Can Ukraine get the nuclear bomb?

Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees that Russia violated with its 2014 invasion. President Zelensky has recently said his country could rebuild its nuclear arsenal.

Zelensky: either we are accepted into NATO, or we make nuclear weapons

In his October 17 speech to the media at the Council of Europe summit, where he was invited to present his "victory plan", President Volodymyr Zelensky shocked the entire world when he stated that for the security of Ukraine there were only two solutions: NATO accession or the nuclear bomb . Even if, just a few hours later, in a meeting with Mark Rutte, the Secretary General of NATO, Zelensky stressed that Ukraine was not pursuing nuclear weapons and that his mentioning the nuclear bomb was only intended to highlight the vital need for his country to join the Western military alliance, this episode raises a number of legitimate questions. Can Ukraine get the nuclear bomb, and if so, what does it mean for the security of Europe and the Black Sea region?

Ukraine's place and role in the Soviet nuclear program

The use by the United States of the atomic bomb in the final phase of the Second World War created strong reverberations within the political-military leadership of the USSR. Joseph Stalin, aware of and horrified by the technological gap that had just opened between the Soviet empire and (still) the North American ally, ordered the immediate development of a program to build the atomic bomb. With the help of industrial espionage, kidnapped German scientists and a massive concentration of human and material resources, the first Soviet atomic bomb was tested on August 29, 1949, in Kazakhstan, and the first hydrogen bomb, almost six years later, on November 22, 1955.

Within the Soviet nuclear program, Ukrainian scientists had held positions of particular importance since the pre-war period, with the Kharkiv/Kharkov research center recording a number of revolutionary approaches and discoveries in nuclear physics compared to researchers in Moscow.

Beyond the theoretical side of obtaining and improving a nuclear arsenal, Soviet Ukraine held a leading position in developing nuclear bomb delivery capabilities. The OKB-586 Design Office, based in the city of Dnipro, was the place where some of the most advanced medium-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles in the Soviet arsenal were designed. Starting with the medium-range R-12 "Dvina" missile, which became world-famous after its deployment in Cuba during the "Missile Crisis" (October 14 - November 20, 1962), the R-14 "Chusovaya" (range of 4500 km), and continuing with intercontinental ballistic missiles like R-16 (estimated range 11000 – 13000 km), R-26 (12000 km) and R-36 (10200 – 16000 km), the last missile manufactured in USSR and nicknamed "Satan" by Western observers.

Ukraine's nuclear arsenal from the collapse of the USSR to the Budapest Memorandum

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, celebrated on Christmas Day, transformed Ukraine, practically overnight, into the world's third largest nuclear power, after the United States of America and the Russian Federation. The eastern state inherited, according to some sources, no less than 5000 nuclear warheads, and according to others, about 1900 pieces , as well as the technical means to deliver them over extremely long distances. They were part of a formidable arsenal, modern for that period, i.e. 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles and an impressive number of strategic bombers, the most advanced of which were the 19 Tupolev Tu-160 supersonic aircraft.

As a result of a hitherto unprecedented international effort on nuclear disarmament, the political leadership of Ukraine was persuaded, in exchange for security guarantees from the United States, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom, to give up its nuclear arsenal, as and to its delivery systems. The document resulting from this agreement was signed in 1994 and received the name of the city where it was initialed, the Budapest Memorandum. That was the start of a process that would stretch over several years: the handover of nuclear warheads to the Russian Federation, the destruction of missiles and bombers, of the silos that housed several dozen "Satan" missiles, the inventory and handover of nuclear material that was exceeding the needs of Ukraine’s civil nuclear energy.

Dream or possibility: Ukraine's current capabilities

The outbreak of Russian aggression in the east of the country in 2014, followed by the large-scale invasion of February 2022, brought back into Ukraine’s public discourse the issue of giving up nuclear weapons as a means of deterring violations of the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Volodymyr Zelensky's speech polarized international public opinion, with many bringing up the article published by the American political scientist John J. Mearsheimer in 1993, in which the author argued for the need for Ukraine to retain a nuclear arsenal to deter future Russian aggression which, in his opinion, relative to history, was imminent.

Therefore, even if there were a political will for nuclear rearmament, is it possible in Ukraine's current situation? The answer to this question is a difficult one, but according to the Ukrainian expert Oleg Zhdanov, the country has the ability to develop nuclear weapons, both tactical and strategic. He recalls the fact that, in terms of the source of the radioactive material, Ukraine has nine nuclear waste pits totaling approximately 42 million tons of radioactive material. With regard to the launch systems, the expertise of the "Pivdenmash" (formerly "Yuzhmash"/OKB-586) missile design and construction office is sufficient to ensure the development of a nuclear warhead remote transport system in a short time. Finally, Zhdanov recalls the fact that if, for various reasons, a "classic" nuclear weapon with all its components cannot be developed in time, one can always resort to what is called in specialist language a "dirty bomb". That is, conventional explosive is attached to the radioactive material, and at the time of detonation, due to the high temperatures, the radioactive element changes its state of aggregation, from solid to vapor, and spreads over a certain area of land turning it into an extremely radioactive and thus dangerous for human exposure.

However, Zhdanov's optimism is not shared by Leonid Kuchma, who, prior to the position of President of Ukraine (1994-2005), was the general director of "the famous rocket design and production office Pivdenmash" (ex Yuzhmash), in the period 1986-1992. He says that the development of a nuclear warhead and a ballistic missile system that can carry it to the target, modern enough not to be intercepted, requires at least 10 years and several billion dollars.

The two opinions, selected to expose points of view from the extreme ends of the issue, reveal not only the existing polarization in Ukrainian society after almost 3 years of war, but also a certain despair in the face of a conflict that, despite the sacrifices made, does not seem to reach a denouement.

The scenario of a Ukrainian nuclear weapon remains unlikely

Even if Ukraine had the financial and technological ability to produce nuclear weapons, such a scenario is unlikely to be accepted by the Western powers that support it, much less by Russia. Including nuclear weapons into the arsenal of the armed forces of Ukraine would not bring with it Russian forces’ withdrawal from the conquered positions, nor would it oblige the aggressor to a truce favorable to the victim. The only way a nuclear weapon can have an impact in a conflict is through its direct use, which automatically triggers an unpredictable chain reaction. An attack by the Ukrainians on settlements or large urban agglomerations on the territory of the Russian Federation would entail, in addition to a similar retaliation from the Russians, the loss of all Western support.

On the other hand, the use of nuclear weapons to strike certain sectors of the front is also problematic, given the proximity of contact lines and the life support systems in armored vehicles, as it would mean both potential losses and an uncertain final outcome. Not to mention the radioactive contamination of the national territory which, for long periods of time, will be uninhabitable and unproductive from an agricultural point of view.