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Get to know your neighbours: Bulgaria’s foreign policy remains hesitant

Get to know your neighbours: Bulgaria’s foreign policy remains hesitant
© EPA-EFE/GEORGI LICOVSKI   |   Bulgarian Prime Minister Kiril Petkov (L) accompanied by North Macedonia's Prime Minister Dimitar Kovacevski (R) inspects the honor guard in Skopje, Republic of North Macedonia, 18 January 2022.

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Untangling GERB and Boyko Borissov’s legacy might take a while: the new cabinet is keeping North Macedonia blocked from EU ascension talks, uncertainties surround a new gas link in Greece while the current Defense Minister downplayed the need of increased NATO presence in Bulgaria and Romania.

One month since the new ruling coalition of four parties, formerly in opposition, assumed power in Bulgaria, hesitant steps dominate over fast reforms. The majority, centered around the recent winning party of political newcomers and former interim ministers “We Continue the Change”, is giving mixed signals on how efficiently “the change” can be carried out. It remains to be seen whether the coalition, featuring WCC, Democratic Bulgaria, Bulgarian Socialist Party and previous winners There’s Such People, can create a solid base for changing the regional dynamics for the better.

On January 18, new Bulgarian PM Kiril Petkov, Harvard-educated former interim Minister of Economy in 2021 and previously known as an entrepreneur, departed to Skopje in a mission to resolve the two-year tense phase in the relationship with Sofia and meet for the first time North Macedonia’s brand new PM, Dimitar Kovacevski, also a Harvard alumni. The meeting coincides with the 30th anniversary of North Macedonia’s independence from Yugoslavia, at the time first recognized by Bulgaria.

Bulgaria’s enthusiasm for fast reforms meets sober realities and a complicated legacy

At home, the parliament is already divided over a subject that’s long not an issue in most countries: providing a certificate of vaccination or proof of a negative test upon entering the National Assembly and state institutions (pro-Moscow far-righters Revival and There’s Such People, formed by popular TV host Slavi Trifonov and his screenwriter Toshko Yordanov, are opposing the measure and are in line with the prevalent skepticism towards vaccines and regulations in the country).

Such a development was not completely unexpected as since the more recent anti-establishment protest wave (2020-2021), opposition parties were united in little else except their contempt for Boyko Borissov’s increasingly controversial legacy. The continuous political stalemate, which yielded five elections in total - three general with three different winners and two presidential, was another factor that whatever next political phase Bulgaria begins, it’ll be a result of a fragile balance to keep.

What then can the new parliament agree on? Surprisingly, the continuous veto on North Macedonia’s EU ascension talks which was expected to be solved as the leaders of “We Continue the Change” repeatedly said that they want a different and more inclusive approach to the country based on shared business interests rather than shared history debates.

However, on January 10, a nearly six-hour meeting between the recently re-elected President Rumen Radev and all the party leaders, ended in a buzzkill press conference on which Radev said that Bulgaria isn’t ready to lift its objections to North Macedonia starting accession talks with the European Union, and called for more negotiations. “Our approval of North Macedonia starting EU accession talks should not be tied to deadlines but with reaching realistic goals, including the recognition of the Bulgarian minority in the country”, Radev said to local media.

Radev’s hard tone to Skopje contrasted Petkov’s previous enthusiastic rhetoric for future collaborations. This also raised questions whether Petkov, whose entrance into politics came via Radev’s appointment of the 2021 interim cabinet, will be at odds with the President in the near future. Shortly after the briefing, it became known that the Chairperson of the Parliament has tested positive for COVID-19. This effectively put Bulgaria’s ruling elite in quarantine and raised questions whether Petkov’s visit in Skopje will be possible.

Why North Macedonia’s ascension to the EU remains a controversial topic

The crossfires between Bulgaria and North Macedonia over historical facts, reclaiming national heroes and shared past seem to be going on for a while. But at least, up until recently, in Bulgaria the topic on whether Macedonian identity is authentic seemed to have been dying out in the media space. That is, before the previous government of GERB and United Patriots reignited the debate by deciding to veto Albania and North Macedonia’s accession to EU talks in 2020.

While focus on Albania remains scarce, the veto on North Macedonia is about Skopje not keeping up with the 2017 bilateral agreement recognizing a shared history.

The discussions on the sensitive identity issue quickly overshadowed the cabinet’s other controversies, at least for a short while, and appeared as a power move for the nationalist-minded voters. The move was widely interpreted and criticized as a nationalistic act undermining EU’s values and enlargement, especially in light of Bulgaria’s own unresolved problem with being the EU’s poorer and most corrupt member. And in Macedonia, the recognition of the Bulgarian minority is interpreted as a way for Bulgaria to make Macedonian society assume a pseudo-Bulgarian identity.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that there is no decision that will appease everyone: Petkov’s softening tone to Skopje might result in losing trust from conservative-minded voters (according to a Gallup International research from December, some 71.1 of the Bulgarians are against any step back from the hardline politics towards North Macedonia).

The strategic first international visit by Petkov was with Greece’s Kyriakos Mitsotakis

Petkov’s visit to Skopje is his second meeting with a Balkan leader since he assumed his position as a Prime Minister. The first one was with Greece’s Kyriakos Mitsotakis on December 20 in Sofia where the two talked about finally completing the gas interconnector between the two countries after a 12-year delay. The link is expected to solve Bulgaria’s dependency on Russia in obtaining natural gas.

Although Bulgaria signed a contract for the transfer of 1 billion cubic meters of gas per year from Azerbaijan in 2009, that agreement never became effective – such a transfer requires the use of the link between Greece and Bulgaria and the project was continuously delayed during the years GERB dominated the local politics.

On January 16, Bulgargaz, the country’s main natural gas distribution company, stated that the current estimates are that the interconnector is to be finished by July 16. Last Sunday, Petkov said during a radio interview that there is an ongoing investigation on Bulgargaz and the lack of progress in finally obtaining the lower price Azeri gas.

Gas prices have gone through a 30 per cent increase since January 1.

Defense Minister fearing increased NATO presence in Romania and Bulgaria will escalate tensions

Since the new coalition stepped in the parliament, there was also a third storyline related to Bulgaria’s foreign policy developments. Little before Christmas, former interim PM and currently Defense Minister Stephan Yanev, said via his personal social media that the deployment of more NATO troops in Bulgaria and Romania in light of Russia’s recent moves holds risks.

"I do not believe that the necessary circumstances that can justify a decision related to the deployment of additional troops on our territory have been met. Such a decision would correspond neither to the union interests nor to the national interest of Bulgaria”, said Yanev, also a former Defense expert to Radev, who has been linked to indirect but alleged pro-Kremlin views and recently called Crimea a Russian territory, a statement for which he eventually apologiesed. Yanev’s statements raised some eyebrows as they were interpreted as severely misjudging Russia’s influence in the region and possible invasion in Ukraine. PM Petkov so far has only commented that discussions over increased NATO presence in the region are only impeding and no immediate decisions have been made.

The first half of 2022, which will either see further stalemate or new agreement with Skopje, will be the real test ground on whether Bulgaria has any potential to be what Petkov promised on his first day as an PM: “a really different place in four years’ time”.

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Svetoslav Todorov

Svetoslav Todorov




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  • One month since the new ruling coalition of four parties, formerly in opposition, assumed power in Bulgaria, hesitant steps dominate over fast reforms. The majority, centered around the recent winning party of political newcomers and former interim ministers “We Continue the Change”, is giving mixed signals on how efficiently “the change” can be carried out.
  • What then can the new parliament agree on? Surprisingly, the continuous veto on North Macedonia’s EU ascension talks which was expected to be solved as the leaders of “We Continue the Change” repeatedly said that they want a different and more inclusive approach to the country based on shared business interests rather than shared history debates.
  • The veto on North Macedonia is about Skopje not keeping up with the 2017 bilateral agreement recognizing a shared history. The discussions on the sensitive identity issue quickly overshadowed the cabinet’s other controversies, at least for a short while, and appeared as a power move for the nationalist-minded voters. The move was widely interpreted and criticized as a nationalistic act undermining EU’s values and enlargement, especially in light of Bulgaria’s own unresolved problem with being the EU’s poorer and most corrupt member. And in Macedonia, the recognition of the Bulgarian minority is interpreted as a way for Bulgaria to make Macedonian society assume a pseudo-Bulgarian identity.
  • Although Bulgaria signed a contract for the transfer of 1 billion cubic meters of gas per year from Azerbaijan in 2009, that agreement never became effective – such a transfer requires the use of the link between Greece and Bulgaria and the project was continuously delayed during the years GERB dominated the local politics.
  • Since the new coalition stepped in the parliament, there was also a third storyline related to Bulgaria’s foreign policy developments. Little before Christmas, former interim PM and currently Defense Minister Stephan Yanev, said via his personal social media that the deployment of more NATO troops in Bulgaria and Romania in light of Russia’s recent moves holds risks.
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