On April 9, the Estonian Parliament passed a law on churches and parishes aimed at forcing the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate to sever its canonical ties with Moscow.
There was virtually no doubt that the law would be adopted: it was supported by both ruling coalition parties and some opposition forces. Only conservative politicians from EKRE and the Centre Party, who largely rely on the Russian-speaking electorate, opposed it. Thus, although the vote was not as unanimous as it was when passing the law depriving Russian citizens of voting rights, the initiators achieved their goal.
As the Russian Patriarchy supported the War in Ukraine, Estonia moved against its Moscow-aligned Church
Although the majority of ethnic Estonians are Lutherans, Orthodoxy remains the most popular denomination in the country. There are many Orthodox churches in Estonia, some of them quite famous, like the Alexander Nevsky Cathedral, situated right across from the Parliament building, at the highest point in Tallinn, or the women’s Orthodox convent in Kuremäe, in North-Eastern Estonia. Both the cathedral and the convent are stavropegial, meaning they report directly to Patriarch Kirill in Moscow.
Estonia also has the Apostolic Orthodox Church, which is subordinate to the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and primarily unites ethnic Estonians. However, its number of parishioners is significantly smaller than that of the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.
The Estonian state — particularly its security and law enforcement ministries — views the Moscow-affiliated church as a soft power instrument of the Kremlin, influencing the local Russian-speaking population and attempting to interfere in domestic politics. In the previous decade, the church maintained close ties with the Centre Party. In 2011, under the centrists’ rule, in Tallinn’s largest district, Lasnamäe — home to a majority of Russian speakers — with funding from Russia was even built an orthodox church. Russian Railways head Vladimir Yakunin personally attended the opening. In return for this gesture of goodwill, Centre Party leader Edgar Savisaar received €1.5 million for his election campaign, sparking a major scandal.
However, the Orthodox Church in Estonia had not faced serious problems with the state before the start of the war in Ucraine.
Everything changed in January 2023, when it was revealed that Metropolitan Eugene planned to hold a prayer service for peace in Tallinn together with the Koos political movement, led by Aivo Peterson. The movement holds openly pro-Russian views; its supporters believe Estonia should not support Ukraine. After a controversial trip to Donbas, Peterson ended up in prison, charged with treason. The Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (EOCMP) was mentioned in the annual report of the Estonian Internal Security Service, and a year after the cancelled prayer service, the metropolitan was forced to leave the country.
The immediate cause of his departure was his refusal to publicly condemn the position of Patriarch Kirill of Moscow, who effectively supports Russian aggression in Ukraine. From the point of view of then Minister of the Interior Lauri Läänemets, this was grounds enough to revoke Metropolitan Eugene’s residence permit in Estonia.
Talinn wants the Orthodox Church to severe ties with Moscow
But the Ministry of the Interior didn’t stop there. Estonian security services demanded that the EOCMP completely sever its ties with Moscow and come under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. For the Church, this was unacceptable. Nevertheless, it tried to compromise with the authorities by removing any reference to subordination to Moscow from its name. In September 2024, it attempted to amend its charter to be renamed simply the Estonian Orthodox Church. However, a judge ruled this illegal, noting that there was already another Orthodox church in Estonia. A second attempt — to use the name Estonian Christian Orthodox Church — was approved, but only after similar difficulties.
Yet this still did not satisfy the authorities. They continued to demand that the EOCMP break from the Moscow Patriarchate and initiated a draft law forcing it to do so. If the Church fails to take the necessary steps within two months after the law’s adoption, its activities will be suspended and its property transferred to the state.
It is worth noting that while Patriarch Kirill is widely disapproved of in Estonian society, the bill restricting the activities of the EOCMP has drawn criticism — not only from the Russian-speaking population. Some Estonian conservative politicians opposed the law. Member of Parliament Varro Vooglaid stated that the bill violates freedom of religion: “This is a mafia-style approach: either you do what we say, pay us, or your shop gets blown up. And then they say: our goal isn’t to blow up the shop, don’t panic, we just want to settle this like friends.”
Some Lutheran priests in Estonia have spoken out in defense of the Orthodox Church — one of them even compared the situation to Kafka’s The Trial. Editorial boards of major Estonian media outlets also raised concerns. Eesti Päevaleht, for example, wrote:
“After the Social Democrats (the former Minister of the Interior who initiated the bill is a Social Democrat – Ed.) were ousted from the government, it’s time to slow down with this bill as well. It clearly divides society. Instead of solving the problem, it may create new ones out of nothing.”
The editorial emphasized that Estonia, as a rule-of-law state, cannot presume malicious intent when no crime has been committed: “Priests serving in Estonia have not engaged in war propaganda — otherwise we would have heard about it long ago. The Church has abided by Estonian law,” the Estonian journalists wrote.
Meanwhile, the Ministry of the Interior has held its ground, even under a new minister.
“It was a historical mistake for there to be two Orthodox churches in Estonia. Before the Soviet occupation, there was no canonical subordination to Moscow in the Republic of Estonia. That came with the Soviet occupation and was imposed by force,” Interior Minister Igor Taro (Estonia 200) told ERR.
Unconstitutional?
The law has not yet come into force, and the Church intends to fight back. The Pühtitsa (Kuremäe) convent has already asked the president to veto the law and appealed to international organizations for support.
“The adopted law contradicts both the Estonian Constitution and international legal norms. We see strong legal grounds to challenge it in court. Furthermore, there is hope that the president may refuse to promulgate it precisely because of its unconstitutionality. It is known that his legal advisers have already expressed concerns about the law’s content,” said Artur Knyazev, a sworn attorney at Boutique Legal representing the church in Estonian courts, in a comment to Veridica.
“We do not have the right to dissolve a religious organization not for its own actions, but for the actions of others who are beyond its control,” he explained, emphasizing that the principle of individual responsibility is a cornerstone of a modern legal state.
In his view, Estonian authorities and parliament have failed to fully consider the consequences of the law — for example, the fate of the Church’s property was never properly analyzed. “During the readings of the bill, relevant questions were raised repeatedly, but no answers were given. This indicates the haste and lack of preparation behind the legislative initiative. Only after the law was passed did the former Minister of the Interior say that the property may be transferred to the state,” said Knyazev. He added that estimating the potential financial damage is currently difficult.
Former Minister of the Interior Lauri Läänemets had earlier suggested that even if the Church’s property is transferred to the state, it would likely be returned to the ‘Russian Orthodox.’ But Knyazev is skeptical: “If the Russian Orthodox agree to the blatantly unlawful demand to change their Church, they might be allowed to use the property — but only at the cost of losing the independence they currently enjoy. There are no guarantees, conditions, or clear plans — only an abstract idea of a vicariate under the Ecumenical Patriarchate.”
The final word in this story has yet to be written, but one thing is clear: the law has done little to improve relations between the Russian-speaking minority and the Estonian state — and therefore its effectiveness in strengthening internal security remains highly questionable.
