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In mid-September, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree increasing the size of the Russian Armed Forces from 2.2 million to 2.4 million personnel, with 1.5 million set to serve as active soldiers. This move aligns with a goal previously set by former Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu, now head of the Russian Security Council. However, the plan may remain just that — a plan. The reality on the ground shows that Russia’s recruitment efforts are struggling, illustrating a curious interaction between the country’s military and civilian economies.
Year Three of Conflict: A New Set of Challenges
As the war in Ukraine drags into its third year, it has become clear that Russia’s military apparatus faces the same problem as its civilian economy: a shortage of manpower. While the civilian sector boasts record-low unemployment rates of 2.4%, similar demographic and socio-political factors are creating an acute demand for new recruits in the military.
Following the partial mobilization in September 2022, it became evident that direct conscription was a risky and unsustainable method for Russia’s leadership. The backlash from the mobilization forced the Kremlin to reconsider its approach, eventually adopting a hybrid strategy. This new method focuses on voluntary enlistment, often from prisons, individuals awaiting trial, or those simply looking for financial incentives. The latter group exemplifies how economic institutions, even in anti-market, authoritarian systems like Russia’s, can be mobilized to meet the state’s immediate needs.
Supply and Demand: A Market for Human Lives
Market economics revolve around the laws of supply and demand, where prices fluctuate according to the availability of goods and services. This contrasts with command economies, where the government dictates prices. Despite its long history of operating under a centralized economic system, Russia is now attempting to address its military shortfalls using market-driven methods. This approach extends even into the military sphere, treating soldiers as a commodity in a grim version of supply and demand.
Initially, it appears that Russia did not anticipate the Ukraine invasion would evolve into a protracted, bloody conflict. Once the reality set in, it became clear that the military was ill-prepared for a war of this magnitude and would require far more personnel than could be provided by conscripts alone. In response, the government began to offer a series of incentives designed to attract "volunteers" into the ranks of the armed forces.
The Kremlin’s first attempts to frame military service as a patriotic duty, with promises of financial rewards, met with limited success. Despite intensified propaganda efforts to stir nationalist fervor, the appeal of slogans like "the motherland is in danger" failed to generate a significant influx of volunteers. One key reason for this is the long-standing apathy instilled by state propaganda, which had for years encouraged the public to disengage from civic life. When the state suddenly needed mass mobilization, the pivot proved ineffective.
The Price of Service: Financial Incentives and Regional Competition
Today, Russian citizens are being drawn into military service with the promise of lucrative rewards, such as:
- Large one-time payments for signing contracts with the armed forces
- High monthly salaries during service
- Special benefits for the families of soldiers, such as preferential treatment for children applying to universities
- Additional perks like loan deferrals, debt cancellations, and utility payment discounts
Regional governments, it seems, have been set recruitment targets by the federal center, creating competition among Russia's various provinces. Wealthier regions, such as Moscow and St. Petersburg, are able to offer significantly larger financial incentives to attract recruits, often poaching potential soldiers from poorer regions that lack the same financial resources.
Moscow and St. Petersburg, two of the wealthiest regions in Russia, are not only rich but also home to populations with incomes far above the national average — people who are not inclined to join the military. However, the regional governments have the financial capacity to outbid poorer provinces, offering prospective recruits better terms. To do this, they openly engage in various manipulative practices, such as temporarily registering recruits in wealthier regions to secure higher payouts.
Despite these tactics, the rapidly increasing bonuses offered for signing military contracts even in wealthy regions like Moscow indicate that recruitment efforts are stalling. The situation has reached a point where the total sum a Russian contract soldier can earn over a year is roughly equivalent to what a man in a poor or economically depressed region would earn in 20 to 30 years. This grim calculation forces many families into a deadly ethical dilemma: Should the man of the house continue working for meager wages, burdened by debt, or take a chance on the war, where he may die but leave behind a significant sum of money for his family?
The Economy of Death: A Case Study of Buryatia
To understand this dynamic, we can look at Buryatia, a region from which Russia has drawn a significant number of contract soldiers. Signing a military contract can yield a one-time payment of 900,000 rubles, while those engaged in combat earn an additional 200,000 rubles monthly. If a soldier dies, the payouts are as follows:
- 5 million rubles as a one-time payment to the family (≈49 000 euros)
- 5 million rubles as an insurance payment (≈49 000 euros)
- 1 million rubles as a death benefit (≈30 000 euros)
Altogether, a soldier’s family stands to receive at least 16 million rubles (≈157 000 euros) should the soldier die after a year of service. Considering the average monthly wage in Buryatia in 2024 was 69,000 rubles (≈680 euros), this sum represents the equivalent of nearly 20 years of earnings. For those making less than the average, or burdened by debt, the figure could equal 30 years or more of wages. Since many contract soldiers are between the ages of 30 and 40, and with the average life expectancy for Russian men at 67 years, it becomes evident that some men are trading their futures for money.
This situation is further exacerbated by Russia’s fatalistic cultural mentality, which has, over centuries, accustomed people to the notion that life in Russia is cheap. Propaganda that glorifies dying on the front line over succumbing to alcoholism in a depressed region only reinforces this outlook. The bleakness of life in Russia’s poorer areas, combined with aggressive state propaganda, the ruthless demands of a deregulated labor market, and the overwhelming power of money, has created a situation where many feel they have little to lose.
The situation is also aggravated by the deterioration of the education system and what Russian philosopher Mikhail Epstein called “the default of Russian culture” – the degradation of the concept of law and justice, and the values of society.
Budgetary Considerations and Long-Term Sustainability
Despite the high costs associated with paying military personnel, it would be a mistake to assume these expenses will cripple Russia’s budget. Revenue from oil, gas, and other natural resource exports more than covers the military's wage bill, allowing the Kremlin to continue purchasing and manufacturing arms. The real issue for Russia’s leadership is that, even with such substantial financial outlays, the pool of willing recruits is drying up. Moreover, any attempt to institute another wave of mobilization could destabilize society, potentially leading to unforeseen consequences for the regime.
In the end, Russia’s current approach to military recruitment highlights a grim reality: the state is willing to trade large sums of money for the lives of its citizens, creating a perverse "economy of death." The sustainability of this model is highly questionable, but for now, it is the method by which Russia is attempting to sustain its war effort. How long this can last, however, remains an open question.
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