Another turbulent year for Georgia was marked by protests, deepening political polarization and growing criticism from Western allies. As the country heads into 2026, it is likely to see further authoritarian moves from the ruling Georgian Dream; at the same time, resistance to the government and the protest movement are not likely to go anywhere.
In an interview with Veridica, the founder of the Europe-Georgia Institute (EGI), Giorgi Melashvili, explores the key trends that defined 2025 and assesses their implications for the future of Georgian society, opposition movements, and Euro-Atlantic integration.
VERIDICA: What were the main political trends in Georgia in 2025, and how might they influence the coming year?
GIORGI MELASHVILI: There were two main trends, or themes, in Georgian politics in 2025. On the one hand, we witnessed at work the “frenzied printing press” of authoritarianism, with the Georgian Dream adopting more and more absolutely repressive, draconian laws that are not only unnecessary for anyone, but are also harming the structure of the Georgian society and are by their nature undemocratic. In addition, they push Georgia even further away from the European Union. This is the first theme: the Georgian Dream, which is trying to consolidate authoritarianism, but they are not doing it very well.
On the other hand, the second main theme is the protest movement that hasn’t gone anywhere and that continues. Despite the fact that from time to time the number of people participating in the daily protests on Rustaveli Avenue changes, the protest movement itself hasn’t disappeared — it is still there.
In addition, the number of protest voters, people who do not accept the Georgian Dream and its authoritarianism, is growing. And with these undemocratic, absolutely repressive laws, the Georgian Dream only helps society better understand what it really is. The dispersal of demonstrators, the use of chemical substances, and so on — all of this also shows the Georgian society who we are really dealing with.
Both of these themes, a move towards authoritarianism and protest and resistance against that authoritarianism are likely to be seen in 2026 as well.
Internal Struggles within the Georgian Dream
VERIDICA: Within the Georgian Dream, the year was marked by clan wars and loud corruption scandals against their own. What do these tendencies indicate?
GIORGI MELASHVILI: The Georgian Dream is not a political party in the strict sense of this word. It is the project of one specific person, of one authoritarian leader. Everything that is happening is a fight for the fur coat from the baron’s shoulder. We see attempts by different clans within the Georgian Dream to gain more access to financial resources and power, as well as attempts to retain power in the face of rapidly shrinking electoral support.
Now there are two main clans. The first is conventionally the Kobakhidze clan, the so-called new Georgian Dream, a comparatively younger generation. Many of these people did not participate in the events of 2012, but many of them were previously even part of the United National Movement. This is the clan that now holds almost all the power and is closest to Ivanishvili.
At the same time there is the second clan — the Garibashvili clan, people who were active in 2012, when the Georgian Dream came to power and who for a long time were the main support of the regime.
What we are seeing is, on the one hand, a battle between two clans, and on the other hand, a revision of the social contract between the Georgian Dream and its electorate. That is why all these events are so painful for the authorities. Because besides the clan struggle, which occurs in any authoritarian regime, there is also a revision of the social contract that existed before.
Anti-Western Rhetoric and Foreign Policy Setbacks
VERIDICA: What other significant accents in the Georgian Dream’s politics in 2025 can be highlighted?
GIORGI MELASHVILI: Undoubtedly, anti-Western tones. Because this noise with which the Georgian Dream tries to drown out all important topics is constantly increasing. They, like Vladimir Putin and the Russian authorities, get lost in their own propaganda and begin to believe in the nonsense that propaganda uses to justify their own actions.
Therefore, the anti-Western rhetoric that Georgian Dream used before has significantly intensified in 2025. In addition, there have been prerequisites that Georgian Dream will attempt to strengthen propaganda about Georgia’s neutrality, which is a suicidal step. At the same time, there were attempts to establish relations with Moscow, which, however, have not succeeded.
From the point of view of international relations, the Georgian Dream had fiasco after fiasco. In January, they promised to improve relations with the new U.S. administration. A year has passed, but the main foreign policy achievement has become a cap that Donald Trump gave to the Georgian ambassador.
There were hopes for rapprochement with Brussels through Orbán, which also did not come true — relations with the EU have only worsened.
Attempts by the Georgian Dream to get closer to Russia also failed: the Kremlin is not even ready for symbolic flirtation regarding the occupied regions, which is understandable given their situation in Ukraine.
The only direction where Georgian Dream is still trying to do something is China, but from the Chinese side there is no particular interest yet, and the more Georgian Dream worsens relations with the West, the less interest China will have in doing anything in Georgia.
So this is a paradoxical situation when relations with China directly depend on relations with the West. Because Georgia’s main function is a transit function. A transit function needs two points: a starting point and an ending point. And if China, without a doubt, is the starting point, then the ending point here is not quite clear given how much the Georgian Dream has spoiled relations with the West.
Added to all this is the geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus. First of all, this is the so-called southern branch of the central corridor. This is the so-called TRIPP, also known as the Zangezur corridor. In addition, Pashinyan recently appealed to the Russian Federation with a request to restore railway communication between Armenia and Azerbaijan. And all this, as a result, in the medium and long term, can completely change the geopolitics of the Caucasus and create serious competition with the northern branch, which now passes through Georgia and whose main competitive advantage was supposed to be the port in the city of Anaklia. But Georgian Dream also failed that port.
So this geopolitical and diplomatic situation is in an extremely problematic state for the Georgian Dream.
The Future of the Opposition and the Protest Movement
VERIDICA: What was this year like for the Georgian opposition, considering that most pro-Western opposition leaders are currently imprisoned? And does the Georgian opposition have a future?
GIORGI MELASHVILI: The year for the Georgian opposition was both very bad and very good. On the one hand, the Tsulukiani Commission (the Temporary Parliamentary Investigative Commission of Georgian Dream, tasked with studying the period of the United National Movement’s rule from 2003–2012, chaired by Georgian Dream Vice-Speaker Thea Tsulukiani) played a very negative role: opposition leaders were arrested on absolutely contrived and unconstitutional pretexts.
This entire commission absolutely contradicts the Constitution of Georgia, because by law most members of the commission should have been representatives of the opposition. The fact that the Georgian Dream appointed five or six people from its own ranks who became quasi-pseudo-opposition and thus formally fulfilled this requirement of course does not constitute compliance with either the spirit or the letter of the law. Therefore, this entire commission, by its very nature, is illegitimate.
On the other hand, despite the fact that opposition leaders were arrested, we see and very clearly observe that the opposition spectrum in Georgia is expanding, and the number of people who are opposed to the Georgian Dream is also growing.
And undoubtedly, from this point of view, the year was by no means the worst for the opposition, because we observe growing disappointment, including among former supporters of the Georgian Dream. Partly this was achieved by the Georgian Dream itself when Irakli Garibashvili (former Prime Minister of Georgia), Grigol Liluashvili (former head of the State Security Service of Georgia) and Juansher Burchuladze (former Minister of Defense of Georgia) were arrested, thereby shattering many propagandistic myths about how “good” the Georgian Dream is.
Added to this was the BBC investigation and also absolutely inhumane dispersals of demonstrators on Rustaveli Avenue. As a result, we obtained an increased protest electorate, which may not always be actively present on Rustaveli, but nevertheless it is absolutely clear to anyone in Georgia that the Georgian Dream is a minority. A rather loud, and noisy one, but still a minority.
VERIDICA: Protests have continued in Georgia for more than a year. How do you see their future and what could they lead to next year?
GIORGI MELASHVILI: The protests will certainly continue. We already see that the protest movement adapts to those draconian laws that were adopted, and this does not happen to the detriment of the protests.
We observe that the protest movement also learns from its own mistakes. For example, Saturday marches gather many more people than daily protests, from which society, objectively speaking, is quite tired. But as soon as large actions, large marches are announced, we see that the population actively participates in all of it.
The main problem in 2025 and, probably, at least partly in the future, is that the protest movement has not been converted into a political process. On the one hand, this is understandable, because what political process can we talk about under authoritarianism. But on the other hand, given that the Georgian Dream could not create a Belarus-type authoritarianism in Georgia, and there are still political mechanisms that may be used, this is also not the smartest strategy. Therefore, it will be good if in 2026 the opposition can also use political instruments.
Euro-Atlantic Integration: Challenges and Prospects
VERIDICA: How realistic is the course towards Euro-Atlantic integration for Georgia, given the continued deterioration of relations with Western partners?
GIORGI MELASHVILI: Under Georgian Dream, of course, this is a very distant prospect, if not completely impossible. But if Georgian Dream either loses the elections or completely changes its rhetoric and its policy, then the European Union now becomes a geopolitical player. The European Union’s interest was very accurately documented: Georgia remains a candidate country for EU membership. Therefore, if in Tbilisi there is finally a government that thinks about Georgia’s national interests, then in that case, of course, eurointegration is only a matter of time, because until now Georgia was the leader of the associated trio of Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova. And this potential still exists.
The problem is that the Georgian Dream has created so many problems that solving these problems will take additional time. So today we are very behind, but so far the potential to make up lost time still exists.
VERIDICA: Obviously the Georgian Dream placed great hopes this year on a reset of relations with the US after Donald Trump’s election victory. Have these expectations been met?
GIORGI MELASHVILI: No, they have not been met. I have already noted that the main foreign policy achievement of Georgian Dream is the cap that Donald Trump gave to the Georgian ambassador.
And if we are serious, then the only thing that Georgian Dream managed to achieve at the cost of huge lobbying in the United States is that the so-called Megobari Act was not adopted by an accelerated procedure, and now it will either be adopted by the ordinary procedure or this will stretch out for a very long time. This was the only foreign policy achievement of the Georgian Dream. Which, by the way, is not an achievement for Georgia. It is exclusively a party goal that they have more or less managed to achieve.
On the other hand, the Georgian Dream continues to be isolated by the Euro-Atlantic community. While both Pashinyan and Aliyev managed to establish relations with the new administration in Washington, and the Georgian Dream failed to do so. And this contrast is very visible when Kobakhidze goes to Ashgabat, while Pashinyan and Aliyev are constantly in Washington.
In addition, the Georgian Dream had hopes that ideological synchronization with the Trump administration would occur. But it is obvious that this also is not happening, because the Georgian Dream very actively violates the red lines that the new US administration has drawn not only in relation to Georgia but also in relation to the European Union. This is the ban on parties, which JD Vance very clearly noted is unacceptable for the United States of America. This is the attempt to tie the Georgian population and not allow it to freely express its opinion, laws against media, attempts, at least rhetorically so far, to fine people for posts on Facebook, and so on.
These are all, of course, red lines for the new administration, and Georgian Dream very actively violates these red lines. Therefore, to speak about them somehow establishing relations with the US is, of course, completely unrealistic, unrealistic and even, I would say, inadequate.
VERIDICA: Georgia remains an EU candidate country, although as EU Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos noted, that status has become nominal. Relations with the EU and the US have been reduced to a minimum. Some European countries and the United States have imposed sanctions on individual Georgian officials, and contacts with representatives of the authorities have been reduced to a minimum. How do you assess how effective these steps by the West are?
GIORGI MELASHVILI: Brussels has not introduced any centralized sanctions because there is Hungary, which blocked all attempts by the European Union to introduce sanctions against specific representatives of the Georgian Dream. Specific countries such as Germany, the Baltic states and so on have, of course, introduced individual sanctions, but at the same time, prior to the adoption of the new mechanism of visa liberalization suspension, the European Union did not take any serious steps regarding sanctions.
Now the situation is changing, they have adopted a new mechanism that allows suspending the effects of visa liberalization for certain groups of the population, and this suspension, of course, will be far more painful for Georgian Dream.
Until now Dream together with their main sponsor Orbán actively used institutional mechanisms of the European Union, for example, the fact that decisions in the EU are made by consensus, meaning the agreement of all member states of the bloc is necessary, and Hungary very actively abused this consensus mechanism because it was Hungary that blocked all attempts at sanctions against the Georgian Dream.
Now, with the new mechanism for suspension of visa liberalization for certain groups announced, Hungary has far fewer opportunities to help their partners in Tbilisi. In addition, Orbán himself has certain problems, primarily his own elections, and the fact that his rating has fallen significantly. And therefore, I think that in April we will already observe a slightly different situation in the European Union and in relations between the European Union and Georgia, because this is the period when elections will be held in Hungary, and there are certain indications that it will be very difficult for Orbán to win those elections.
VERIDICA: How do you see the beginning of next year for Georgia?
GIORGI MELASHVILI: The Georgian Dream will continue to stamp out democratic laws and try to choke the protest, civil society and free media. On the other hand, what gives me hope is that the protest also continues, and it has not gone anywhere.
The Georgian Dream is not able to increase its electoral base, so they are hysterically trying to find new topics, whether it is food prices, the fight against corruption, or anything else. But they are not doing very well. They are so used to operating in abstract notions of a global party, war, deep state, and other conspiracy nonsense that they now find it very difficult to switch to real problems. And as is known, propaganda clichés have a certain inflation: they lose their power, and now the Georgian Dream is actively trying to come up with something new to at least retain its remaining electoral base.
