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The Ukrainian army managed to take the whole world by surprise, from Russian enemies and Western partners to its own population, when it launched a surprise incursion into Russia's Kursk region on August 6. Ukrainian forces quickly captured around 100 towns and over 1,300 square kilometers. A month after the launch of the operation, Russian troops seem incapable of organizing a counterattack to recover their lost territories. Numerous analysts and pundits have noted that this Ukrainian counteroffensive on Russian territory undermines one of the fundamental myths of the Putin regime, that of guaranteeing Russians' security.
Beyond the Ukrainians’ indisputable tactical success, the question that arises is what exactly did they manage to achieve from a strategic point of view? Based on the statements made on and off the record by Ukrainian officials, the offensive in Kursk was expected to achieve several objectives: to draw Russian troops from other sectors of the frontline, to further ease the pressure exerted on the Ukrainian forces, to provide Kyiv with an edge in future peace negotiations, something they can offer in return, and to lift Ukrainians’ morale after more than a year of bad news coming from the front.
Only the last objective appears to have been achieved: the Kursk offensive managed to raise morale, both on the front lines and at home. Furthermore, it has made many Russians wonder if the war is really unfolding as well as they are told. As for the other objectives, things are much more complicated. The Russians have not moved any troops from the hottest areas on the ground, and peace negotiations are out of the question, at least for now. In addition, if peace talks do actually being, it is unclear whether Ukraine would still hold Kursk.
The Kursk operation raised Ukrainians’ morale at a very difficult time
The Kursk offensive was launched at a time when morale in the Ukrainian camp was rather low. For the first time, opinion surveys revealed part of society was willing to concede territories to Putin's Russia in exchange for peace.
Belief in the possibility of a quick victory, as promised by the authorities against the background of some minor victories reported in the first part of the war (the cast-out of the Russian army from the Kyiv area, the counteroffensives in Kharkiv and Kherson), gradually started to leave more and more room for war fatigue and even demoralization. Their effects were compounded by the Russians' constant shelling, targeting infrastructure objectives and cities, as well as by the failure of the offensive of spring-summer of 2023, and the dismissal of the army commander, General Valerii Zaluzhny, etc. This was followed by the Russian’s slow advance, an operation that exhausted Ukrainian defenses with intense bombing and repeated waves of land attacks. Their retaliation campaign managed to capture a number of settlements. Another blow to Ukrainian morale were the delays in the delivery of weapons and ammunition from the West. All this led to losses on the frontline, forcing Kyiv to tighten legislation in order to draft additional men in the army.
In this context, the Kursk operation and the first reports of the Ukrainian army taking control of certain settlements in the Russian Federation had a positive impact on the general mood of society. A series of patriotic Ukrainian posts, as well as jokes with obvious anti-Kremlin overtones, went viral on social media. Even national television stations ridiculed the “helpless” Russian army.
On a more serious note, the discussion about peace in Ukraine, a scenario that takes into account Kyiv’s terms as well, not just Moscow’s, has been rekindled. Ukrainian analysts began to praise the new head of the army, Oleksandr Syrskyi, for moving the war to Russian territory, and social media were flooded with messages of satisfaction: “Let the Russians learn a thing or two about war the hard way”.
Some of the most viral posts and comments in the last month concerned the expansion of military operations to other Russian regions, or even the liberation of the Crimean Peninsula. The Russians’ weak and delayed response after Ukraine penetrated their defenses also attracted a number of reactions.
The incursion made president Volodymyr Zelenskyy popular again, after his speeches had started to lose their appeal to the very war-weary Ukrainian society. After the failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive left the population dispirited, Zelenskyy again became quoted and sometimes praised by the media. “24 years ago the Kursk submarine sank - a symbolic beginning for Putin's regime. Now we know what his end will be. It's all about Kursk”, Volodymyr Zelenskyy said, presenting the incursion as a blow to the Kremlin leader and his belligerent regime.
Asked by reporters about how they feel about the Kursk operation, Ukrainians in various cities across the country said they were proud of the army, happy and amazed, but also afraid of the possible high loss of human lives.
Moscow's reaction, similar to that of the USSR after the Chernobyl disaster: keep calm, everything is fine
Whereas Kyiv called the Kursk operation an important strategic move and the beginning of the end for Putin’s regime, the Kremlin and its affiliated media tried to minimize the impact of this operation in public space.
For this reason, after a period of chaos in Russian media, when outlets and media agencies were taken by surprise and did not know how to respond, and official reactions often contradicted each other, the Kremlin decided to approach the topic as a Ukrainian terrorist” provocation, which will be solved in due time without much trouble.
“We need to deal with these bandits who entered the territory of Russia and took the Kursk region by storm, and who are trying to destabilize the borderlands as a whole”, the Russian president said. The Kremlin promotes the idea that the Kursk operation is a provocation carried out by certain groups of Ukrainian bandits, mercenaries and terrorists, who did not seize any major objective, but simply tried to destabilize Russia. To prevent the Ukrainian operation from being overly reported in the domestic media, Putin visited a number of states and regions for several days in a row, trying to convince their citizens far from the military hot zones that this is a minor local issue in the context of the broader war effort. Kremlin’s reaction to the incursion is strikingly similar to the communication strategies of the USSR during the incident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, when the population was told about a local incident and about the aid provided to civilians.
The international media noted the Kremlin's attempt to convey a sense of normalcy regarding the Ukrainian incursion. In this regard, government media have focused mostly on efforts to provide humanitarian aid to the nearly 200,000 Russians who have fled their homes, as if they were victims of floods or other natural disasters, rather than people displaced in the wake of the first foreign military incursion on Russia’s territory since World War II.
During the last two weeks of the Ukrainian incursion, Russian propagandists tried to stop their interviewees and guests from criticizing the central authorities for the “Kursk disaster”.
On September 1, Solovyov Live, a Sunday show that rounds up the week's most important political events, discussed the developments in the Middle East, how Putin congratulated Lukashenko on his 70th birthday anniversary and other events, without mentioning the events in Kursk. In order not to spread panic at society level, the Kremlin decided to monopolize official discourse about the incursion, also by silencing a number of Telegram channels.
On September 2, one of the most influential Telegram channels in Russia "Rossia Seidchias" (Russia Today) quoted one of Putin’s cronies, Ukrainian oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk, who reached Russia after a prisoner exchange and who said that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk was of no importance. “The Ukrainian army controls only 5% of the Kursk region, without achieving any strategic objective. Zelenskyy is celebrating as if he has reached the Urals, asking for applause and calling for the celebrations to continue”, Medvedchuk said. The Russian oligarch is often used by Russian propaganda to illustrate false narratives or to manipulate public opinion.
The Russians are not as calm as the Kremlin would like
According to a study by Open Minds, the incursion of the Ukrainian army into the Kursk region generated significant anxiety and doubt on social networks. The effect resembles the effects of the partial mobilization of September 2022 and the uprising of Yevgeny Prigozhin in June 2023. While the Russian authorities tried to portray the Ukrainian operations in Kursk as a waste of resources and a failure to achieve any notable military objectives, the public's reaction highlighted concern about the state's ability to protect its own territory. Although overall support for the war dropped significantly in the first week of the incursion, due to the unexpected nature of the event, the long-term effect still remains uncertain.
According to a survey conducted by Levada Center, 51% of Russians are closely monitoring the developments in the Kursk region, while 43% have heard of this Ukrainian operation, without knowing many details nevertheless. Among those who are aware of Ukraine’s offensive, 63% of the respondents expressed serious concern with the developments, especially in relation to civilian casualties and the authorities’ helplessness.
The Kursk offensive also succeeded in shattering the pro-war narrative carefully fueled by the Kremlin. Pro-Putin bloggers, media analysts (including state media) and refugees from Kursk publicly criticized the military and the authorities, especially in the early days of the war. Even harsher reactions were recorded by independent Russian media outlets – one relevant example in this regard is a statement picked up by The Insider: “May all of Putin's cronies roll over and die!”
The Kursk offensive, a gamble won by Ukraine, or one that could backfire?
A month since the start of the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk, reports from the area are finally taking a backseat, shifting the spotlight on other topics: the amplification of the Russian bombing campaign, the government reshuffle in Kyiv and losses sustained on the front in Donbas. Here, the Russians are closing in on the strategic city of Pokrovsk, whose capture might jeopardize the entire Ukrainian defense line in Donetsk and bring the Russians within striking distance of another region, Dnipropetrovsk.
In recent weeks, the speed of Russia’s advance in Donbas has doubled. Vladimir Putin even felt the need to boast about his achievements in front of children. The Russian leader appeared unsympathetic when he publicly admitted that, in recent months, the mighty Russian army, despite of its superiority in numbers, was barely able to capture several hundred square meters per day (a fraction of a football pitch). It is possible, however, that Putin’s statement was meant to shift the discussion from away from Kursk and create the impression that the Ukrainian incursion is irrelevant.
It is clear, however, that, no matter how Russian propaganda presents it and how much it tries to trivialize it, the Ukrainian offensive is not irrelevant, because it represents a humiliation for Putin. What Ukraine can actually gain from this, however, is a completely different matter.
The Kursk operation involved some of the most experienced units at Kyiv’s disposal. If the absence of those units in Donbas will allow the Russians to capture Pokrovsk and several other settlements of strategic importance, the Ukrainians might find out that they’ve won a thousand or so square kilometers in Russia, but they lost much more at home. For now, they seem to be keeping their optimism. The commander of the Ukrainian army, Oleksandr Syrskyi, said that the offensive in Kursk forced Moscow to move to the area reserve troops that it can no longer throw into battle in other sectors of the frontline, and that Ukrainian forces allegedly succeeded in blocking the Russian advance on Pokrovsk.
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