The war in Ukraine has prompted many NATO states to take action with a view to strengthening their armed forces. Instead of deterring the Allies, Putin only brought them closer together.
Germany, forced to rethink its security strategy, although still reluctant to earmark 2% of the GDP to defense spending
Starting mid-June, Germany has for the first time devised a national security strategy. The document had been on the agenda of the ruling coalition in Berlin long before Russia launched the large-scale invasion against Ukraine. However, last year’s events in Eastern Europe precipitated – and also impacted – the elaboration of such a strategy. It is therefore no surprise that the text refers to Russia as “the biggest threat to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area”. Similarly, Germany’s commitment towards NATO, the EU and individual European partners (of which France holds pride of place), is not something out of the ordinary. Perhaps the only striking detail is the description of China as a country “constantly acting against our interests and values”, although German authorities admit at the same time that Beijing remains a partner without which “many of the current crises and conflicts would remain unsolved”.
Despite its many “constitutional” objectives in terms of national security, Germany’s defense strategy has a circumstantial character, pundits say. Upon taking power in 2021, the three-party coalition made up of the Social-Democrats, the Liberals and the Greens mentioned a new major threat to the security of the European Union in general and Germany in particular: the USA’s isolationist policies in the Trump era. Today, the document makes no mention of this threat. Nor does it refer to the creation of a National Security Council, like the one in the USA. The reason is tied to political frictions, because such a council would eventually be subordinated to the chancellery controlled by the Social-Democrats. In the current administration, the Greens control the Foreign Ministry and would take this decision as an insult.
Yet perhaps the most blatant political blunder in the current strategy is the eternal problem of the 2% of the GDP allotted to the defense budget. Like all other NATO members, Germany too pledged to earmark 2% of the GDP to its military sector. Some ten years ago, Germany joined other NATO states in promising to fulfill this obligation, although unlike the others, Berlin is yet to deliver on its promise. The security strategy adopted this month does mention this aspect, although with one special consideration: Germany will allot 2% of the GDP to defense spending on average over the course of several years “without overburdening its federal budget”. Alright, but what does that mean in practical terms? Liberal Finance Minister Christian Lindner made it very clear that over the coming period, at least, the additional funds earmarked to the defense sector will be transferred from a special fund of 100 billion EURO. In other words, The Economist writes, the final decision over allotting 2% of the GDP to defense spending will rest with upcoming governments, neither of which will however “dare to cut social spending to supplement the defense budget”.
The Russian threat attracts massive investments in the military sector both in the West as well as in ex-communist members of NATO
The practice of operating the occasional budget “amendments and additions” was adopted by other governments as well, including in Romania. Romania’s security strategy (adopted in 2020 and expected to come into force by 2024) is an expression of Bucharest’s commitment to “continue the process of transforming, modernizing and endowing the Romanian Army by allotting 2% of the GDP to defense spending, for a minimum of 10 years, in a process started as early as 2017”. Yet beyond the fine print of budget appropriations and special funds, the tendency to increase military spending is a fact in Romania, in Germany and in every other European country.
Let’s take France, for instance. The French Parliament has planned to earmark 413 billion EURO to its military budget over 2024-2030, a 40% increase compared to the similar budget allocation in the previous budget framework. The Macron administration could therefore be the first in France to honor its commitment of allotting 2% of the GDP to the national defense sector. Much like Germany, France’s new budget structure was directly influenced by the war in Ukraine: the budget bill presented to the French Parliament mentioned the war in Ukraine over ten times. Poland’s budget for 2023 earmarked 20 billion EURO to defense, which is tantamount to nearly 4% of the country’s GDP, representing a 160% increase compared to the country’s defense budget some eight years ago. A Veridica analysis shows that starting 2015, the number of servicemen enrolled in the Polish Armed Forces increased from 95,000 to over 160,000, including 30,000 non-professional servicemen part of territorial defense units.
It's also worth noting that both Romania’s and Poland’s national defense strategies designated Russia as a threat to European security before the invasion of Ukraine. Adopted in May 2020, Poland’s defense strategy showed that “the Russian Federation’s neo-imperial policy, promoted also with the use of military force”, is the most serious threat to Poland’s security. This assessment had long been formulated by political elites in Warsaw, ever since the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia. It was then that a paradigm shift occurred in Poland’s threat-assessment strategy – the risk of a military conflict on the territory of Poland and its vicinity stopped being considered “marginal”.
In Romania’s 44-page security strategy, adopted also in 2020, the paragraph discussing Moscow’s actions follows the coronavirus pandemic, described as a factor of instability. “The Russian Federation’s aggressive behavior, its actions to militarize the Black Sea region and its hybrid campaigns designed to maintain a climate of tension and insecurity close to Romania’s borders, all determine Romania to firmly continue its overarching process, started in 2015 and designed to develop robust deterrence and defense capabilities”, the document reads on page six. A dozen pages later, the document refers again to the Russian security threat. It is in part generic, and although it doesn’t specifically mention the Russian Federation, the reference is implicit: “The reemergence of countries that seek to become regional leaders and challenge and even infringe on existing international law standards, has prompted an increase in the risks and threats to global security in general and Romania in particular”. However, the previous article, makes no confusion about the source of this threat, in a language specific to the world of diplomacy: “The attitude and actions of the Russian Federation that resulted in the breach of standards of international law have perpetuated and extended disputes with some Western and NATO states, creating major impediments in identifying sustainable solutions with a view to ensuring stability, predictability and security”.
More or better?
It is worth noting at this point a subtlety regarding the destination of military spending triggered by the war in Ukraine: what will the additional funds be used for? Many politicians and generals in various countries have argued in favor of more tanks and more servicemen. But strength does not always lie in numbers. Again, let’s take the example of France. Paradoxically, Paris is cutting back on its procurement of military equipment. The French air forces will have 48 less Rafale jets, 15 less A400M carriers and nearly 500 less Griffon and Jaguar armored vehicles than originally planned. Is this a good thing? General Thierry Burkhard, the chief of France’s Defense Staff, claims this is the right way forward. Critics don’t distinguish between a capable army and a sizable one, the French general argued. “It makes no sense having an army to parade on Bastille Day but which cannot fight”, Burkhard said. The number of tanks, ships and aircraft may not increase as it should, but the existing equipment must be fully operational. “When you buy a tank, you should also have the properly trained people to operate it, to have munition and spare parts allowing you to take it out in the field”, general Burkhard also said.
Let’s discuss a different example now. According to estimates, 40% of Poland’s 52-billion-złoty defense budget for 2021 (approximately 11.5 billion EURO) covered personnel costs: the salaries of professional servicemen, civilian employees and military pensions. According to Veridica, a simple calculation shows that in order to double its army (300,000 servicemen, one of the objectives mentioned in Poland’s Law on the Defense of the Motherland), Poland will require additional funds that should also cover the potential increases in military pay and the costs of training and recruiting new soldiers. All that given Poland’s defense budget in 2021 stood at 2.2%.
The Putin effect: NATO is closing ranks
Four years ago, the then president of the United States, Donald Trump, lectured European countries with respect to allotting 2% of their GDP to defense spending. The White House leader particularly criticized Denmark. “For the record, Denmark is only at 1.35% of GDP for NATO spending. They are a wealthy country and should be at 2%. We protect Europe and yet, only 8 of the 28 NATO countries are at the 2% mark. The United States is at a much, much higher level than that...”, Donald Trump tweeted. Such statements were not isolated throughout Donald Trump’s mandate at the White House, the American president going as far as threatening the USA would leave the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Trump’s mandate ended without the USA withdrawing from NATO, but also without producing any radical change in terms of NATO members’ contributions to military spending. It can be argued that where Donald Trump failed, Vladimir Putin, the mastermind of the plans to invade Ukraine, appears to have succeeded. Most European nations quickly got to view Moscow’s war of aggression as “the biggest security threat in Europe since the Cold War”. As a result, European parliaments and governments displayed a growing readiness to shore up their military budgets.
And for Putin’s failure to be complete, we need only add the latest wave of NATO expansion (Finland and Sweden renounced their neutrality to join the Alliance, and the former’s accession has already been formally ratified) as well as the Alliance’s decision to deploy additional international troops on its eastern borders.
