Ukraine will collapse within a few days, losses on the front will cause Russians to revolt against Putin, Russia and NATO will end up in a nuclear war—these are some of the scenarios that have been considered in the four years since the launch of the large-scale invasion. These "prophecies," even if they have not come true, have marked the conflict and the behavior of the various players directly or indirectly involved in it and can provide benchmarks for understanding the present and clues for future developments.
1. The Russian "blitzkrieg" did not lead to Ukraine's rapid surrender
Before February 24, 2022, many military and political assessments were based on the idea that Ukraine would not be able to resist a large-scale Russian invasion. There were estimates in the Western media that Kyiv would fall within a few days. Fox News, for example, reported that US officials were discussing scenarios in which the Ukrainian capital could be conquered within 72 hours. However, this rapid surrender did not happen. The Ukrainian state did not dissolve, the armed forces resisted, and Kyiv was not occupied.
In the early days of the war, it seemed that Putin's dream of a blitzkrieg had a chance of success. However, the Russian army got bogged down near Kyiv and was then forced to retreat. In the following year, Ukraine even managed to launch successful counter-offensives, liberating even more Russian-occupied territories. Subsequently, however, the war turned into a war of attrition, and losses on the front lines increased exponentially, especially for the Russians, who to this day have been paying a heavy price for every square meter they’ve managed to conquer. A recent study by the well-known American think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) pointed out that, after four years of war, the number of dead and wounded is approaching two million , including 1.2 million Russians and 500,000 to 600,000 Ukrainians. Of these, at least 325,000 Russians and between 100,000 and 140,000 Ukrainians have been killed, while the rest have been wounded, captured, or are missing.
Instead of an immediate collapse, Ukraine entered into a protracted war that radically altered the parameters of the conflict. The resistance of the Ukrainian army blocked the scenario of a Russian victory achieved at minimal cost, which would have rapidly reconfigured the regional security architecture. Had Kyiv fallen in the early days, the war would likely have ended sooner, with a much more destabilizing strategic outcome for Europe.
2. Ukraine's political leadership did not flee the country
In the early days of the invasion, one of the big unknowns was the fate of Ukraine's leadership. The international press reported on the possibility of President Volodymyr Zelensky being evacuated, including an offer from the US to get him out of Kyiv. The Washington Post later analyzed Zelensky's famous reply, which became a political symbol of the moment: "I need ammunition, not a ride" [out of Ukraine]."
The evacuation did not take place. Zelensky and the core of the government remained in Kyiv, in a city under bombardment and threatened with encirclement. The decision had enormous political significance: not only did it prevent a power vacuum, but it also sent a message to society and external partners that the state was continuing to function. If this leadership had gone into exile, the war would have taken a different turn, with increased risks of administrative disorganization and the establishment of a regime imposed by Moscow. The fact that this scenario did not occur was one of the conditions that made long-term Western support possible.
3. Ukraine did not experience economic collapse
In 2022, economic forecasts for Ukraine were deeply pessimistic. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank warned that the economy could contract by up to 45%, depending on how the war unfolded. International news agencies reported on the risk of widespread economic collapse.
Although the Ukrainian economy experienced one of the most severe contractions in its history, collapse did not occur. The state continued to function through consistent external financial support, budgetary adjustments, maintaining a minimum level of economic activity, and reconfiguring trade routes. Subsequently, World Bank data even indicated a partial recovery of the economy.
However, during these years, Ukraine's dependence on external support deepened. If the state had defaulted, the conflict would most likely have been pushed much earlier towards a negotiated solution, on terms unfavorable to Kyiv, with the risk of capitulation.
4. Society's morale did not collapse as a result of Russian bombing
One of the aims of Russia's strategy was to destroy Ukraine's energy infrastructure in order to break the will of the population. The international media described this tactic as an attempt to force Ukraine to surrender through cold, power outages, and psychological pressure.
This surrender did not happen. Although the winters were marked by extremely difficult living conditions — lack of water, heat, and electricity — there was no social breakdown that would push the state toward capitulation or generate massive protests against the authorities.
The fact that pressure on the population did not produce the surrender Russia had expected disproved one of the central assumptions of psychological warfare. However, the price was high: social exhaustion, migration, economic losses, and constant pressure on public services. If society had surrendered, the conflict would have quickly shifted from the military to the level of capitulation.
5. No anti-war revolt has broken out in Russia
Since the invasion began, many analysts have suggested that mounting human losses would generate internal opposition to the Kremlin. There was even an expectation that the mothers and wives of the killed soldiers would become a vector of public discontent as coffins returned from Ukraine and the human cost of the war became increasingly visible in Russia.
However, a massive, potentially destabilizing revolt did not occur. A large-scale internal movement could have shortened the duration of the war, but at the risk of an unpredictable political crisis in a nuclear-armed state.
6. Putin's regime did not collapse under the weight of sanctions
During these years of war, Western sanctions were frequently presented as a tool capable of quickly causing the collapse of the Russian economy. IMF estimates pointed to a severe contraction, and the idea that the Kremlin regime could be seriously weakened was circulating in the public sphere.
This collapse did not happen. The Russian economy partially adapted by reorienting exports, increasing internal control, and circumventing sanctions, and the regime remained functional. Gradually, the Western strategy shifted from expecting a rapid economic shock to a logic of long-term economic erosion . If the sanctions had led to a rapid collapse, Russia's ability to sustain the war would have been drastically reduced.
7. Russia did not resort to nuclear weapons
In 2022, the risk of nuclear escalation became a central element of international debates. Moscow's threats, blackmail, and strategic ambiguity fueled fears about the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons.
Fortunately, this escalation did not occur. Despite repeated threats from Russian propagandists and regime figures (the most vocal of whom is still former president/prime minister Dmitry Medvedev, whose rhetoric often borders on the ridiculous, but even Vladimir Putin has spoken of this possibility on several occasions), the war remained conventional. However, the fact that the Russians did not resort to their nuclear arsenal was not the result of a single factor: it reflected both constant pressure from the West and signals from China, which conveyed that this would be a so-called red line. At the same time, Moscow had its own calculations: resorting to nuclear weapons would have permanently compromised any form of international credibility, including in its relations with the countries of the Global South and especially with China, on which it has become increasingly dependent economically.
On the other hand, the nuclear threat had an effect: it contributed to the caution of Western administrations, which calibrated their military support for Ukraine precisely to avoid crossing certain thresholds. Thus, fear of what did not happen decisively influenced what happened later, turning the conflict into a protracted war, managed under the sign of nuclear red lines.
8. Western and transatlantic unity did not collapse
Against the backdrop of the energy crisis, inflation, and rising political costs, there were fears that the war in Ukraine would quickly destroy Western unity and accentuate internal divisions. At the end of 2022, Reuters was already observing signs of fatigue within the EU regarding sanctions.
However, the great rupture did not occur. Despite differences in priorities, Western solidarity and the transatlantic relationship were maintained. The sanctions regime continued, and political coordination between European capitals and Washington remained functional.
If the West had visibly divided, Ukraine would have been forced to accept surrender, and Russia would have achieved a major strategic victory at little cost.
It was only after Trump's arrival at the White House that signs of repositioning began to appear within the West. However, these developments are not a direct consequence of Russia's actions, but the result of political dynamics that existed even before the war.
9. NATO did not directly enter the war on Ukraine's side
In the first weeks of the invasion, the prospect of direct NATO involvement was intensely discussed, particularly through the idea of establishing a no-fly zone over Ukraine. However, the Alliance rejected this option, citing the risk of direct conflict with Russia.
There was also concern that NATO could be drawn into the war not on its own initiative, but through an uncontrolled escalation: attacks affecting the Alliance's infrastructure, territory, or military equipment. The scenario in which the collapse of Ukraine would have forced NATO into a direct confrontation with Russia was not ruled out, but this has not happened either.
NATO support has remained indirect (arms deliveries, training, intelligence, and logistical support). The fact that direct confrontation was avoided limited the risk of global escalation. At the same time, the conflict was prolonged, gradually turning into a war of attrition.
10. The war was not quickly "frozen" by an agreement
In the early months of the invasion, there were assessments that the war could be quickly "frozen" by means of a negotiated agreement . Scenarios circulated about an early peace that would have enshrined Russia's territorial gains and ended active hostilities. No such agreement was reached. Although there were direct talks between Ukrainian and Russian delegations, including in Istanbul, they did not result in a formula acceptable to both sides. The war was not transformed into a "frozen" conflict.
If an agreement had been reached in 2022, the war would have ended sooner, but at the cost of legitimizing aggression and chronic instability in the wider Black Sea region. The fact that this scenario did not occur prolonged the armed conflict, but prevented it from becoming a dangerous precedent in which the use of force would have been rewarded territorially.
What unfulfilled prophecies teach us
The reality on the ground can always upset the plans, expectations, and scenarios that various actors in the field are considering. Mike Tyson's famous quip, "everybody has a plan until they get punched in the face," was widely quoted when the Russians' plan to quickly defeat Ukraine failed.
It is clear that some of the scenarios mentioned above are out of the question at this point. However, nuclear escalation, weakening Western solidarity, or the spread of the conflict continue to exist as latent risks, present in the political and military calculations of all the players involved.
Unfulfilled prophecies provide landmarks for understanding the present and clues for future developments. The war in Ukraine is, in this sense, a story of tested limits—a story in which restraint has mattered almost as much as action, and in which the avoidance of irreversible scenarios has paradoxically allowed a more limited conflict to continue for four years. In this war, what did not happen was often as decisive as what did happen.
