this kind of institutional imperatives our country pledged to observe upon accession, at least in the European Union proper. It is worth recalling the case of Poland, which for a long time was a major beneficiary of cohesion funds, even in an era when it was governed by an illiberal regime. Admittedly, observance of democratic principles has today become a prerequisite for the allocation of funds. But the overall picture remains the same. Brussels is certainly willing to tolerate various internal or campaign statements, as long as the actual political gestures comply with the commitments of an EU Member State.
The unknown variable or the Simion “hologram”. Positioning on major global topics
From this point of view, the possibility of Simion winning the presidential race cannot be good news, given that not even Ilie Bolojan had a clearer pro-European and pro-Ukrainian stance – possibly for electoral reasons. The problem, however, is how bad the new political context will be for Romania. There are a number of possible answers in this regard, especially since Simion is still a “variable” in connection to major geopolitical issues. Commentators observed not just the difference between the presidential candidate's internal and external discourses, but also the fact that even his internal discourse has changed, from rhetoric and aggressive “hooligan-like” gestures, to the quasi-absence from classic media and the solemn and succinct unilateralism of network messages (à la Călin Georgescu), to the point where Simion was even called a “hologram”. The fact that he claims to implement the policies of people like Donald Trump or Giorgia Meloni and that his party, AUR, is a member of ECR, the “moderately extremist” faction of European politics that aspires to become part of European political decision-making, seems to suggest a future softening of positions and political messages. Simply put, you can't stay or affiliate yourself to the European conservative and reformist international with a pro-Russian discourse.
More will certainly be revealed in the days ahead, because on Tuesday, George Simion said he is “ready” to face Nicușor Dan in public debates and answer the media’s questions. The topics of discussion will, however, be less geopolitical. And it remains to be seen who and how “prepared” Simion.
Whether or not Simion wins the race for Cotroceni, Romania faces two alternative scenarios. The first, it becomes Eurosceptic at state level. The second, it adheres more firmly than before to European values. Whereas the former possibility is bad and threatening news, the even worse news is that the latter would have been unlikely anyway.
The relationship with the USA: George Simion and the MAGA “international”
If JD Vance’s over support for Călin Georgescu and Simion’s attempt to lobby in Washington lead us to infer Romania has a somewhat privileged relationship with the USA, it must be said this is sooner the focus of demagogy. Perhaps this relationship will exist to a certain degree, but it is one with a geopolitical partner that is self-degrading from the rank of the world’s sole superpower and is contradictory in terms of both statements and actions – as was the case of the tariffs Trump has repeatedly mentioned, or the “peace in Ukraine within 24 hours”, which, a few months after Trump’s inauguration, the American administration is threatening to abandon.
The next president of Romania should have diplomatic and geopolitical skills that exceed those of his predecessors, because, to put it plainly, the strategic partnership with the USA meant Romania had someone to look to and to draw inspiration from when excluding, for instance, Huawei from mobile networks, thus making life a lot easier for the Romanian president. Today, however, we are heading towards a mock-partnership with a mock-America, with a hologram for president.