In March, Estonia once again made the news: social media groups dedicated to the non-existent “Narva People’s Republic” appeared, and a drone that had crossed from the eastern border crashed into a power plant near Narva.
Attempts to determine who and why sought to revive the specter of Russian separatism attracted perhaps even more interest outside Estonia than within it. In the public sphere, attention to the groups was drawn by the Propastop portal, specializing in countering propaganda.
The portal reported that groups with separatist symbols and politico-militaristic content had appeared on Telegram, TikTok, and VKontakte, portraying Narva as a political entity independent from Estonia. It also featured a telling screenshot illustrating the creators’ aspirations: “#WaitingForRussia. News from the most beautiful country on Earth.” At the same time, another goal was declared — namely, autonomy for Ida-Virumaa.
War or no war, lunch is on schedule
In essence, the group’s content concerned not only Narva itself but the northeastern region as a whole, with an emphasis on preserving Russian national identity. The information was presented in a humorous format, using memes and semi-anecdotal texts. For example, a posted daily schedule of the Narva militia suggested that within a few hours — interrupted by a lunch break — the region’s largest cities, Narva, Kohtla-Järve, and Sillamäe, would be taken.
At the time of Propastop’s publication, the groups had 60–70 users, with active posting beginning in February of this year. Parallels with eastern Ukraine were too obvious not to raise concern: in industrial Ida-Virumaa, the population is predominantly Russian-speaking and generally the least integrated into Estonian society (partly due to its ethnic composition).
There were also historical precedents: in 1993, shortly after the restoration of independence, an unauthorized referendum was held in Narva and Sillamäe on granting Narva national-cultural autonomy within the Republic of Estonia. Organizers claimed that turnout exceeded 50% and that an overwhelming majority supported autonomy. The authorities, however, cited lower figures, and the Supreme Court ultimately annulled the results.
After the issue was picked up by the country’s largest news portal Delfi, Prime Minister Kristen Michal was forced to comment on it at a press conference, hastening to reassure the public. The Internal Security Service stated that this was likely a Russian information operation aimed at sowing panic. “Such methods have been used before both in Estonia and in other countries. It is a simple and inexpensive way to unsettle and intimidate society,” a KaPo representative said.
A journalistic experiment showed that a representative of the “Narva People’s Republic” has a poor grasp of local realities, and that there is neither a real local political movement nor any significant funding behind it.
There were also critics of Propastop: for example, ERR journalist Indrek Kiisler stated that it is fighting windmills, and that the portal’s publication about drawings on social media attracted massive attention, increasing the number of subscribers of the “Narva People’s Republic” tenfold.
Despite the fact that the story was reported in foreign media (including, for example, Bild), it did not provoke any significant public reaction in Estonia. According to journalistic surveys, Narva residents themselves show no enthusiasm for autonomy. As for the alarming signals coming from such groups on social media, the local population has grown accustomed to them: the information war has been going on for years.
People fear drones more
Drones are a different matter. A Ukrainian drone that flew in from Russia on March 25 and crashed into the frequently malfunctioning Auvere power plant triggered a nervous reaction among the population. The state alert system, citing the Defence Forces, reported an air threat several hours after the drone had fallen, urging people to seek shelter. In another message, it was explained that “due to Russia’s aggressive war against Ukraine, there is a drone threat in the region.”
The government convened an emergency meeting, a crisis commission was assembled in Narva, and the population was told that the drone had gone off course. That same night, Russia was hit by one of the most massive Ukrainian attacks, including strikes on the neighboring Leningrad oblast, where the port of Ust-Luga caught fire.
Defence minister Hanno Pevkur stated at a press conference that the threat level had not increased, and that the drone should not have been shot down, among other reasons because falling debris could have given Russia grounds to claim an attack from Estonia.
Nevertheless, the incident raised many questions. Security expert Ilmar Raag noted that drones should be shot down even if it is an accident. “With a very high probability, something like this will happen again, even if a real war does not begin. It’s like snow that falls in winter,” he wrote. In the comments, fellow citizens complained that official messages had caused unnecessary panic: “It creates the impression that someone regrets that nothing serious is happening here.”
Perhaps the highest level of anxiety over the existing threat is observed among pro-Ukrainian political émigrés from Russia. For example, war correspondent Arkady Babchenko writes on Facebook that the question should now be framed not as “why Putin should attack the Baltics,” but “why Putin should not attack the Baltics.”
He concludes that there are no restraining factors: all sanctions have already been imposed, oil is no longer supplied to Europe, gas supplies have been reduced to minimal levels and are also planned to be phased out, and the Russian economy has been put on a war footing, so another war would not have a significant negative economic effect. The only factor restraining potential aggression against the Baltic states, in his view, is the difficulty of fighting on two fronts. But even here, he believes, Russia would have enough manpower and armored vehicles accumulated in the Leningrad Military District, whose use is dictated by military logic, since otherwise they would simply deteriorate.
“By starting a war, Russia risks nothing at all,” Babchenko argues. “It won’t be like with Tehran.” There will be no massive retaliatory missile strikes on Moscow simply because Russia has nuclear weapons. And in the event of success, Putin would gain not only the occupied territories of the Baltic states, but also a potential split within NATO.
However, these apocalyptic arguments do not sit well with the fact that Russia’s nuclear weapons have not been used despite regular Ukrainian drone strikes deep inside Russia, like those carried out on the night of March 25.
Estonia, meanwhile, remains on the periphery of this war, which is only occasionally reminded of by rare drone crashes, air raid drills, and strange groups on social media.
