Reports about a Russian “shadow fleet” designed to circumvent European oil sanctions emerged as early as late 2022. Since then, sanctions have been tightened several times, but the presence of vessels transporting Russian oil in the Baltic and North Seas despite restrictions and the lack of international insurance has become evident.
Lately, the shadow fleet is apparently also being used as one of Russia’s tools of hybrid warfare. Estonian residents have experienced the effects of this activity firsthand.
Too many “accidents” involving Russia’s shadow fleet and Western undersea infrastructure
"The Russian shadow fleet plays a very significant role. Many ships move through international waters in the Gulf of Finland, and a substantial number of them are quite old and in poor technical condition. Potentially, this means a significantly increased risk of environmental disaster. And since these vessels are not properly insured, it could lead to a situation where it is impossible to recover costs from the responsible party — costs that will be substantial if the consequences need to be mitigated," Raivo Vare, an economic expert and former State Minister and Minister of Transport, told Veridica.
The fact that an oil spill from an uninsured Russian vessel would be an ecological disaster for the shallow Baltic Sea has been repeatedly emphasized. But the potential threat does not stop there, as it became clear when maritime cable “accidents” began occurring one after another in the Baltic Sea. At the sites of these incidents, Russian or Chinese vessels were often found nearby.
In October 2023, the Chinese ship Newnew Polar Bear, flying under the Hong Kong flag, damaged the Balticconnector gas pipeline between Finland and Estonia, as well as underwater communication cables connecting several countries. A few months later, Chinese authorities acknowledged responsibility but attributed the incident to an accident.
On November 17, 2024, one of the three cables connecting Sweden and Lithuania via the Baltic seabed was damaged. On the same day, a fiber-optic cable linking Finland and the German city of Rostock was severed. A Chinese vessel, Yi Peng 3, sailing under the Chinese flag and having recently departed from the Russian port of Ust-Luga, was detained by Danish authorities in the Kattegat Strait on suspicion of deliberate sabotage but was later released.
On Christmas, the Russian shadow fleet tanker Eagle S, flying under the Cook Islands flag and en route from St. Petersburg to Egypt, severed the EstLink 2 power cable connecting Estonia and Finland. Several communication cables were also damaged in the process. The Finns acted more decisively than the Danes, arresting and confiscating the tanker. In mid-January, Finnish investigators reported that the crew of the detained Eagle S had also planned sabotage on the EstLink 1 line and intended to damage the Balticconnector gas pipeline in the Baltic Sea.
"Let's be honest, this is already the third time, i.e., a pattern. Now the coastal countries are taking action, trying to create a new system that would prevent such situations or at least reduce their likelihood. However, this won't be easy since we are dealing with deliberate actions. Western countries continue to rely on the framework of maritime law, which leaves considerable room for Russian maneuver," says Raivo Vare.
Estonia's energy system under pressure
At the same time, the consequences for Estonia may prove much more significant. Since the Baltic country imports electricity from Finland, the severing of the cable means higher electricity prices. Immediately after the cable malfunction, electricity in Estonia was, at one point, 26.5 times more expensive than in its northern neighbors. Considering that Estlink 2 was out of operation for most of the past year, causing energy prices to rise by 10%, this spells not only problems for businesses but also increased social discontent. It's worth noting that Estonia is experiencing its third year of economic crisis, and repairs to the damaged cable are expected to last until the summer of this year.
The situation is further complicated by the fact that Estonia is set to disconnect from the BRELL energy grid in early February. While experts had previously assured that the transition away from the Russian power system would be painless for the population, in the current conditions of non-functional energy cables and a lack of domestic capacity, the outlook seems more doubtful.
"These cables were not cut accidentally, as the disconnection from the Russian grid now has to occur simultaneously with cable repairs, which could take longer. It’s likely that this also serves goals in energy policy, which Russia is trying to influence. The cable break will exert inflationary pressure and economic uncertainty in the Baltic countries, slowing economic recovery," Vare explains.
At the same time, it is evident that the shadow fleet ships pursue other goals. For instance, the advanced technological equipment found on the Eagle S tanker detained by the Finns was enabling the vessel to be used for espionage.
China, too, is benefiting from the sabotage in the Baltic Sea, using it as a testing ground, according to Vare. China now has the opportunity to observe international reactions: how Western countries, for example, would respond in the event of a Taiwan blockade and the severing of the island’s cables. Sweden's Minister for Civil Defense, Carl-Oskar Bohlin, stated that anchor marks found on the NordBalt cable were likely caused by the Chinese ship Yi Peng 3. Bohlin also suggested that these incidents could be related to the Baltic states' impending disconnection from the Russian power grid.
Countermeasures needed
Estonian politicians have repeatedly raised the issue of Russian-Chinese sabotage at the international level. In November last year, members of the European Parliament, including Urmas Paet, the vice-chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, sent a request to the European Commission on how it plans to prevent the navigation of Russia's shadow fleet in the northern seas.
Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal discussed the problem with NATO's Secretary General. "We need to enhance the level of monitoring and protection of critical infrastructure both at sea and on land. We will request assistance from the fleet and allies," he stated at a government press conference. Interior Minister Lauri Läänemets noted that the frequent damage to infrastructure in the Baltic Sea can no longer be considered accidental. "In the current security situation, it doesn't matter whether this is a military attack or a hybrid one. It is directed against someone or something and has a specific goal," said Läänemets.
In December, Tallinn hosted a meeting of the Joint Expeditionary Force of Northern European countries, where 12 nations (the UK, Germany, Denmark, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Finland, Sweden, and Estonia) signed an agreement to jointly combat Russia's shadow fleet by checking their insurance. If a vessel cannot provide proof of insurance, it will be detained. Finland's decisive actions in the case of the Eagle S demonstrate that such measures are effective and readiness exists, although, according to Raivo Vare, the decision was made at the last minute, and it is clearly premature to say that infrastructure in the Baltic Sea is reliably protected.
According to Vare, Finland's actions set a precedent, including in terms of international maritime law. However, to carry out maritime police operations to detain Russian and Chinese vessels involved in sabotage, coordinated actions and funding are required. "Currently, Finnish partners are escorting Russian ships just in case, as a preventive measure, but this is only part of the necessary activities," Vare notes. "The European Union must allocate money for this."
The United States is also taking measures, having already imposed strict sanctions on Russia's oil sector aimed at restricting the activities of the shadow fleet. However, according to experts, this does not guarantee the prevention of future sabotage in the Baltic. "I believe this possibility still remains. Russia has created one of the most powerful systems in the world for this purpose; their ships have even been spotted off the coast of Florida," Vare says. "How intensively they will continue depends on the effectiveness of our countermeasures."
