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Veridica.md
To many, the South Caucasus is too remote and complicated, with too many conflicts to merit serious analytical effort. Of course, such a judgment is totally wrong. The region is not only an extremely interesting topic, but also an important factor in developments on a wider, even global scale. Its strategic position requires important analytical exercises on logistics corridors, stability/instability and local and global interests. It should be considered that Iran is the neighbor of this region to the south, Russia is the neighbor to the north, Turkey to the southwest, and the boundaries to the east and west are the Caspian Sea (i.e. Asia) and the Black Sea (i.e. "the West").
For the European Union, the area ensures the connection with Asia through the Black Sea and the Romanian, Bulgarian and Georgian ports. For China and other Asian economies, it is the direct route to the European common market. Now, due to the threat of Houthi rebels in Yemen, it also represents a more expensive but safe alternative to the conventional sea route via Bab el-Mandeb, the Red Sea and Suez. Any complication in the South Caucasus can lead, as it has happened so many times before, to long-term destabilizing processes giving headaches to many players involved. This is also the case now, when the prospect of a peace treaty ending the age-old conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia is shaking things up to levels incomprehensible to those unfamiliar with developments there.
Recently, there’s been more talk about the possibility of an institutionalized form of regional cooperation, even about the establishment of a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) type of structure with the participation of the three countries from the South Caucasus. After all, such a structure has been tested before and worked by relinquishing national sovereign authority over some resources (coal and steel in the case of the ECSC, starting in 1952). Gradually, it all led to the common market and all the other supranational arrangements that make up the European Union today. Why would such a model not be successful in the South Caucasus? The answer is invariably the destabilizing factor par excellence called Russia. Or, more precisely, the imperialist dream of Moscow, which always triggers the reactions of its rivals in the area, Turkey and Iran.
But Russia did not fulfill the promises made in the last decades and abandoned Armenia when, in 2020, that country should have resisted the Azeri offensive with the Russians’ support. Disappointed, the Armenians recognized the defeat, but also the end of relations with Moscow, which thus lost the only ally in the region outside of the separatist entities on the territory of Georgia. Now, Yerevan and Baku are negotiating the peace treaty, with both sides firm on their own terms and conditions. The atmosphere around this process is sometimes tense and many observers are pessimistic, believing that certain conditions will never be met. For example, the Azerbaijanis insist that the Armenians delete from their constitution provisions that could lead to a new conflict. I have read the entire text of the constitution and found nothing that could represent a casus beli. Maybe it’s not Baku, but another player that is insisting on those changes.
Indeed, many of the conditions are actually imposed by the two sides' powerful allies, notably Iran (on Armenia's side) and Turkey (on Azerbaijan's side). The Zangezur Corridor, for example, strongly demanded by Baku and Ankara, is actually more important for Turkey's connection to Asia via Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea. More important even than for Azerbaijan. Armenia does not want to give in, always retorting that a corridor on its territory would violate its sovereignty and territorial integrity, but it does not (yet) advance alternative solutions either.
For example, it could propose that Turkish and Azeri carriers operate on road and rail routes between Azerbaijan and Turkey, being exposed to fewer controls and paying lower taxes on the territory of Armenia. Such an arrangement could even represent the basis of a regional agreement, which would also include Georgia, thus highlighting the region's strategic position on the Middle Corridor between China and Europe. Who knows, maybe this could be a first step towards a Caucasian Community that expands over time to other policies.
But it seems increasingly clear that any such arrangement would run into explicit or implicit opposition from the neighboring powers. Iran misses no opportunity to protest when the Turkey-Azerbaijan link is discussed, fearing it would damage its own long-term connection with its Armenian ally through Georgia to the Black Sea. Russia traditionally opposes any initiative to which it is not a party, then uses any position gained to undermine regional projects. Turkey remains suspicious of everyone else, but continues to eye the markets of the Turkic states in Asia, as it has since the days of Turgut Özal, in the 1980s. It needs the corridor to Azerbaijan most, and would want it without having to pay much, which would mean an even more drastic reduction of Armenia's role in the region, perhaps even its exclusion from the scheme of Caucasian national sovereignties.
In general, the big problems arise when the "great powers" intervene, especially those in the extended Caucasus region. A telling example in this regard is the so-called 3+3 format, initiated by Turkey immediately after the end of the last Azerbaijani-Armenian war and which became operational only when Sergey Lavrov formally announced it , thus indicating the Kremlin's support. The 3+3 format brings together the three South Caucasus countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia), plus the three neighboring regional powers (Russia, Iran and Turkey). However, being an external initiative, it does not seem likely to lead to important results. Despite the explicitly pro-Russian and anti-Western stance of its current government, Georgia has had no diplomatic relations with Russia after the 2008 conflict, because of which it lost 20% of its territory (South Ossetia/Tskhinvali and Abkhazia), still occupied by Kremlin troops.
To avoid complications, Georgia stated at the outset that it would not participate and has not sent representatives to any of the three 3+3 meetings so far. Armenia, for its part, has not restored diplomatic relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, having closed borders with the two neighbors. And the government in Yerevan, led wisely enough by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, prefers direct dialogue with the counterparts in Baku and Ankara, including in connection with the completion of peace negotiations, which are already included in the so-called "Minsk group" under the aegis of the OSCE. Thus, the 3+3 format is not of much interest in Yerevan either. All this also makes Azerbaijan not attach much importance to the 3+3 platform. Therefore, its big problem, although not explicitly stated, is actually the support it receives from the neighboring powers, which arouses suspicion in the three countries of the South Caucasus. The fear, also unspoken, is that such a platform will only be a new opportunity for Iran, Turkey and especially Russia to put pressure on Armenians, Azeris and Georgians according to their interests.
Russia wants to impose its agenda by undermining global and regional stability
In Georgia, the party currently in power is called the Georgian Dream (GD), established by the oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, the one that let Georgia in the past 12 years either directly, as the Prime Minister, or from a more discrete role of gray eminence. The party enjoys Russia's explicit support both domestically and in foreign policy. Although President Salome Zourabichvili is a politician devoted to the country's European path, her office has limited powers and she can only veto the most important decisions of the pro-Russian executive. That will not be an insurmountable obstacle for the executive and Ivanishvili, who propagate precisely the Kremlin's pro-Russian and anti-Western messages. The goal, understood by almost everyone, is to manipulate the populations of South Ossetia (Tskhinvali) and Abkhazia in favor of Russian interests in Georgia and the South Caucasus.
The recent adoption, with the decisive votes of the GD, of the law on "secret agents", as well as the law that drastically limits the rights of the LGBT community, also leads in this direction. Inspired by similar legislation in Russia, both actually undermine the country's European integration. Thus, it is clear that the October 26 parliamentary elections are in fact an essential referendum for the future of the country. Although they are not listed in the polls as likely to win a supermajority needed to amend the constitution, the GD and Ivanishvili can hope to remain a decisive factor, precisely to continue manipulating the government in Tbilisi in the interests of Russia. This year, the executive and prime minister publicly launched another "project" inspired by Moscow. It is a plan for the reunification of Georgia, which is exactly the version supported by the Russians and will lead, if applied, to the loss of the state's sovereignty both in relation to the separatist regions and internationally.
As Diana Shanava explained for Veridica, the GD/Ivanishvili “reunification plan” and the so-called "restoration of territorial integrity" would actually mean enslaving the country to Moscow's interests, and this through the power it would grant to the two pro-Russian entities in the north of the country. In perfect harmony with the speeches coming from Moscow on this topic, the GD plan is rather reminiscent of the Kozak plan for the Republic of Moldova. Launched by Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dimitri Kozak in 2003 as a proposal for a definitive settlement of the Transnistrian conflict, that plan actually meant federalizing the Republic of Moldova and subordinating its policies, including foreign policy, to the veto power of Moscow-controlled Transnistria.
The Kozak plan did not survive, but the conflict remained "frozen" and the pro-Russian population of Transnistria and other regions of the country continue to represent a significant manipulation mass for the Kremlin's anti-Western policy at the local and regional level. This was seen quite clearly in the October 20 elections and referendum. The same scenario is at work in Georgia. Although most polls show that the Georgian Dream won’t be able to win enough votes to form the government and amend the constitution on its own, and the opposition could form a successful alliance, the GD will continue to be an important factor in Georgian politics as a promoter of Russia’s destabilizing interests.
Moscow has been building all this regional scaffolding on experience accumulated over time, both during the USSR and in the last 10-15 years. The professional experience of Vladimir Putin and other close members of his entourage also meant involvement in the Soviet and post-Soviet foreign policy precisely during these periods. The Soviet regime, just like the Putin regime is doing right now, carried out its foreign policy by massively exporting conflicts and weapons, as well as by blackmailing countries that depend on gas, oil and other raw materials from Russia. They get all of this in exchange for the Kremlin's influence over their respective governments.
We see this scheme at work in many parts of the world, from Africa to the Middle East. Only two military bases in Syria (Latakia and Tarsus) are enough for Russia to play its role in the relationship with Damascus and the other players. The military and political support given to Iran must be placed in the same context. The Kremlin relies in such cases on the experience gained in starting and maintaining the so-called frozen conflicts in Europe and the Caucasus, from the Republic of Moldova (frozen conflict in Transnistria) to the Republic of Georgia (frozen conflict in South Ossetia and Abkhazia). And its efforts continue in the direction of destabilization. These days we see the Kremlin extremely active in the electoral episodes in the Republic of Moldova, where its agencies and their methods of operation were exposed, but also in Georgia. There is already clear evidence of Russia's involvement in the presidential election for the Oval Office in the White House as well. We do not have such direct evidence from Romania, but there is still time until the elections.
All of this serves the simple and highly visible goal of Russian politics: to undermine global stability so that Russia can put forward and impose its own agenda in the international arena. The developments in the South Caucasus cannot unfold without Moscow’s assiduous involvement either, with negative effects for the countries there but also for the rest of the world, considering the importance of the region on the geostrategic map. The situation must be followed with utmost attention by all those involved in the analysis, design and execution of the foreign policies of all the players concerned. The warning issued by Kaja Kallas is very important in this context. It clearly shows who the enemy is and how they are behaving. If this will also mean a decisive change of attitude in Brussels, all EU member states must be able to respond accordingly. We already know, from the history of the last century, that enemies like the current ones rely precisely on our lack of reaction.
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