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The names floated for the incoming Trump administration suggest that the greater Middle East will remain a focus for Washington. An attention that Iran and Turkey do not like.
Energy resources, the great stake of the greater Middle East. Pacifying the region, a strategic goal
The extended area of the Middle East stretches from the land and sea space of Cyprus and the eastern Mediterranean to Iran and the Gulf of Oman in the east, and in the south to Yemen and the Gulf of Aden. From the European perspective, analyzes of developments in this region inevitably start from the Eastern Mediterranean and from the particularly important position of Cyprus. Natural gas and oil reserves in the eastern Mediterranean Sea are very large. Prospects made by Noble Energy in 2010 and validated by the US Geological Survey (USGS) indicated exploitable quantities in the area of more than 6,000 billion cubic meters (mmc) of natural gas and more than 7 billion barrels of oil. It would be enough for decades of capitalization by the states of the region and Europe, at least during the transition to the green economy.
Most of the Eastern Mediterranean reserves have been located in the territorial waters of Egypt, which has built and now operates two large liquefied natural gas (LNG) platforms at Idku and Damietta. These are also the only such facilities in the entire region. Rich fields, especially in natural gas, have already been identified in the territorial waters of Israel (approx. 1,000 billion cubic meters), which already exports LNG through the two Egyptian platforms. Gaza, Syria, Lebanon and Cyprus are the other states or entities with ownership rights to the rest of the reserves, but for various reasons have not started their exploitation yet. The most serious of the reasons is, of course, the war and the damaged relations between some states in the area.
Given its proximity, but also its high energy needs, the European Union has the potential to be the most reliable and serious customer for such wealth, all the more so as it has been forced to reduce and even eliminate its dependence on Russia (and Iran). The problem is that although numerous liquefaction/gasification platforms have come on stream in recent years in Greece, Croatia, Italy, France and Spain, liquefied gas is still more expensive than the gas carried through pipelines, although it allows access to suppliers anywhere in the world.
At present, the annual consumption in the EU is lower compared to previous years, between 250 and 300 billion cubic meters. More than 80% is provided by pipeline imports from Norway, Algeria, Libya, and Azerbaijan, as well as LNG from the US, the Persian Gulf and other suppliers. LNG imports accounted for more than 40% of the total gas purchased by the EU in 2023. Consumption tends to decrease amid global warming and the transition to a green economy, combined with geopolitical events, but some resources, such as natural gas, are less harmful than coal or oil and could remain an important transitional source of energy. That is why the Eastern Mediterranean reserves are not at all negligible, both for the countries in the area and for the EU. The Union and its partners, especially the USA, must support the resolution of conflicts in the wider Middle East area in order to make possible (1) the clarification of property rights and (2) the efficient exploitation of those resources through cooperation projects. However, the situation remains complicated due to three main factors: Iran's aggressiveness, Russia's involvement, and Turkey's rather unclear regional policy. This is also the context in which Donald Trump returns to the White House.
Iran, seen as a major obstacle to stability in the Middle East, will face a more hostile administration in Washington
The most recent successes in pacifying the greater Middle East are related to the first Trump administration, through the Abraham Accords initiated in 2020. In exchange for advantages provided and/or guaranteed by Washington, the Arab states that signed the agreements committed to recognizing Israel's sovereignty and normalizing diplomatic relations with that state. While Egypt and Jordan had already recognized the independent state of Israel in 1979 and 1994, respectively, the Abraham Accords have so far been signed by the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco. As highlighted in a previous article on Veridica , the Biden administration continued the Trump initiative and was preparing the momentum of the process: the normalization of Israel's relations with Saudi Arabia. Until the Gaza war broke out, an agreement between the two days was thought to be a matter of weeks, but the brutality of that war, added to by the one in Gaza, make that impossible now. If it doesn't happen by the end of the year — which is highly unlikely — Trump will take over the process from there.
The outline of the White House team suggests that the US will not treat the Middle East lightly at all. With a now Republican-dominated Congress, the Florida Republican senators Marco Rubio and Michael Waltz are likely to fill the positions of secretary of state and national security adviser, respectively. Rubio is a conservative politician known for his tough stance on authoritarian regimes in general. Waltz has more than two decades of active duty in the United States Army Special Forces, known as the Green Berets. He has been decorated four times and is a career-long veteran of the war in Afghanistan, serving as part of the forces sent by Washington to various hot spots in the Middle East and Africa. Both Rubio and Waltz are known for their consistently tough approaches to China, Iran, Russia and other authoritarian regimes.
Iran remains, in fact, the biggest regional issue both for Israel and especially for the Sunni Muslim states in the region. And as if Iran supporting the terrorists Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen, not to mention the significant aid given to Putin in Ukraine, were not enough, recently, US intelligence has also identified Iran behind a series of plots to assassinate Donald Trump.. It seems, therefore, that we are witnessing a desperate attempt by Tehran to cause instability at global level, beyond the greater Middle East.
Contrary to the expectations of some, it is rather likely that the Trump 2 term will bring more substantial and even more coherent engagement in the greater Middle East. The transactionalism that Trump displayed even during his first term as president could be more accentuated, doubled by a more categorical classification of White House adversaries and partners. Those who will support Trump in his initiatives, designed most likely in favor of Israel, will be admitted to the table where the advantages are shared. Adversaries, such as Iran and its allies in Lebanon and Gaza, will face the consequences.
Biden's lack of time gives the future tenant of the White House a historic chance to crown the peace process with an Israel-Saudi Arabia-USA tripartite agreement. Of course, the agreement will be designed against Iran, but with an emphasis on specific aspects of maximum interest for Saudi Arabia, faced with a significant fiscal deficit: limiting the Tehran regime's oil exports, especially to China.
Between Erdoğan's 'art of the bazaar' and Trump's 'art of the deal': why the next US administration might be less patient with Turkey
There is one more detail that should not escape observers of developments in the greater Middle East. Rubio and Waltz have also been highly critical of the Erdoğan-AKP regime in Turkey, the US's old NATO ally in the region. Over time, both politicians have come out strongly not only against that regime's authoritarianism, but also against its policies in Iraq and Syria, where Turkish troops occupy vast territories and fight against the US's Kurdish allies. Waltz, in particular, as a former Green Beret, best understood and consistently supported cooperation on the Syrian front between the US troops and the Kurdish YPG militia, which the Turkish military continues to hunt as an existential enemy. Also, Israel's new foreign minister, Gideon Saar, has recently said that his country should work closely, for its own security interests, with the Kurds, whom he called Israel’s “natural ally” in the region. Such collaboration, much to the liking of the new administration in Washington, would be perceived as a real threat by the Turks.
Against this background, we shouldn’t forget Trump’s public humiliation during Erdoğan’s latest visit to the White House, in November 2019, that is exactly 5 years ago. Then, dozens of protesters, chanting against the Turkish leader on the esplanade in front of the US president's residence, were beaten by members of the Turkish security element right before the eyes of American authorities and journalists. It was after all Erdoğan's very last visit to the White House; Joe Biden met with him only on the occasion of meetings of the heads of states of NATO or under the auspices of the UN, and always far from Washington. After the episode of November 2019 and with Rubio and Waltz on the team, it is rather likely that during the new presidential term the Turkish president will still be ignored. Then, although both presidents are known for their transactional approach, there is still a big difference between what Nektaria Stamouli calls in Katimerini the "art of the deal" (Trump) and the "art of the bazaar" (Erdoğan).
This time, with a much tougher transactional administration in Washington, Turkey may be limited to bazaar arrangements like the ones its ruling regime made with Iran during Obama's time at the White House (gold for oil ). Ankara's support for Hamas will also undermine the Erdoğan regime's position vis-à-vis a Trump administration that, we already know, will unabashedly support Israel. I believe, based on the data so far, that the American support for the Kurdish forces in Syria will also continue, which is the Turks’ biggest nightmare, as for them patriotism has meant, for generations, a deep anti-Kurdish, anti-Greek, anti-Armenian and anti-Western nationalism.
Adding to all this is the mirage of hydrocarbons in the eastern Mediterranean and, in this context, the US policy towards Cyprus. Due to geography, the island is the only EU territory left outside the European energy network. The exploitation of the gas resources discovered in its waters is prevented by Turkey, which for some time has been insisting on the formula of two states on the island and undermines whenever it has the opportunity the solution of a single federal state, already a member of the European Union.
The support for the northern territory has recently received a new boost at the meeting of heads of state in the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). The organization accepted the participation, even without a formal status, of Ersin Tatar, the president of the internationally unrecognized state entity of Northern Cyprus. Western protests, especially the very strong one by the European Union's External Action Service, received an equally harsh response from the Turks . At stake, of course, is the control over the gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean: if the Turks are excluded from this game, then they do everything so that no one can enjoy it. However, Cyprus is making great efforts in parallel, supported by the European Union, by Greece and also by the US for the building of the Great Sea Interconnector, which would supply electricity from Israel to Cyprus, then Crete and mainland Greece, thus linking the island to the EU's common electricity market and facilitating two-way energy transfers between the Union and the Eastern Mediterranean. And Israel supports all these efforts because it is directly interested in selling energy on this route, along with Egypt and other states in the area, when the normalization of relations will also allow the clarification of property rights. In this context, it is quite possible that the Trump administration will take up another Biden initiative, granting Cyprus the status of "major non-NATO ally", which does not require the approval of all the members (where Turkey has the power of veto).
It is very interesting to see how the Ankara regime will proceed. There are many regional cases in which it will have to and should yield. If it doesn't, it may have a lot more to lose than it already has. The two leaders, Turkish and American, know each other very well and do not have much time at their disposal: they will quickly go all the way to get what they want, and the cases where the interests of the two sides do not coincide are now quite a lot. In conclusion, I don't think there are too many who are happy about Donald Trump's electoral victory, neither in Tehran, nor in the ranks of Hamas and Hezbollah, nor in Ankara.
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