Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Baltic countries have been skeptical about Russia’s true aims. It was a view that proved to be more realistic than those held by many in the West, who thought that Russia can be a genuine partner of the Western liberal democracies and part of a stable international system. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the 24th of 2022, even the most Moscow-friendly Western capitals have been forced to reconsider their policies. The voice of the Baltic countries and their support for Ukraine is better heard than ever before.
The Baltic States have been at the forefront of support for Ukraine from the very beginning
As Ukraine’s former ambassador to Latvia Olexander Mischenko once admitted, the “Stinger” rockets provided to Ukraine by Latvia on the eve of the invasion – on 23rd of February – were being used just a few days later just outside Kyiv, in the battle of Hostomel against the Russian army. The executive director of the Institute of World Policy, iSANS expert Yevhen Mahda recalled for Veridica that Estonia, also before February 24, handed over to Ukraine all its 155 mm howitzers. That support remained high ever since, taking different shapes, from lobbying Western allies to do more for Ukraine – more weapons deliveries, more sanctions targeting Russia, etc. – to, more recently, threatening to boycott the 2024 Paris Olympics if Russia is allowed to take part in the event.
The numbers are telling: if aid to Ukraine (military, financial, and humanitarian assistance) is calculated as a percentage of the GDP, the Baltic countries (and Poland) are leading, according to Germany’s Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
In 2023, Estonia’s military assistance to Ukraine will increase to 370 million EUR or slightly more than 1% of the country’s GDP. The military assistance includes ammunition, howitzers, artillery support equipment, Javelin anti-tank missiles, anti-tank mines, helmets, vehicles, mortars, communications equipment, dry food packages, and grenade launchers.
In late January, Latvia announced its aid to Ukraine had already reached 1% of its GDP, also about 370 million EUR. Vilnius donated dozens of Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, two Mi-17 helicopters, self-propelled howitzers with ammunition, dozens of drones, spare parts of howitzers, anti-tank weapons, fuel, individual equipment, dry food for soldiers, and other goods.
Lithuania offered so far 660 million EUR, including 240 million EUR in military assistance. There’s more to come. The Lithuanian Defence Ministry earmarked around 40 million euros from its 2023 budget for support to Ukraine, with the necessary items to be purchased from Lithuanian producers. Lithuania also plans to contribute to an international fund aimed at financing heavy weapon purchases for Ukraine. Lithuanian citizens had their own contribution, crowdfunding for the military drones and radars.
Mark Voyger – a senior fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Analysis and Director of the Master’s Program in Global Management, American University Kyiv – points out that together with Poland, the Baltic States are the key countries of NATO solidarity. In other words, they are “small countries with great influence”. Voyger points out that, besides their firm pro-Ukraine stance and their efforts to convince allies – and especially the US – to step up support for Ukraine, the three Baltic countries worked towards isolating Russia on the international stage and showed support for Finland and Sweden’s bids to join NATO.
The Baltic countries’ attitude towards Russia, shaped by Moscow’s past aggressions
The roots of the Baltics’ uncompromising attitude can be traced back to the history of the 20th century. The Baltic countries were invaded by the Soviet Union in 1940, as a consequence of the Nazi-Soviet Molotov – Ribbentrop Pact. The alliance between the two terror regimes was, however, short-lived, and the Baltic region fell under Nazi rule when they attacked the Soviet Union. The Red Army would return to the region in 1944, chasing away the Nazis. That was followed by a long-term occupation of almost five decades.
The Soviet occupations came with two waves of deportations of the Baltic people, in 1941 and 1949, policies of russification, and the harsh hand of a totalitarian regime. None of these managed to break the people of the region. As the USSR entered an accelerated decline during the ‘80s, the Baltics were the first countries to proclaim their independence.
However, that was not enough. Russia, the USSR’s successor state loomed large just across the border, and historical experience had taught the Baltic States what kind of a neighbor that might prove to be; after all, the Soviets were not the first to invade: when they did it in 1940 they simply restored the control the Russian Empire used to have over the region. The Baltics had to move further away from Russia, and the path they chose was to seek admission to the European Union and NATO, an alliance that could provide them with the security they needed. Even so, Russia was always there. It waged a constant propaganda campaign in the Baltics and it did not stop doing it after they joined NATO; if anything, the campaign became more intense.
After the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, the Baltic countries stepped up efforts to open the eyes of their Western allies about the real nature of Russia, the deputy director and researcher at the Latvian Institute of International Affairs Martins Vargulis told Veridica. However, the West seemed to prefer to pursue a business-as-usual policy towards the Kremlin. Before the 2014 annexation of Crimea and even up to the 2022 large-scale invasion of Ukraine, there were voices in the West insisting that Russia has changed and even alleging that the Baltics were exaggerating the threats it posed because of their Russophobia. It took the large-scale attack against Ukraine to prove the Baltics right, and that strengthened their position among their partners, points out Mark Voyger who stresses that unlike in 2008 and 2014, Western countries can no longer dismiss Russia’s war of aggression as a regional conflict in a faraway land. Voyger points out that Russia has clearly positioned itself against democracies and Western countries, thus the position of the Baltic countries is “very justified, reasonably harsh”.
The different perspective they had on Russia meant that they were more prepared when Ukraine was attacked, according to Toms Rostoks, an associate professor at the University of Latvia and senior researcher in the National Defence Academy of Latvia. Rostoks pointed out that the Baltic states helped Ukraine much earlier than others who just reckoned that “invasion is horrible”, and when Western countries were still trying to understand what is happening, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia already knew what to do.
Yevhen Mahda notes that Baltic politicians are more straightforward than politicians representing Western countries. “There are objectively fewer politicians in the Baltic countries, who are ready for business as usual with Russia, so they are sincere and persistent in the matter of introducing sanctions and aid to Ukraine”, according to Mahda, who added that the Baltic countries “showed the need for real, not declarative, observance of European principles”.
The way forward: increased regional cooperation and more NATO troops
The position of the Baltics is unlikely to soften. “Ukraine is fighting our war. If Ukraine loses, then the challenges will increase,” warns Martins Vargulis. His position is shared by Mark Voyger who points out that there is no way back anymore. “The stakes are too high,” he says, adding that if Russia is not defeated “it will definitely try to punish the Baltic States”. This “punishment” could take different forms, it could be, for instance, a hybrid attack or economic pressure, thus the current war is existentially important for the Baltics and Poland.
However, experts are urging the Baltic countries to take into account the lessons of the war. “You will need everything Ukraine has now,” says Mark Voyger speaking about the military equipment. At the same time, since the Baltic countries are smaller than Poland, many elements working in Ukraine will not work in the Baltics in the case of an attack. In other words, Russia must be stopped before it crosses the borders of the Baltics because, unlike Ukraine, these small countries have no strategic depth. Also, the Baltics must work on civil defense and more people must be involved in it. Even if NATO has consolidated its presence in the Baltic states, they should nonetheless continue to consolidate their security and explore new ways of doing it, for instance by cooperating with each other more. In case of an attack, the Baltic countries must be able to rely on each other.
Cooperation with Poland, which shares much of the Baltics’ anxiety towards Russia and has shown a similar level of support for Ukraine, would also be important. Unlike the Baltics, Poland is large enough to be a regional security provider and it has embarked on an ambitious procurement program for its growing armed forces. As far as security is concerned, Poland will have an irreplaceable place in Eastern and Central Europe.
The security architecture of the region would also be significantly strengthened once Finland and Sweden are welcomed into NATO, and the Baltic states know that and are big supporters of the two countries accession.
Finally, a further increase of NATO’s presence in the Baltic countries would act as a further deterrent for Russia, who should understand that, for all their size and geography related vulnerabilities, the Baltic states are no longer an easy prey.