Europe’s defense capacity: the Ukraine test

Europe’s defense capacity: the Ukraine test
© EPA-EFE/JUSTIN TALLIS/POOL   |   Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky, Britain's Prime Minister Keir Starmer and France's President Emmanuel Macron chat after holding a meeting during a summit on Ukraine at Lancaster House in London, Britain, 02 March 2025.

The signals given by the US regarding Ukraine and whether it intends to maintain or observe the existing transatlantic defense commitments are forcing Europeans to rethink their security. However, building an independent defense capacity at the European level entails costs of hundreds of billions and may face boycott from extremists.

Europe's geopolitical position regarding the Ukraine conflict and the ceasefire negotiations is a perfect barometer of the continent's future defense and geopolitical capabilities. Although the European leaders’ actions seem internally inconsistent and unproductive in the current context, and the EU remains largely ignored at the "big table" of the American-Russian-Ukrainian negotiations hosted by Saudi Arabia, Europe matters more than it may look. And post-Brexit Britain is becoming a vital security partner for Europeans.

Macron's ignored proposal has had consequences: Europeans are finding a voice for themselves

Immediately after the Trump-Zelensky clash on February 28, the emergency meeting in Paris of the European leaders ended without any apparent consequences. Frustrated, the media concluded that Europe did not have the political will and, possibly, the means to replace an America that was "taking control" of Ukraine and that, later, would even announce the cessation of any aid to the country, even though Trump seems to have reversed his decision.

Emmanuel Macron's proposal for a partial truce – in the air, at sea and with regard to the energy infrastructure – aroused a vague interest, but only as an idea that could unblock some negotiations that were hypothetical anyway. The only positive reaction came from Vladimir Zelensky who, after the clash in Washington, had every interest in considering any alternative. Other more or less emergency meetings of European leaders followed, after which the US unilaterally announced the start of peace negotiations in Saudi Arabia.

Despite all the pleasantries exchanged with Trump, both Macron – delegitimized by the French elections – and the British Prime Minister Keith Starmer have seemingly found themselves outside the geopolitical game, as the main exponents of a Europe that fails to reach consensus on a relevant global stance and does not have the military means or areas of influence to impose it.

There was a time when questions about the role of the European Union in the new multipolar context – in fact about the very existence of such a role – seemed legitimate. However, the negotiations launched in Saudi Arabia between the Americans, Russians and Ukrainians (separately) have led exactly to the step proposed by Macron: a partial truce. And the US’ and Russia’s ability to achieve results is, until proven otherwise, about the same as that of Europe’s, now removed from the game, as long as the proposal made in Saudi Arabia is accepted only by Ukraine, and Putin, very much into blowing kisses to Trump, has suggested a series of conditions regarding Ukraine’s territory and membership in NATO, which do not seem to lead to any understanding.

If we ask ourselves what Europe could have done more or better about the Ukraine issue, the answer would be: exactly what it has done. It launched a reasonable proposal or state of mind, after the catastrophe of the Zelensky-Trump-Vance meeting. Beyond the fact that it is the only reasonable one at the moment, the proposal for a partial truce has two other qualities. First, it does not defy the morality of global politics by suggesting that Ukraine should cede territory or be denied access to NATO. It leaves the dirty work to the great strategist Donald Trump, who is very motivated to complete the "first 24 hours of his term" in which he promised to end the war in Ukraine. And second, it is a trigger for reflection that generates a strategic repositioning of the EU member states, and not only theirs.

"The Coalition of the Willing". 5 years after Brexit, London returns by the side of the Europeans as a vital security partner

All of the above has transformed the European Union into a majority (even if not unanimity) which is aware that it must mobilize itself in order to create a common defense capability, which is essential for a geopolitical stance. The issue of sending European peacekeeping troops to Ukraine, which has divided the member states, has come to the fore. Hence the idea of ​​a "coalition of the willing", made up of the states that agree to send such troops. Such a coalition leaves Eurotoxic leaders like Hungary's Viktor Orbán or Slovakia's Robert Fico offside, because it is created outside of the European mechanisms, in which they have the right of veto. The idea is promoted especially by the British Prime Minister Keith Starmer, and the decisive involvement of a post-Brexit United Kingdom, which has a significant military force though, shows that the map of Europe is also beginning to be redrawn according to geostrategic imperatives. The European Council of the EU country leaders will count less in the context of ​​a "coalition of the willing", and countries "less willing" to make defense efforts will lose their negotiating power within the Union in the future.

It is also worth noting the relative discretion of Brussels itself in the current context. With the exception of a proposal   for 800 billion euros in defense funding made by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, the heads of the EU institutions have been less communicative on the matter. This is preferable to the "photo ops" in Tel Aviv after the Gaza attack, by the same President of the Commission, which were rightly sanctioned as having no geopolitical weight or negotiating power behind them.

Europe's defense costs hundreds of billions annually and is also threatened by the extremists’ boycott

Experts are warning that creating a European army and, in general, completely replacing the US “umbrella” is an operation that could take, at best, years. The costs are substantial. The Financial Times has calculated that the so-called “peace dividend”, that is, the defense spending saved by European countries as a result of America’s protection, between 1995 and 2023, amounts to 387 billion dollars per. year  (almost as much in euros); that is how much more the European states would spend together each year if they allocated 3.5% of the GDP to defense. The amount does not make the Commission’s proposal to spend a total of 800 billion euros on armaments seem at all enormous. It is also worth noting that the Brussels-based Bruegel think tank estimates that, if the Americans step back, an additional annual effort of 250 billion Euros will be needed at EU level for defense  in order to deter Russia. And the "European army", however created and configured, would need 300,000 more people.

The European public opinion is favorable, in principle, to increasing the defense capacity, but there are also pressures, coming from the populist/pro-Russian/extremist area, which can discourage politicians when they come up with such initiatives.

Proof of this is the very attitude adopted by Romania regarding the “coalition of the willing”. Before the meeting of the defense ministers in Paris, the interim president Ilie Bolojan stated  that Romania would not send peacekeeping troops to Ukraine. In the above-mentioned context, the very invitation addressed to Romania is a plus, and a negative response decreases the country’s maneuverability. After all, the conflict in Ukraine is closer to us than to other countries, and in case of an active involvement, Romania could maintain its position as the “southern pillar” of NATO’s eastern flank or of any coalition that could ensure the military stability of Europe. As a reason for Romania’s contrary attitude, Bolojan only formulated a vague explanation, related to the “lack of parliamentary support” for such a measure.

For lack of a more convincing explanation, we can attribute this positioning to the election campaign, in which the decision to send troops to Ukraine would provide extremist candidates with plenty of topics to discuss. This is also suggested by the fact that one of the extremist leaders kept claiming  that Bolojan wanted the troops to be sent even after he had explicitly denied it.

Europe is moving towards a new configuration, with the countries that understand the need for defense at the forefront

Theodore Roosevelt's much-quoted precept "speak softly and carry a big stick" (which means "adopt a conciliatory/non-confrontational tone, but have a big stick on you nonetheless") - seems to be the exact opposite of Donald Trump's foreign policy. While the precept referred to calm, peaceful negotiations, backed by considerable military force, the US in the Trump era is, on the contrary, interested in the noisy and conflictual affirmation of a new identity, coupled with disinterest in the military and in areas of influence. However, the European leaders who seem to have assumed this principle - Macron or Starmer -, through a conciliatory and moderate attitude, combined with realistic and limited actions, had much to gain, beyond appearances.

The new geopolitical configuration will favor countries and leaders who manage to think several moves in advance, which is completely different from the grandiose attacks and shows for his own electorate given by Donald Trump at the meeting with Zelensky. The capacity for self-defense is undoubtedly one of Europe’s long-term goals. Theodore Roosevelt also stated that if a country cannot protect its own interests, the international community will not be able to do it to a great extent. An idea that is very similar to Donald Tusk's witticism: "Right now, 500 million Europeans are begging 300 million Americans to defend them from 140 million Russians who have not been able to bring 50 million Ukrainians to their knees for three years."

There are plenty of European leaders who have noticed the absurdity – and they are winners in the new context. Friedrich Merz's statements and intentions are also clear, after his appointment as Chancellor of Germany, to the point where there is talk of a "restart of the Franco-German engine" of Europe, given Macron's recent high-impact political gestures.

If Romania emerges from the sign of electoral caution after the presidential elections, it will have a better place in the new European geopolitical configuration. Otherwise, we will be relegated to a Europe that is increasingly united, but around different poles than today.

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