Friday, February 6, 2026 Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya had a busy day – a couple of meetings with representatives of the Belarusian diaspora in Warsaw and an on air interview to Belsat TV. Officially, that was the first day of her office operating from Warsaw, while she had landed in the capital of Poland two days earlier.
“I just want to say: don't view my personal move to Warsaw as a break with Lithuania. On the contrary, this is a country to which I am very grateful… Lithuania played a huge role in our resistance. Lithuania submitted documents to the International Criminal Court. Lithuania changed the law to give Belarusians the opportunity, for example, to obtain documents for three years. They are very loyal to Belarusians,” – Tsikhanouskaya said.
Is Russia trying to drive a wedge between Lithuanians and Belarusian exiles?
Although it definitely shouldn’t be considered a break, it looks like a result of an obvious cooldown in relations between Lithuanian officials and Belarusian civil society. While Vilnius is really doing a lot to put pressure on the Lukashenko regime on the international arena as well as in bilateral relations, the inner policy at the moment couldn’t be described as extremely welcoming for many Belarusians, who had to flee their Motherland after 2020 protests and ongoing repressions.
Thus, only in 2025, Lithuanian authorities deemed 1,634 Belarusians as a threat to national security, which is almost three times more than a year earlier. 391 of them were denied their first temporary residence permit, 1,023 had their permits not renewed, and another 214 existing temporary residence permits were revoked. There were also some decisions to deny and revoke permanent residence permits.
Usually the Lithuanian authorities don’t voice the reasons for such decisions, but it is already known that some people were recognised as a threat to national security for previously working in the Belarusian state institutions or being the conscripts in the Armed Forces of Belarus (not depending on the term and period of service). This was the case of Vasil Vieramiejčyk, formerly a fighter of the Kastus Kalinouski regiment within the Armed Forces of Ukraine, who came to Lithuania in September 2022. He was refused a residence permit because he previously served in the Armed Forces of Belarus in 2009-2016. As a result, he moved to Vietnam, where he got arrested and then handed over to the Lukashenko regime enforcement agencies in November 2024. A year later he was sentenced to 13 years in prison. His wife and daughter are still living in Lithuania.
Lithuania’s hardening towards (some) Belarusians may be partly connected to quarrels about history. For example, in Lithuanian media and social networks since 2022 there are disseminated fears of “litvinismas” – a term and theory artificially created by local marginalised historic circles. According to this theory, Belarusians want to reclaim Vilnius and the region as traditionally Belarusian territories. Although you won’t find such territorial claims in any modern Belarusian politicians’ statements, some Lithuanian politicians and civil activists tend to bring this narrative to the agenda. Coincidentally, such messages are constantly disseminated by bot accounts in social networks in Belarusian, Lithuanian and Russian languages, while there are also provocations, when Lithuanian monuments are damaged with graffiti in Belarusian language with mistakes. Which looks like an organised Russian operation against both the local Belarusian diaspora and the integrity of Lithuanian society in whole. Taking into consideration the changes in the policies and attitude towards Belarusians in Lithuania, the operation is working out.
Tsikhanouskaya left after her security level was downgraded. Some businesses are welcoming the departure, as they eye better relations with Belarus
However, the main reason for Tsikhanouskaya’s move was the security issue. In October 2025, the Lithuanian media LRT reported that the level of Tsikhanouskaya's security was reduced. Since 2020, Tsikhanouskaya has had 24-hour security in Lithuania and abroad in accordance with the status of a category C official guest – one provided for foreign ambassadors and representatives of international organizations. According to the report, from November 2025, the security level was downgraded, and the State Security Service, which had protected Tsikhanouskaya up to that point, was replaced by the Criminal Police Bureau. At the same time, LRT explained that the Lithuanian state had spent approximately €1 million annually on the Belarusian democratic leader’s security, transportation, residence, and VIP terminals at airports.
“I thought I'd be returning home from Vilnius, which is just 30 km from the Belarusian border. But our level of security in Lithuania has changed. It's not just about my personal safety, but also that of our office employees. This forced me to seek alternative solutions and reorganize our operations” – Sviatlana told in her interview to a Polish newspaper Rzeczpospolita in January 2026.
Of course, this situation couldn’t have been omitted by the Russian propaganda – massive troll attacks on all news about Belarusian democratic forces in Lithuania were aiming at disseminating the narrative of “ordinary Lithuanians being angry at budget costs spent on useless foreign opposition politicians”. At the same time the narrative about Tsikhanouskaya’s being the reason for hybrid aggression of the Lukashenko regime towards Lithuania has been actively supported by bot accounts in social networks. According to these messages, without supporting Belarusian democratic forces Lithuania would have been on good terms with Minsk, which could have brought a lot of profits for the local economy and “ordinary Lithuanians who are tired from Brussels’ ruling their country”.
There are concerns that some of the Lithuanian political forces would like to go for a sort of “reconciliation” with the Lukashenko regime. The main issue for Minsk is the access to the Klaipeda port for exporting potash fertilizers as well as other goods. Already in autumn 2025 Lukashenko openly asked Lithuania about this in return for 1,000 trucks of Lithuanian companies, blocked by the regime enforcement agencies in Belarus.
Against this background, there are several large Lithuania-based big businesses, directly interested in restoration of the transit lines with Belarus. At the moment one can’t see the change of the official position of Vilnius towards the Lukashenko regime, but there are voices stating that it can become different under the alleged pressure of the American administration seeking for the peace in the region with the use of dialogue with the dictator in Minsk. The head of Lithuanian Foreign Ministry Kęstutis Budrys on February 11, 2026 said that the attitude to the regimes in Minsk and Moscow will remain the same: “We must implement the sanctions package in full. America has reserves, and Europe has reserves. We still have something to do. Therefore, there are no changes in policy and position on this issue”.
Between Warsaw and Vilnius
However, the departure of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya doesn’t mean the complete relocation of her office from Vilnius. “Part of the office will operate in Warsaw. However, the main, international team will remain in Vilnius for the time being, because we have diplomatic accreditation in Vilnius, processes are established in Vilnius, there is interaction with the Lithuanian authorities. Therefore, it is not about moving, but rather about reformatting the work of the office as a structure” – Franak Viačorka, Thikhanouskaya’s lead advisor told the media.
At the moment the leader of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus is getting to know the Polish political landscape and the activities of the local Belarusian diaspora, holding meetings and taking part in events throughout the country. First of all, the security issue has been resolved: “I will feel very safe. The level of security is the same as it was before in Vilnius” – Sviatlana explained to Belsat TV. Another thing to mention, that unlike Lithuania, the political agenda in Poland is generally more positive towards Belarusians and tough towards the Lukashenko regime. One can state that the pressure on the official Minsk is one of the few issues that all the mainstream political forces in Warsaw do have the consensus on.
