Although 60% of Ukrainians continue to trust President Volodymyr Zelensky in the context of the war, more and more can no longer imagine him at the head of the state in peacetime. Polls show a society united around national defense, but one that seems increasingly ready for a generational change in politics. While confidence in the current leader remains significant, expectations for the future are increasingly shifting toward the idea of renewal—a Ukraine led by a new elite, formed in the trenches, in local administrations, and in civic networks, which is already emerging as a moral force in the postwar period.
Zelensky symbolizes resistance, not the political future
According to a survey conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in early October 2025, 60% of citizens say they trust President Volodymyr Zelensky, while 35% say the opposite. Only 11% believe that elections should be held before the end of the war – a clear sign of the legitimacy of the current leadership. These figures contradict the false narratives spread by Moscow, according to which support for Zelensky has collapsed and society wants elections. Ukrainians accept that, given the state of war, it is impossible to hold elections even if the usual term of office has been exceeded.
However, the figures change when it comes to the post-conflict period. 41% of respondents believe that Zelensky should remain in politics after the war, but 36% believe that he should retire completely. 14% even call for him to be prosecuted.
Former President Petro Poroshenko is no longer seen as an alternative either. Forty-six percent of Ukrainians believe he should withdraw from public life, and almost half of respondents say they no longer see either Zelensky or Poroshenko—the two presidents Ukrainians elected after Maidan and before Russia's large-scale invasion—in politics.
Sociologist Anton Hrushetsky emphasizes that there is a clear expectation for renewal. "Most citizens are not calling for political blood, but only for a dignified withdrawal. It is a civilized approach, typical of a democratic society that is learning to manage change without revenge," he explains. Ukrainians want neither the collapse of the current power nor the return of the old opposition, but the emergence of a new elite.
Russia – the absolute enemy. Ukraine does not accept territorial concessions
While the domestic political scene is increasingly dynamic, the negative attitude towards Russia remains categorical. 91% of Ukrainians say they have a negative opinion of Russia. Hostility is widespread – from 92% in the west to 80% in the east – a sign of rare national cohesion after more than three years of war. Research shows that this perception has strengthened in response to the Russian aggression, not as a cause of it, contradicting the Kremlin's thesis that the invasion was a response to Ukrainian "Russophobia."
More than half of Ukrainians categorically reject any territorial concessions, and two-thirds do not accept formal recognition of the occupied regions. Even in the event of a decline in external support, the majority would prefer to continue the resistance. More than 70% of respondents believe that the war should be continued even without US assistance, relying on European support and their own resources. Unity around the rejection of any territorial concessions explains the absence of internal pressure for a peace imposed by Moscow, which the Kremlin refuses to understand.
A two-speed society: "We live normally amid the abnormal"
Vitaliy Kim, governor of the Mykolaiv Regional Military Administration, describes a profound shift in the mood of society: after more than three years of large-scale war, Ukrainians have moved from a phase of "adrenaline" to one of "acceptance." People are asking less and less "when will the war end" and are focusing on the present, trying to live normally amid the abnormal. "We are living through the war by entertaining ourselves—with karaoke, concerts, restaurants," Kim told Glavkom, suggesting that the initial energy of resistance has been replaced by a routine of survival and a need for economic stability, not emotional promises.
He observes a growing difference between the frontline regions, where life is reduced to survival, and the more sheltered cities, where the focus is on resuming daily activities—services, entertainment, consumption, support for the army. This internal divide reflects the psychological fatigue of a society living at two speeds. At the same time, Kim warns of the risk of "politicizing the military" and urges the military not to enter the political arena before the war is over—a call to maintain the balance between civil and military authority.
For Kim, adaptation does not mean indifference, but rationalization. The intensity and pace of this confrontation, coupled with the support of Western partners, have made it possible to avoid economic collapse. Ukrainians are no longer asking for "painkillers," but for clear information about what they can do today, says the governor. In Mykolaiv, for example, the decline in civilian casualties after 2023, despite intensified bombing, shows a collective adaptation to danger. At the same time, society seems increasingly weary, living between acceptance of war and exhaustion.
"The war can only end in Moscow"
For media expert Oleksiy Kovzhun, the war in Ukraine cannot end with a political compromise. "If this confrontation does not end in Moscow, it means that it has not ended at all," he says, warning that a "freeze" of the war would only be a dangerous pause, meant to give Russia time to regroup. Kovzhun rejects the idea of a fragile peace and emphasizes the imperial nature of Russia’s aggression, which turns the occupation of territories into a mechanism for fueling the war.
Domestically, Kovzhun observes a society that has matured under the pressure of conflict. Whereas Ukrainians once looked to the West as a model of the "normal world," today they see themselves as "the adults in the room" — the ones setting the moral and political tone in a world in crisis. This transformation, says Kovzhun, is the most important consequence of the war: Ukraine is no longer just a geopolitical actor, but "a laboratory of democratic resistance." Instead of waiting for a providential leader, society demands functional institutions, accountability, and leaders capable of managing reconstruction and security. For Kovzhun, Ukraine's real victory will not be military, but civilizational—the moment when the country proves that it can "defeat the empire within its own conscience."
What will the "post-Zelensky" period look like?
Amidst fatigue and a desire for renewal, the Ukrainian press is talking about the emergence of a new generation of leaders (mayors, military personnel, volunteers, activists) who have made a name for themselves during the invasion. Anton Hrushetsky told KIIS that "in the heat of war, a new Ukrainian elite is being forged, made up of people who have demonstrated efficiency and courage. Citizens are aware of this transformation and are ready to give them the chance to prove themselves politically after the war."
Publications such as Ukrainska Pravda and NV are already writing about the potential leaders of the future: local commanders, former governors, or volunteers who have gained public trust through their actions during the crisis, not through speeches. In the west, south, and center, many mayors have established themselves as pragmatic leaders, capable of managing crises, attracting funds, and maintaining community cohesion during Russian attacks. These people could become the core of a "post-Zelensky" Ukraine.
Ukraine at a crossroads
Ukraine is at a historic turning point: still at war, but already in the process of redefining its identity. At the same time, the country is undergoing a broad process of European integration. The front remains open, and behind it, society is seeking a new balance, while the political environment is knocking on the door of the European Union. From this point of view, "victory" no longer means the liberation of territories for Ukrainians, but the survival of the state model. Trust in the old elites is eroding, even in the context of a war of attrition.
The survey responses indicate a high degree of realism. Approximately three-quarters of respondents support a European peace plan that would freeze the current front line without legal recognition of lost territories, but with firm security guarantees and a European perspective. About 30% would consider such a solution a "victory," and 18% a "defeat," suggesting a painful but pragmatic acceptance.
Behind these figures lies a society that is weary, but more skeptical of heroic rhetoric and more aware of the costs of war. Ukraine is no longer animated by the excitement of the beginning, but by a calculated resistance, in which hope coexists with pragmatism. Ukraine's future depends on society's ability to transform resistance into political maturity—the true guarantee of its security.
