Latvia must be prepared for everything in its defense: in the short term for versatile hybrid attacks, and in the long term even for a broader and more direct attack.
Drones, a damaged cable, and an attack on a museum
Although talk of a Russian attack on Latvia is nothing new, events in recent months once again bring into focus Latvia’s readiness for various scenarios. A drone with explosives over Latvia, a drone over the Riga international airport, the damaging of communication cable in the Baltic Sea, an attack on the Occupation Museum in Riga, and ultimately the uncertainties related to the war in Ukraine in the Trump era, once again raise the question of the ability of Latvia and the entire Baltic region to defend themselves in the event of various types of attacks. In addition, the attempts in recent years from Belarus to forcefully push migrants from Iraq and other countries into Latvia, as well as Lithuania and Poland have not been forgotten.
Almost all of these events have been called hybrid attacks, most likely organized by Russia and Belarus. Only the origin of the drone over Riga airport is unclear. However, here too, the responsible institutions have unofficially indicated that the drones’ purpose was to threaten civilian flights over Latvia. The police are currently investigating this matter.
“Classic” disinformation has not disappeared either. For example, shortly before the European Parliament elections in June 2024, Andrejs Kozlovs, a representative of the “For Stability” party, announced that Latvia was ready to directly involve its army in the Russian-Ukrainian war. The “For Stability” party was previously known for its ambiguous position regarding this war and its participants. There was also fake news that NATO would deploy nuclear weapons in Latvia, while women would be forcibly conscripted into the army and sent to the front.
Latvian Ambassador to NATO Maris Riekstins said that a surprise major attack on Latvia would be impossible, as Russia wouldn’t be able to hide its preparations. As for a surprise minor attack, it could successfully be repelled by Latvian and NATO forces already in the country. In turn, the new commander of the Latvian Army, Kaspars Pudans, emphasizes that it is impossible to reveal all response scenarios to the Russian attack, but the scenario of the annexation of Crimea, when Russia’s “little green men” suddenly appeared is highly unlikely. Meanwhile, a study made by Baltic journalists concluded that the invasion of Ukraine has significantly reduced the capabilities of the Russian military, but at least some of what has been lost has been regained. Moreover, Russia’s arsenal near the Baltic states has grown.
A direct attack is currently not possible, but hybrid attacks can be very diverse
Latvian experts interviewed by “Veridica” have different opinions on the security situation. Karlis Bukovskis, a doctor of political science at Rīga Stradiņš University, says that the situation has not changed significantly: “We are safe, but we must remember that he who protects himself, God also protects”. In other words, Latvia must continue to purposefully develop its military capabilities. This means both the ability to repel hybrid attacks, where “Russians and Belarusians will not lack imagination”, and in the distant future – to repel a direct military attack. Latvia and NATO forces in Latvia must be able to hold out for 72 hours until reinforcements arrive. “We are building muscles so that they don't even want to attack us”, says Bukovskis.
Also, military analyst Martin Verdins rejects the possibility of a direct or conventional invasion of Latvia and the Baltics. However, a hybrid war is already more likely. From a military point of view, “something similar to what happened in Ukraine in 2014 could happen here”. For instance, some internal instability appears and armed opposition carries out sabotage. Verdins thinks that Latvia can handle a “small hybrid war”, but if the attack is more widespread, then the support of allies will be needed. According to the analyst, “the security situation in the Baltics has been deteriorating over the past 20 years”. The danger has grown gradually: first, there was Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 2007 Munich speech, in which he called for a change in the world order, then – in 2008 – the attack on Georgia, and in 2014 the annexation of Crimea, followed by the large scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Ieva Berzina, a researcher at the Latvian National Defence Academy, says that the situation in the Baltics is difficult to analyze because Trump’s policy is unclear. “We could wake up and find out that Trump has said something else”, she comments. However, she calls for the drone flights over Latvia to be taken seriously. “Whatever it was, it is better to overestimate the threat than to underestimate it. It doesn't matter how it was intended, what matters is that we act as if it were a threat. In this way, the opponent’s weaknesses are sought and trust in state institutions is undermined because the drone flights sparked discussions in Latvian society”, says Berzina.
Latvia’s readiness is growing, but not sufficiently
Even though Latvia is working very seriously on strengthening its military capabilities, more could be done. Martin Verdins points out that Latvia has not invested enough money in its army for years. What has been lost must now be regained in a short time, by quickly upgrading weapons, as well as increasing the number of people who can defend the country. He also emphasizes that Latvia should already ask its allies to lend it weapons that Latvia does not have, but which it will buy later. Since the Baltics are an outpost of Russia, the allies should help.
In his opinion, Latvia is technically ready for many things. For example, a drone flying over Latvia with explosives could have been shot down. Latvia has also been able to prevent cyberattacks. However, the country is less prepared to face an online disinformation campaign according to Verdins: “I do not guarantee that we would not end up in a situation where the government is led by a party similar to the one that currently rules Georgia [that] will turn the country in a different direction”.
Berzina, on the other hand, emphasizes that the unity of Latvian society, the ability to cooperate, the sense of belonging to the country, as well as the readiness to defend one’s country are at an average level. If compared with Finland, then in all indicators, Latvia has lower rankings, says Berzina, who has studied these issues. “Many things have been done, and the situation is improving. We are at an average level, but we have a lot to do. When thinking about crisis preparedness, we need to think about political and social aspects”, she explains. However, the situation can be improved. People are already becoming more civically active, but ideally, everyone should know what to do in emergencies. She is critical of the so-called 72-hour bag. Institutions have repeatedly encouraged people to prepare a bag containing basic necessities that people can survive on for three days. Berzina admits that such a bag encourages fleeing rather than resistance.
Bukovskis points out that the idea of a direct attack on the Baltics is popular in the West, where politicians are trying to convince their citizens that more money should be invested in defense. However, in his opinion, Russia is too busy in Ukraine to do anything in the Baltics. In addition, Russia has other territories that it, according to its ideology, has lost. These include Georgia, Central Asia, and even Belarus has not been completely taken over. There is also the question of influence in the Arctic, the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and the Baltic Sea. However, if Latvia and Europe are ready for a potential attack, a Russian attack is less likely. Bukovskis stresses that Putin is an opportunist who will take advantage of the situation. Thus, Latvia should not give this opportunity.
The worst is not noticing anything
Verdins believes that the worst-case scenario is not being prepared. In his opinion, the most dangerous situation will arise if Ukraine and Russia agree on a ceasefire, and Russia will be able to turn its attention to other countries. In three to five years, Russia could be ready for a new war. In his opinion, Latvia should have the capacity to stop, at some point, no further than 100 – 150 kilometers inside its territory, a major Russian assault, just as the Ukrainians did. Also, Latvia and the other Baltic countries must be able to defend themselves for about a month, until NATO troops arrive in sufficient numbers. However, in order to be able to defend themselves for that long, each of the Baltic states needs at least two mechanized infantry brigades. Brigades usually have several thousand soldiers. Latvia does not have two brigades of its own. In relations with the US, he recommends responding to the US interest in the Arctic. Latvia is located relatively close to the northern territories; it has access to the northern seas, as well as ports and shipyards. Because of such economic interests, the current US leadership could be more interested in the defense of the Baltics. Though, he is skeptical that the Baltics will face easy days in the future. Even if Russia changes leadership, its revanchist policies will continue. Thus, Latvia must be prepared.
