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The self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic ceased to exist in September 2023 following a two-days blitz Azeri military operation. The enclave, which had been one of the epicenters of tension in the South Caucasus for several decades, returned under Baku’s control, albeit with a major cost. Virtually the whole Armenian population fled to Armenia, which had been supporting Nagorno-Karabakh for decades and fought two wars over it with Azerbaijan. This was the first case of territorial integrity restoration in the post-Soviet space. Veridica spoke with Georgian expert and former Minister of Reconciliation and Civil Equality, Paata Zakareishvili, a scholar in conflictology, about how the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh could affect Georgia, what the emergence of a new player – Turkey – in the region means, and what opportunities arise for Tbilisi, Yerevan, and Baku in light of Moscow's weakened position.
Turkey’s return to South Caucasus just as Russia was abandoning Armenia was instrumental in changing the region’s power balance
VERIDICA: Without a doubt, Azerbaijan's victory in Nagorno-Karabakh will have an impact on Georgia, but it now depends on how much this influence is accepted by Georgian authorities. Are they ready to embrace this new reality that has been created in Karabakh?
PAATA ZAKAREISHVILI: This new reality actually emerged in 2020 when Turkey, for the first time in 100 years, returned to the South Caucasus through Azerbaijan—culturally, linguistically, religiously, and so on. The Turkish factor as a security factor was clearly perceived by Russia. Russia understood that for the last 100 years, it had been the only elephant in the room in the South Caucasus, but now there is a second elephant. Russia has signaled that it sees all of this and, consequently, began to change and adjust its relationship with Armenia. Moreover, it started to consider the interests of Azerbaijan more to avoid being completely sidelined in the Caucasus. In essence, Russia abandoned its ally Armenia and ceased its support. It is only now that Armenia is beginning to understand what Russia has been doing since 2016, when there was an escalation of the conflict in the south after a long hiatus, and Azerbaijan gained the advantage and took certain strategic heights. Russia calmed Armenia down at that time, and it was the first signal, but unfortunately, Armenia did not see it. Only now is it clear what Russia has been doing.
VERIDICA: What does Turkey's Presence in the South Caucasus mean for Georgia?
PAATA ZAKAREISHVILI: Turkey is a NATO member, and Georgia has declared its intention to join NATO in the future, even enshrining it in its constitution. Azerbaijan did not signal any NATO aspirations and nothing suggests it plans to do that in the future. Despite this, Azerbaijan has more security agreements with Turkey than Georgia does. I believe that Georgia should acknowledge this new reality and start leveraging Turkish support as a security guarantor, join the agreements that have been signed and agreed upon between Turkey and Azerbaijan, and also become a part of these agreements.
It is false and entirely incorrect when Georgian authorities, represented by the "Georgian Dream", claim that they are left alone to face Russia and are forced to pursue a policy of concessions to Moscow, as we are witnessing now. NATO interests stand behind Georgia, which are being pursued, including by one of the most powerful NATO members, Turkey. Turkey is the only neighboring country that has signed a border agreement with Georgia, and they acknowledge Georgia's territorial integrity not just in words but also in actions. Turkey is a very reliable neighbor, and most importantly, it has its interests not in Georgia but specifically in the context of Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea, and Central Asia.
Meanwhile, the Georgian government is trying to distance itself from Turkey in the context of security and politics. From an economic standpoint, we cooperate, especially in terms of potentially bypassing Russian sanctions through our countries.
A chance for the Southern Balkans to move beyond the conflicts that have been plaguing the region for decades
VERIDICA: What could Azerbaijan's Victory mean for Georgia?
PAATA ZAKAREISHVILI: For Russia, it is undoubtedly a worst-case scenario if Georgia starts to align with Turkey, similar to Azerbaijan. However, what Azerbaijan did was to use Turkey as a security guarantor as it was getting more aggressive towards Armenia and Karabakh. The question of how they chose to act is debatable, and I believe this issue could have been resolved peacefully. But Georgia should take a different path. First, we should consider Turkey as an ally, and secondly, the European Union. We must clearly convey to our fellow citizens, the ethnic Abkhaz and Ossetians living today in the occupied territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, that we will never resort to armed solutions. We should assure them that there is a European Union monitoring mission between us. I think this would be a very clear signal to the Abkhaz and Ossetians that Georgia harbors no aggressive intentions and wants to resolve the conflict exclusively through peaceful means.
The similarity with Azerbaijan is that we should ally with Turkey, but the difference is that we should solely seek a peaceful resolution to our conflict. I believe that we can achieve more effective reconciliation, considering the interests of the Abkhaz and Ossetian sides.
VERIDICA: Would the new political realities in the South Caucasus determine the EU to favor Armenia over Georgia?
PAATA ZAKAREISHVILI: If we talk about how the West has recently started to look towards Armenia and might now prefer Yerevan, especially in the context of anti-Western statements from the "Georgian Dream," it's still a matter of debate. Armenia is more vulnerable to Russia; its economy is directly dependent on Russia, Russian troops are stationed there, and there is a powerful Russian base in Gyumri, which is legitimate. Russian troops are present on Georgian territory as well, but they are stationed illegally in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. If Armenia wants to join the West, it needs to address these issues and question the presence of Russian troops on its territory. Georgia has more advantages over Armenia in terms of the EU, especially as we await candidate status.
However, Georgia should also constantly remind the international community that the presence of Russian military bases on its territory is illegitimate. In the fifth point of the peace agreement signed on August 12, 2008, it was stated that Russia would take on the obligation to withdraw its troops from Georgian territory. Russia has not fulfilled this point to this day. This issue should be constantly addressed, but Georgian authorities only remember it on August 8th, the anniversary of the war.
Nevertheless, if Yerevan begins a gradual movement towards the West now and also requests candidate status for NATO membership, it would be beneficial for the entire region. This would also be interesting in the context of the Turkish-Armenian conflict. If Armenia now distances itself from Russia and leans towards the West, it could significantly impact the situation in the South Caucasus. Many new options for finally resolving conflicts in the South Caucasus would emerge. For the first time in centuries in the South Caucasus, three countries—Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan—would be able to determine their own fate without the presence of outside empires, such as the Ottoman, Persian, and Russian empires. Especially now, when Russia's position in the region has noticeably weakened due to the Ukraine war, Tbilisi, Yerevan, and Baku have many unique opportunities in this context.
