Donate
The announcement that Ursula von der Leyen will seek a second term at the helm of the European Commission has relaunched the debate about the Green Deal, more specifically the set of environmental policies that constituted the main line of action requested by EU states from von der Leyen’s first term in office, which is expected to end concurrently with the European Parliament election of June 6-9. Supporters of environmental policies believe the Deal will endure. Opponents of the Green Deal underscore its failure and expect an eventual “cancellation”, whatever that means. What’s the source of these grievances and to what extent is the European Union wavering in this respect? How “green” is Europe's future?
Centrist parties have started to relativize the discussion about the Green Deal
The Green Deal has been frowned upon more or less openly amidst political circles in Brussels since it was first brought up for discussion on December 13, 2019, on the sidelines of a European Council meeting. Prior to 2024, Europe's “ruling coalition”, made up of the popular centrists (EPP), socialists (PES) and those from Renew/ALDE, has refrained from voicing criticism of the Deal out in the open. The criticism has started to appear, however, either toned down or veiled.
On January 18, Politico.eu published a report on a draft political initiative of the European People's Party, whereby, in addition to a series of measures related to strengthening the EU’s military capabilities and securing its borders, the party argues in favor of waiving the decommissioning of petrol or diesel engines starting 2035, as stipulated by the Green Deal. The offer is sweetened with a vague expression of commitment, emphatically based on “innovative concepts and marketing tools”. However, the media has underlined the lack of any consistent chapter on environmental policies in the EPP document.
A few days later, on January 24, another draft, this time of a manifesto put forward by the Party of European Socialists (PES), was published by Euractiv.com. The document expressed its principled support for the Green Deal, but with a key undertone: a “Social Green Deal”, mainly focused on workers' rights and obviously social policies.
The two documents make up the electoral platforms for the European Parliament election and therefore the official positions major European parties will have to build on in the period ahead, from the negotiation and investiture of the next European Commission, to its political mandate and specific measures. In addition, political pundits not just in Brussels, but everywhere else are well aware that draft documents elaborated by major parties usually don’t reach the press by themselves or by coincidence, especially when we’re referring to publications monitoring political developments, like the two mentioned above.
Regarding the manifesto made public by the third party in the “European ruling coalition”, Renew, I wasn’t able to find much information. It seems to firmly support the Green Deal, but, paradoxically, Renew's godfather, Emmanuel Macron, called for a "regulatory break" regarding the Green Deal as early as May 2023. Interpreted in the context of the French president’s “rightward shift” due to political turmoil at home, the option still includes the key term “regulatory” (pertaining to legislation), to which I will refer later.
Farmers’ “anti-Ukrainian” protests are actually closely tied to the Green Deal
Broadly speaking, the explanation is fairly easy to grasp: risks arising from the Green Deal have started to materialize. And this is happening in a way everyone can see, as farmers all over Europe have started protesting since the start of 2024. It’s a very interesting case of accidentally (or mostly accidentally) diverting public attention: the protests have been perceived by the media and society in general as primarily criticizing Europe’s relationship with Ukraine and grain imports, through which the Western world tries to keep this country’s economy afloat. And yet, underneath this causal connection we can notice a long series of demands that have to do with the Green Deal. However unclear the outcome of the conflict in Ukraine may be, the second causal link is a phenomenon that will extend over a longer period of time, as the European Union's environmental goals stretch to 2030-2050.
The mechanism by means of which the war close to Romania’s borders affects European agriculture is pretty straightforward: Ukrainian grain enters Europe at low prices via the so-called “solidarity lanes”, distorting the European agricultural market and impoverishing farmers in EU member states. The Green Deal, on the other hand, runs deep in the countless grievances voiced by farmers, from chemical fertilizers, potentially toxic and energy-consuming, to fuel prices, which include the “tax” on pollution.
Even in Romania, where farmers' protests unfolded concurrently with demonstrations staged by transporters, we can find similar grievances and demands. Farmers complain about the high energy costs associated with irrigation or want exemptions from GAEC norms (restrictive EU agricultural environmental standards), although their demands cover quite a large spectrum of issues.
Cities, roads and borders blocked in many European capitals, from Portugal to the Netherlands, paint a political (and electoral, in 2024) reality that cannot be ignored, which is now underpinning even the fundamental documents of major European parties. It will all make for a heated public debate, both before and beyond the European Parliament election of June 2024.
The “Fit for 55” emissions-curbing project: too ambitious a legislative package?
In July 2021, the European Commission launched a comprehensive legislative package, bearing a name that’s hard to translate: “Fit for 55”, which has now become an inside joke amidst political circles in Brussels. At its core, the project seeks to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 55% by 2030. The source of amusement is that it roughly translates as “ready for 55” or “55 and strong”, which conjures the image of someone who’s past his prime, who sweats away the hours at the gym. It’s an image disturbingly similar to that of Europe in the current geopolitical context. The problem with that package isn’t just the name, though. The legislative expression of environmental policies contained in the Green Deal, Fit for 55 includes hundreds of pages of legislation on 13 major chapters, such as renewable energy, emission reduction or energy efficiency. This requires an explanation for part of our readers: the main source of policies (i.e. actual measures) at European Union level is the European Commission, which more often than not passes these measures through legislative initiatives, which are usually very technical. In such cases, the traditional starting point is an initial agreement between the Commission and member states, and ultimately the item of legislation is approved through various European procedures, jointly with the European Council and Parliament.
Fit for 55 was enthusiastically promoted by the European Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, and was entrusted (either as a political hot potato or a “cookie”, depending on how you look at it) to Frans Timmermans, a Dutch Socialist (Labor Party) and First Vice-President of the Commission in charge with the Green Deal. So far, nothing out of the ordinary: Brussels' “green” ambitions stem from its “science-based governance”. With the exception of conspiracy theorists or venal denialists (producers of polluting energy and associated politicians), global warming and its destructive effects are very hard to dispute and must be acknowledged by the European Union, especially since EU countries are among the 196 signatories of the Paris Agreement, which aims to keep global warming below 2° Celsius compared to pre-industrial levels. But while goals of this kind are more difficult to contest, the strategy by means of which they can be achieved is subject to lengthy discussions. The launch of Fit for 55 has left part of the political circles in Brussels baffled by its huge scope and its propensity for exhaustiveness. The advocates of Fit for 55 say the Commission intended the package to be impactful, an expression of its political will. And what's more, it proves that the Commission was mindful of every detail the green transition entails. Its opponents say that setting out to legislate (and ultimately make the rules) in so many areas at once could lead to inconsistencies and generate negative effects that might have been prevented with a more gradual or topical approach.
I don’t think it’s a stretch to see a link with the “regulatory break” called by Emmanuel Macron. But, of course, it also boils down to the other politicians’ selfish care for their own political reputation.
The problem is when science turns into ideology
We clearly can’t argue with the fact that the president of the European Commission, who is at the center of communication for the current mandate, wanted the launch of Fit for 55 to make an impact. Von der Leyen’s excuse, however, is that this kind of impact does not only boost her own reputation, but can rally an entire continent behind a necessary transition through political decision-makers and informed media. Otherwise, reconciling the humongous legislative package with its gradual implementation remains a dilemma that’s very hard to solve in itself. Things become clearer when we strike a semantic balance between “politics” and “policy”, a difference much discussed in Brussels. Whereas “politics” has the familiar connotations of generality and even politicking, “policies” refer to concrete, sectoral strategies aimed at accomplishing more general objectives. The question that arises is to what extent has Fit for 55 shifted from “policies” to “politics”? In other words, has the project been imbued with an ideological character, pertaining to beliefs and propaganda, instead of expert opinions and what we’ve termed science-based governance?
The green transition has been called a “transformative” experience for Europe. And mutations of such magnitude also come with inevitable negative effects. The question is whether, by ideologising this transition, the European Commission made inceptual mistakes that could have been avoided. In retrospect, it's easy for us to fit all the negative consequences here. But it is equally true that, for instance, in every country in Eastern Europe, the post-communist transition spelled a period of collapse of the local industries and of sharp economic shrinking, regardless of the decisions of local political leaders. That doesn't mean the Green Deal risks wreaking the same havoc. It sooner means that some inevitable transformations depend less on policies and political will rather than on the general course of history or objective circumstances.
In less developed EU countries, such as Romania, imposing the Green Deal may ramp up Euroscepticism
Romania is struggling with two types of problems with regard to the Green Deal. The first concerns the low rate of absorbing European funds, which is ultimately owed to a lower degree of responsiveness to European political imperatives. It’s not just incompetence and corruption, but also an objective gap compared to the development and needs of Western countries. Whereas the state of our railway infrastructure is appalling, in advanced countries it works like clockwork. The authorities, however, are more concerned with its digitization or green transport alternatives, such as hydrogen-powered locomotives. It’s not that the National Recovery and Resilience Plan doesn’t specify such projects. As highways have started being developed in Romania, they will bring benefits. The problem is they could have been much bigger.
The second problem has to do with poverty, to put it bluntly. Let’s take one convincing example: the cheapest electric car on Automarket is Dacia Spring, priced at 20,800 EUR. The popular Logan model, running on gas, costs 13,500 EUR. The price difference is much more taxing for a Romanian than, for instance, for a Belgian. You can easily imagine the social and political effects of rising fuel prices, heating bills or other price hikes driven by economic chain reactions. European countries with lower living standards will be more affected by the Green Deal. It is here that Euroscepticism poses a bigger threat.
Environmental policies will be mitigated, not abandoned
All estimates regarding the upcoming European legislature confirm the possibility that the EPP-PSE-Renew coalition will be restored. Right now, centrist parties in Europe have adopted more conservative positions on environmental issues compared to 2020, also because that’s what European voters want (and will continue to press for), and because, in tactical terms, a “greener” approach would create more maneuverability for right-wing radicals in the ID and ECR groups. That does not mean, however, that the Green Deal will be discarded. Over the top or not, Fit for 55 has pushed Europe's politics and economy towards a point where a return to a “zero moment” like the one before 2019 would be unthinkable. In addition, if we look at Emmanuel Macron's “rightward shift”, we’ll notice the campaign for the European Parliament has already begun, and politicians' statements on the Green Deal must be interpreted in this key. In other words, the EPP may not go all the way to keep the combustion engine running in the coming term, just as PES’s “social green” policies may be more or less vehement.
Beyond all that, the 2020-2024 European legislature has pushed things beyond a point of no-return. The future Green Deal, version 3.0 (2.0 has already been announced or at least so inaugurated, in the cryptic and baroque fashion of EU political communication) will include mitigations and case-by-case changes, whereas the negative effects will be taken under advisement. But let's not forget that, in its current form, the Green Deal survived the COVID crisis and the war in Ukraine. “From green dove to military hawk”, is how Politico summarizes Ursula von der Leyen's transformative journey, a pun on two birds where the former is a symbol of peace, while the latter alludes to political leaders who favor aggressive policies, in its American usage. Most certainly, the future European Commission will have to deal with Russian aggression, migration and border security, right-wing extremism and the EU's so-called strategic autonomy, a broader concept defining the EU’s military response capacity. Nevertheless, environmental policies will remain essential.
