The Russian aviation industry is facing an unprecedented crisis. Following the large-scale aggression against Ukraine in 2022, numerous sanctions were imposed on Russia, impacting almost every sector of the economy. However, their effects have been uneven. While debates continue among economists as to why Russia’s economy continues functioning and even demonstrating growth, some sectors have been significantly disrupted, with sanctions proving effective and difficult to circumvent. Aviation stands out as a prime example. Why have sanctions in this sector been so effective? What lessons can be drawn from this case when assessing the overall impact of restrictions on the Russian economy?
Air travel is crucial to keep the largest country in the world connected
A glance at the map is enough to grasp why aviation plays a crucial role for the Russian Federation. As the largest country in the world by land area, Russia’s accessibility and internal connectivity rely heavily on the development of its aviation sector. While road and rail transport can cover basic logistical needs, a modern economy—especially one aspiring to operate on the global stage—requires speed and rapid response to changing conditions. In this context, air travel remains irreplaceable.
Russia’s aviation history is marked by achievements in both civilian and military sectors. Dating back to the early 20th century, the industry has produced iconic aircraft, including the Tu-144, one of the world’s two supersonic passenger jets, developed as a counterpart to the Concorde. Similarly, the Antonov An-225, the largest cargo aircraft ever built, was a Soviet engineering marvel developed in Ukraine. Tragically, the An-225 was destroyed during the Russian offensive towards Kyiv in early 2022, symbolizing the conflict’s impact on aviation.
While the Soviet Union was among the leaders in both civilian and military aviation, the post-Soviet decades saw the Russian aviation industry struggle to maintain its former prestige. By the 2000s, the sector had integrated into global supply chains, developing aircraft using Western components such as engines, avionics, and composite materials. This collaboration offered hope for a revival of the civilian sector after the crisis of the 90s, with ambitions of mass-producing hundreds of aircraft annually to meet both domestic and export demand.
However, the sanctions imposed on Russia after February 2022 have effectively dismantled these aspirations. The toxicity of economic relations with Russia drove partners and investors away, and that forced the Russian government to revise its ambitious plans drastically. As a result, both transport and passenger aircraft production in Russia plummeted, with medium-term projections being continuously scaled back.
The crisis the Russian aviation industry faces can be best understood through the psychological stages of coping with difficult situations: denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance. Russia’s response to the aviation sanctions mirrors this framework closely, now reaching the final stages of realization.
Denial: Ignoring the Obvious
In the wake of the aviation sanctions imposed in 2022, the Russian government initially responded with a bold development plan for the domestic civilian aviation industry. This plan was devised during a period of inflated optimism when many in Russia believed that the economy had successfully “decoupled” from Western capitalism and could thrive independently using domestic resources.
At the time, Russia’s commercial aviation fleet consisted of 1,287 aircraft, including 1,101 passenger planes and 84 cargo aircraft. However, 67% of the fleet consisted of foreign-made planes, responsible for 95% of passenger traffic. The government’s ambitious program aimed to produce 1,800 new aircraft domestically by 2040, including the Sukhoi Superjet 100 (SJ-100) and the MC-21. Aircraft deliveries were supposed to begin as early as 2023, yet these optimistic projections were based more on hope than on reality.
Anger: The Reality Sets In
Over the next two years, both the Russian government and its society gradually came to terms with the profound dependence of their aviation sector on global supply chains. The sanctions not only barred Russian airlines from flying internationally but also restricted the purchase of foreign-made aircraft and components. The limitations even extended to the use of Western airspace for Russian carriers.
By late 2024, it became increasingly evident that the Russian civil aviation development program was out of sync with both the industry’s capabilities and market demands. The dependence on Western components could not be easily replaced, as aviation engines and avionics are far more complex to smuggle than microchips or basic components. The MC-21, once hailed as the future of Russian aviation, was revealed to have only limited potential among a small circle of allied nations.
Furthermore, the costs of replacing foreign components with domestically produced alternatives led to skyrocketing production expenses. For example, the MC-21’s price surged due to the replacement of U.S.-made Pratt & Whitney engines with Russian PD-14 engines, nearly doubling production costs from 800-900 million rubles to 1.8 billion rubles per aircraft. The situation was similar for the Superjet, where the shift from Franco-Russian SaM146 engines to PD-8 engines increased production costs by nearly 40%.
Bargaining: Revising the Unrealistic Goals
With the realization of severe limitations, Russian authorities began to gradually revise their goals. The planned production targets were repeatedly adjusted, with timelines pushed further into the future. Serial production of the MC-21 was postponed from 2024 to 2025, the SSJ-New from 2023 to 2026, the Tu-214 from 2023 to 2025, and the Il-114-300 from 2024 to 2026.
By 2024, the government’s civil aviation program was scaled back from 1,080 aircraft to 994. At the same time, the number of foreign-made aircraft in Russia’s fleet was expected to decline from 738 planes in 2022 to just 319 by 2030 due to a lack of spare parts and the inability to purchase new planes.
Depression: The Reality of Stagnation
With Russia's economy now operating under a military Keynesian framework, there were fewer resources available to support the aviation sector. Without access to foreign aircraft and struggling to produce enough domestically, the industry faced two increasingly concerning trends: cabotage flights and aircraft cannibalization.
Cabotage refers to foreign airlines conducting domestic flights within Russia, while cannibalization involves grounding parts of the fleet to strip usable components for remaining operational aircraft. This practice, although it allows keeping more aircraft in the air for a longer period of time and preserves air transportation, nevertheless clearly reflects the deep stagnation and decline in capacity of the aviation industry in Russia.
Acceptance: A Quiet Collapse
While Russia’s official plans for a booming domestic aviation industry remain in place on paper, there is growing consensus among experts and even government insiders that the targets are unrealistic. Yet, the reluctance to publicly admit failure means the plans remain officially valid, even as the evidence of stagnation mounts. Therefore, the stage of accepting the inevitability of a difficult situation in the aviation industry has not yet arrived.
Lessons from the Aviation Sanctions
While Russia’s military aviation remains impressive, civil aviation has repeatedly lagged behind. This clear example demonstrated to the West the obvious difficulties and vulnerabilities that the Russian economy has in the sphere of civil aircraft manufacturing.
For Western policymakers, the sanctions on Russia’s aviation sector have proven remarkably effective. Their impact was felt rapidly, has been long-lasting, and is difficult to circumvent. Russia faces both economic losses and reputational damage, with long-term setbacks in aviation technology development.
Moving forward, as diplomatic negotiations eventually unfold, the aviation sanctions will likely remain a key bargaining tool. Their rapid implementation and potential reversibility make them a strategic lever for future Western policies concerning Russia and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. The aviation industry case exemplifies how well-crafted sanctions can target critical sectors with lasting consequences.
