Madrid 1997 – Madrid 2022. An evolution of NATO’s perception of the Russian threat

Madrid 1997 – Madrid 2022. An evolution of NATO’s perception of the Russian threat
© EPA-EFE/SERGIO PEREZ   |   General view of a meeting during the second and last day of the NATO Summit at the IFEMA Convention Center, in Madrid, Spain, 30 June 2022.

At the 1997 NATO Summit in Madrid, the Alliance kicked off its eastward enlargement process by integrating ex-communist  countries that used this opportunity to make sure they would never again fall under Russia’s control. A quarter of a century later, also in Madrid, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization launched a new strategic concept, taking note of Moscow’s aggressions and threats.

Madrid, 1997: NATO starts expanding eastwards

In early July, 1997, I was in Madrid attending what everyone saw as a historic summit, for the simple fact that it was held shortly after the first Balkan wars, while another war was brewing in Kosovo. At the time, the Allies had already started expanding eastwards. In 1997, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland were invited to join this military bloc. They were all former members of the Warsaw Pact, the old military alliance of communist countries in Europe. Romania was to wait, the final declaration mentioning our country at the time as a NATO candidate state that had reported remarkable progress towards meeting NATO accession criteria. The USSR had collapsed just 6 years before. 25 years ago, NATO allies regarded Moscow as a partner, together with whom they had signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation a month before the summit.

The final paragraph in the abstract published on the website of the US State Department states: “The Act has no impact on NATO enlargement. That process is proceeding on schedule; NATO leaders at the Madrid summit in July will extend invitations to the first countries to begin accession talks. Those countries admitted will have the full rights and responsibilities of Alliance membership, and the door to membership will remain open to all emerging European democracies.”

The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council set up under the Founding Act, later on replaced by the NATO-Russia Council under the Rome Declaration, proves that Europe was seeking unprecedently close ties with the Kremlin. Of course, all we had witnessed up to that point were minor shows of strength from a country that had freshly broken away from the USSR. From the interview I took for Veridica of analyst Vladimir Socor with the Jamestown Foundation and Eurasia Daily Mirror I learned that the first signs of the aggressive policies that would define the Putin era had been there in the 90s as well, if we look at just Transnistria and Georgia.

I strongly believe Russia was on a mission from the very start, and that its expansion plans had been devised by think tanks working for the KGB, or more recently, the FSB. I am equally confident that, despite reaching out to Moscow to strike a partnership, the Allies also knew from the very start who they were dealing with. If we take a closer look at the history of Europe in the last 30 years, since the lifting of the Iron Curtain, we will clearly notice that NATO had locked horns with Russia ever since the Balkan Wars in the early 1990s. Russian propaganda made sure to depict NATO as “the aggressor” in the Balkans, focusing on the Allies’ actions without mentioning the fact that Moscow-backed Serbs (remember Slobodan Milošević, or his partners in crime Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić?) had been slaughtering the Bosnian population, which is exactly what the Russians are doing in Ukraine today. I would merely call to mind the siege of Sarajevo or the Srebrenica massacre. And to cast off any shadow of doubt about the Allies’ operations in Balkans, they were each backed by UN resolutions seeking to protect the civilian population and ultimately end the war.

The steps taken by NATO in Eastern Europe were commonsensical in such a turbulent context. After all, this was the first war in Europe after World War II. From the perspective of countries that sought to join NATO, the fear that history could repeat itself and Russia would invade overnight at any point in time, was the driving force behind the transformation of these countries that were so eager to come under NATO’s umbrella of extended security.

Madrid, 2022: “We cannot discount the possibility of an attack [from the Russian Federation] against the Allies’ sovereignty and territorial integrity”

25 years away from the historic summit of Madrid, the Spanish capital-city again hosted a summit of crucial importance for the future of the Alliance, this time held against the backdrop of a war started by Russia. The new strategic concept of NATO states the obvious: “Moscow’s behavior reflects a pattern of Russian aggressive actions against its neighbors and the wider transatlantic community.” For this reason in particular, in 2022 NATO repositions itself so as to respond to any and all challenges better and faster.

Since the start of the war, Vladimir Putin has pompously indicated the North Atlantic Alliance does not belong in areas Russia professes to be rightfully hers, invoking Romania too. To quote NATO’s Secretary General, Putin wanted less NATO, and now he’s getting more NATO on his borders. The Madrid Summit saw the decision to strengthen the Alliance’s eastern flank. Allied leaders invited an additional two states to join the military bloc: Finland and Sweden. I won’t go into details regarding the two countries’ decision to seek collective defense, but I will look at the map. For Putin, the Baltic Sea is off limits. The Kaliningrad exclave, which Putin uses to threaten the whole world with nuclear warfare, has become an increasingly isolated spot, also owing to the rail blockade imposed by Lithuania. And it’s the new strategic concept of NATO that provides the explanation:

“The Euro-Atlantic area is not at peace. The Russian Federation has violated the norms and principles that contributed to a stable and predictable European security order. We cannot discount the possibility of an attack against Allies’ sovereignty and territorial integrity. Strategic competition, pervasive instability and recurrent shocks define our broader security environment. The threats we face are global and interconnected”, the document reads.

The fact that Russia is described as “a direct threat” to the security of NATO states, that the Black Sea is finally mentioned in the document as an area of strategic interests, also owing to Romania’s relentless efforts, are all major elements of the new NATO strategy. Now, more than ever, the open-doors policy appears to be of key importance. We should take a step back and look at the broader picture, lest we should be tempted to believe the EU opening its doors to Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova was merely a circumstantial decision. I believe we’re seeing a strategy meant to bring both countries into NATO, sooner or later. The Republic of Moldova is carrying the burden of the frozen conflict in Transnistria. When it comes to Ukraine, on the other hand, we should take under advisement all possible scenarios, including the fact that, once the war is over, part of its territory might have an uncertain status. Uncertainty is the Russians’ favorite tool, if we consider all the frozen conflicts in the Black Sea. I think it was not by chance that the Madrid Summit final declaration devotes a paragraph (17) to the Republic of Moldova, Georgia and Bosnia.

“In light of the changed security environment in Europe, we have decided on new measures to step up tailored political and practical support to partners, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, and the Republic of Moldova.  We will work with them to build their integrity and resilience, develop capabilities, and uphold their political independence.  We will also enhance our capacity-building support to partners from the South.”

Is it truly possible for these countries to join the EU and/or NATO? How could they, since the Red scourge had made sure early on to enroot what we generically call frozen conflicts deep in their territories? The Allies know for a fact today that they need to show pragmatism, to be one step ahead of the Russians. Why shouldn’t they be allowed to join the way Cyprus did, a country left divided by the Turkish invasion of 1974. Northern Cyprus proclaimed its independence in 1983, and was recognized as a sovereign state only by Ankara. This did not prevent Cyprus from joining the EU in 2004. I am confident the Allies are working with a number of scenarios that could very well fumble Moscow’s plans.   

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