In recent weeks, representatives of Georgia’s ruling party, the Georgian Dream, have been praising the 1783 Treaty of Georgievsk, which basically made eastern Georgia a subject of the Russian Empire; the treaty would soon be breached by Russia, which would end up occupying Georgia for the coming two centuries - first as an Empire, and then, following a brief independence, as the Soviet Uniun. Georgian Dream officials are now saying that King Erekle II’s decision to sign the treaty was a wise one, it had no alternative and ultimately saved the Georgian nation and statehood.
The new interpretation has emerged against the backdrop of Tbilisi's deteriorating relations with its Western partners, and it has been accompanied by similar statements from pro-Russian forces in Georgia and a positive response in Russian media. The opposition, meanwhile, fears that the historical debate may serve a present-day political purpose: to make the public more receptive to possible compromises with Moscow.
Erekle II gave up his kingdom’s sovereignty in exchange for Russia’s protection. When the time came, Russia failed to fulfil its obligations
On August 12, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze said that the Treaty of Georgievsk had played a crucial role in saving Georgia. When a journalist pointed out that Russia later failed to honor the terms of the agreement, the prime minister replied that the treaty had been observed during Erekle II's lifetime.
Kobakhidze's main argument was the interval between the signing of the treaty and the annexation of Kartli-Kakheti by the Russian Empire. Almost 20 years, he said, show that Erekle II's decision "worked": Georgia survived a period of existential threat.
To understand the government's current line of argument, it is worth recalling what the Treaty of Georgievsk actually was. The treaty was signed in 1783 between the Russian Empire and the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti, the eastern Georgian state ruled by Erekle II. Kartli-Kakheti came under Russia's protection and partially gave up an independent foreign policy, while the Russian Empire, in turn, undertook to defend the kingdom.
At the same time, the treaty was not an agreement between a united Georgia and Russia. Other Georgian kingdoms and principalities, including Imereti, Samegrelo and Abkhazia, were not parties to it.
The protection Russia had promised later became one of the main points of contention. In 1795, the troops of the Persian ruler Agha Mohammad Khan invaded eastern Georgia and sacked Tbilisi, yet Erekle II did not receive the Russian military assistance he had expected. After his death in 1801, the Russian Empire abolished the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti and incorporated its territory into the empire.
Kobakhidze, however, believes these subsequent events do not negate the correctness of Erekle II's decision. On August 18, he called the conclusion of the treaty a "civilizational choice" and said the king's decision was not merely justified but "the only correct one, with no alternative." The prime minister also linked it to Georgia's modern European identity.
"By signing the treaty, whether the Russian Empire wanted it or not, Georgia nevertheless gained a fundamental benefit. At a moment when we stood on the brink of existence and non-existence, thanks to this step by Erekle II we not only survived as a nation but ultimately prevailed, which is best confirmed by the fact that today Georgia is a distinctive country founded on Christian values, national roots and traditional European culture," Kobakhidze said.
In his reasoning, Kobakhidze presented Russia's abolition of the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti as a process that became possible only after the Georgian king's death: "When Erekle II passed away, unfortunately, events took a different course."
A few days later, other members of the ruling party began speaking about the Treaty of Georgievsk in a similar vein. MP Davit Matikashvili called the treaty a "smart and wise" decision thanks to which the Georgian people were able to "physically survive." Gia Volski, while acknowledging that Russia had not fulfilled the terms of the treaty, also said the agreement ultimately helped Georgia avoid disappearing as a nation.
"After the signing of the Treaty of Georgievsk in 1783, Georgia suffered a number of serious blows, and Russia did not fulfill the terms of this treaty. That started later, when it became advantageous for Russia. For a certain period, Georgia went through a very difficult time… In the end, this helped ensure that Georgia would not become, let's say, a vassal of some Muslim culture and a rather aggressive neighbor, or disappear altogether as a nation and a people."
Thus, a unified logic is gradually taking shape in the statements of Georgian Dream representatives: a small state facing the threat of destruction was forced to make a pragmatic choice in favor of a stronger neighbor for the sake of its own survival.
Why the opposition is wary of the new interpretation
Such interpretations of tragic events in Georgian history have drawn a sharp reaction from the pro-Western opposition, diplomats and civic activists.
Critics of the government point first and foremost to the fact that Russia failed to fulfill the key obligations set out in the treaty. The events of 1795, when Tbilisi was captured and sacked by the troops of Agha Mohammad Khan, are recalled especially often.
Diplomat Gia Japaridze called Kobakhidze's statements an attempt to justify the government's current foreign policy course. He also stressed that the treaty was concluded between the Russian Empire and the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti, not between Russia and all of Georgia.
According to the government's opponents, the problem with the current interpretation lies not only in how the events of the 18th century are assessed. What worries them is the political conclusion that may be drawn from this history today.
If Erekle II's agreement with Russia is presented as an example of successful pragmatism, the same logic could be applied to present-day relations with Moscow: concessions and compromises with a stronger neighbor could be portrayed not as a threat to sovereignty but as a necessary price for security and survival.
That said, there is no public confirmation that the Georgian government is already preparing a new treaty with Russia. Georgian Dream has not officially announced negotiations on an alliance agreement, and the Russian side has not said it is preparing any such document either. But the very idea of a new agreement has already entered Georgia's political space.
Georgia’s pro-Russians want a Georgievsk-2
Georgian Dream leaders often connect this historical parallel to present-day Georgian-Russian relations. Kobakhidze compared the Treaty of Georgievsk to the August 2008 war and said that "under Mikheil Saakashvili's leadership, all signed and unsigned agreements were torn up over our heads."
Against this background of statements from Georgian Dream officials, a new idea emerged: that Georgia should pursue a new treaty with Russia. The most outspoken advocate of a new treaty is Mamuka Pipia, leader of the pro-Russian party Solidarity for Peace.
On August 18, after Kobakhidze's latest statement about the treaty, Pipia welcomed the prime minister's position and said his party was working on a direction he called "Georgievsk-2."
Pipia said he agreed with Kobakhidze that the original treaty had saved Georgian statehood and Christianity. However, he disagreed with the prime minister that this historical choice was connected to Georgia's European perspective.
"We are working in this direction, and very soon a corresponding statement will be made from Moscow," Pipia said describing the proposed new treaty as a "completely new, comprehensive and, most importantly, equal treaty" with the Russian Federation.
Pipia's position goes considerably beyond Georgian Dream's officially stated stance. In the past, he has advocated restoring diplomatic relations with Russia, concluding an alliance treaty, and removing from Georgia's Constitution Article 78, which obliges the country's constitutional bodies to take all measures for Georgia's full integration into the EU and NATO.
Georgian Dream has not officially put forward any such demands. Nevertheless, Pipia's reaction shows how quickly the historical interpretation offered by the ruling party can be incorporated into a contemporary pro-Russian political agenda.
From Erekle II to the Russian narrative
The Treaty of Georgievsk and the image of Erekle II became part of Georgian Dream's political rhetoric long before the current statements.
This became especially noticeable in 2023, after literary scholar Levan Berdzenishvili criticized Erekle II. He described the decision to conclude the treaty as a step that later allowed Russia to establish control over Georgia. Georgian Dream representatives sharply criticized Berdzenishvili, and his public appearances were repeatedly disrupted by supporters of the pro-Russian Conservative Movement. The scholar was later attacked on the street.
In September 2025, a new monument to Erekle II was unveiled in Tbilisi. At the ceremony, Kobakhidze called the king a symbol of patriotism, love for the homeland and pragmatism.
In this way, Erekle II has gradually been transformed from a historical figure into a political symbol. In the government's interpretation, he represents a model of behavior for a small state that, under threat, makes a pragmatic choice in favor of a strong ally.
This interpretation bears notable similarities to a long-standing Russian narrative about the Treaty of Georgievsk.
Moscow has repeatedly portrayed the 1783 agreement as a voluntary rapprochement between Russia and Georgia and has emphasized the Russian Empire's role as the protector of Kartli-Kakheti. In 2021, on another anniversary of the treaty's signing, the Russian Foreign Ministry stated that the rapprochement between Russia and Georgia served the interests of both countries, specifically highlighting the protection Russia had provided.
Tbilisi called that interpretation cynical at the time, recalling that it was precisely Russia's violation of the agreement that marked the beginning of the subsequent annexation of Georgian territories.
Today, part of this historical narrative is being voiced by Georgian officials themselves. Irakli Kobakhidze is not proposing to restore a Russian protectorate and continues to call Georgia a European country, but his claims that the alliance with co-religionist Russia was a "civilizational choice," saved Georgia from destruction and was the "only correct" decision echo the Russian interpretation of the empire's role in the South Caucasus.
Russian media have also noticed this similarity. On August 21, the Russian outlet Vzglyad published an article headlined "Georgia Has Taken an Important Step Toward Normality." The author linked the new assessment of the Treaty of Georgievsk to a broader shift in the Georgian authorities' attitude toward Russia and specifically welcomed the return of a respectful attitude toward the agreement as an alliance with Russia that supposedly saved Georgia.
More than a historical dispute
To date, there is no public confirmation that the Georgian authorities are preparing a new treaty with Russia or holding negotiations on any alliance agreement. Yet what is happening goes far beyond a historical discussion.
Several political processes are converging around this issue at once. Georgian Dream is drifting ever further from its Western partners, and Georgia's course toward EU membership has effectively been suspended. At the same time, pro-Russian political forces are using the government's new rhetoric as an argument for closer relations with Moscow and are already talking about their own version of a future agreement with Russia.
The reaction of the Russian information space is also telling: statements by the Georgian leadership are being viewed there as a possible sign of a change in Tbilisi's attitude toward Moscow and a reassessment of Russia's historical role.
The return of the Treaty of Georgievsk to the political agenda matters not only for how the story of Erekle II is interpreted today. What matters more is the political meaning this interpretation acquires in contemporary Georgia. By presenting the agreement with the Russian Empire primarily as a pragmatic choice that helped preserve Georgian statehood, the government is at the same time offering society a particular model of how a small state should behave in the face of a stronger neighbor.
This is why the question today is not only what happened in 1783, but also why this version of the past has become especially sought after in Georgian politics right now, and what vision of the country's future foreign policy course it is helping to shape.
