Belarusian ultras opposing Lukashenko are now fighting for Ukraine

Belarusian ultras opposing Lukashenko are now fighting for Ukraine
© EPA-EFE/Oleg Petrasyuk   |   Members of the Belarusian community and Ukrainian activists take part in a march to honor killed Euromaidan revolution activist Mykhailo Zhyznevsky, and all Belarusians who died fighting for Ukraine, in Kyiv, Ukraine, 26 January 2024, amid the Russian invasion.

On July 20, 2024, in Warsaw, 20 football teams took part in an amateur football tournament called “The tournament in memory of Mikita Kryucou”. Although it looked like a usual summer competition for football fans, it was covered by the Belarusian independent media and visited by important figures in Belarusian football, who were living in exile. The reason is the name and the occasion: Mikita Kryúcoú was a fan of Maladziečna Football Club, who was died during the 2020 anti-government protests in Belarus; many believed he was murdered by the Lukashenko regime enforcement agencies. He got famous on August 9, 2020, when during a mass demonstration in Minsk he approached the regime riot police with Belarusian national white-red-white flag and told them to stop violence against peaceful protesters. On August 12, 2020, he disappeared, and some two weeks later, on August the 24th, he was found hanged on a tree in a forest. An official investigation reported that he “intentionally damaged himself, which led to death”, although his body had evidence of brutal violence. No independent expertise of the body was allowed. Mikita Kryúcoú was one of the first people and the first football fan to be murdered by the regime during and after the 2020 protests. This is one of the most important moments in the history of the Belarusian ultras’ ongoing fight against dictatorship.

After Ukrainian ultras fought Ianukovici and the (pro)Russians, the regime in Minsk decided to clampdown on Belarusian ultras

Like any other autocratic system in the world, the Lukashenko regime has never welcomed the existence of any organizations outside its control, football fan groups included. However, before 2014, Minsk did not conduct any organized repression campaign against the ultras. The governments did try to limit their activity, the riot police would occasionally charge the stadium terraces – usually when pyro was used – and some ultras would sometimes be arrested.

Events in neighboring Ukraine would change that. Ukrainian ultras played a big role during the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine and afterwards were first to join volunteer formations to fight against Russia-backed separatists in the East of the country. Minsk took note and decided to act against its own ultras. I was present at the pre-season meeting at the Belarusian Football Federation Headquarters in spring 2014, when the heads of GUBOPIK (the special police department officially responsible for combating organized crime and corruption but in reality serving as political police) publicly declared the war on ultras and hooligans in Belarus. According to their words, the ultras should be exterminated as a movement, as they posed a threat to normal functioning of the state and security of people and constitutional order. This marked the start to an anti-ultras campaign by the regime with the use of political police and state propaganda.

The ultras groups were deemed organized criminal groups, which was underlined in the propagandist materials. This had a small influence on the people of Belarus, as state propaganda could never boast a big audience, but still was an indicator of the state's attitude to people coming to football stadiums to support their teams. As all the sport clubs in Belarus are state-controlled, there was no possibility for the clubs to do something about these practices of the regime. For example, the cameras were installed at all football stadiums to watch directly the tribunes, where the ultras were located. Police officers would also be placed, with cameras, at the tribune entrances, filming the faces of all those who got in. 

Travelling to an away game became also a challenge. If the away fans would come by bus, they would be escorted by the police to the stadium. If they would come by train, police vehicles would usually be waiting for the groups, to transport them straight to the stadium (during the “good days”) or to police stations (during the “bad days”), where they would either be requested to provide all the data about themselves or be beaten by the riot police just for fun. The latter didn’t happen very often, but when it did, it was impossible to hold anyone accountable for the beatings. Sometimes after these visits to the police stations – I was calling them “social rides” – the fans would be arrested for 15 days for false accusations of “breaking public order” (for example, cursing in public). The only witnesses in the court to prove these accusations were of course the other police officers. 

At the same time, lists of the active fans of all the clubs were created. Before every season, police officers would visit the house of every person on those lists and spoke to them “in order to prevent illegal activities”. They visited people’s homes even if they had not been involved with the ultras for a long time. The government also wanted to control and censor messages and symbols printed on banners and t-shirts, and the ultras’ chants.

Any clashes between rival groups of ultras were treated like the activities of organized criminal groups or armed robbery acts. As a result, there were a couple of cases when the fans were sentenced to 9 or 10 years in prison for participation in fights on the outskirts of the cities.

National identity, COVID policies and the rigging of elections. How the ultras and Lukashenko came head to head

Belarusian ultras are promoting national symbols and Belarusian language as well as strongly supporting the sovereignty of Belarus and opposing the integration of the country into Russia. That’s unacceptable for Lukashenko’s regime, which has been carrying a pro-Russian policy that included the suppression of the Belarusian national identity. From the very beginning of his rule in 1994, Alexander Lukashenko has done everything to ban Belarusian national symbols (coat of arms, flag, hymn) and decrease the use of Belarusian language. Instead, the symbols from the era of Soviet occupation of Belarus and Russian language are the backbone of the Lukashenko regime. Lukashenko even called Belarusians “Russians with a quality sign” and stated that “Moscow is our capital”.

Promoting national identity thus became a trademark of the opposition to Lukashenko regime, and the ultras came to be seen as part of that opposition, although they mostly preferred to stay out of politics.

The football fans proved that they could find common ground across club rivalries during the Covid-19 pandemic, when most of them decided to boycott the games. At the time, Belarus was the only country in the world not to stop official football competitions, as the regime downplayed the pandemic, hid the statistics on deaths, failed to implement any measures to protect the citizens from the disease, and didn’t provide the doctors with the means to fight Covid.

With the pandemic still ongoing, the ultras got political, as starting with August 9, 2020, they joined the mass protests against the rigging of the presidential election in cities all over the country. In Minsk, for instance, fans of Dinamo often stood side by side with their Partizan archenemies against the brutality of Lukashenko regime riot and political police. That was unheard of, as even in terms of political leanings the two groups go head to head – while Dinamo ultras are right wing, the Partisan ones are one of the few left-wing firms in Eastern Europe. Throughout the history of modern fan-movement of Belarus this rivalry had been the biggest and most well-known. And yet, all that rivalry was put aside as they marched for democratic changes, sovereignty and European future for Belarus.

Many ultras played a big role in the protests of 2020. One of the most famous examples is the case of Siarhei Patsukevich and Andrei Sudas – two fans of Tarpieda (Minsk) were probably the most active participants in the protests during Lukashenko’s visit to Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant – one of the most important enterprises of the Belarusian military industry, – where they both worked. On August 17, the dictator personally came to meet the workers of the plant but was told to “f*ck off” and to “shoot himself” by the crowd. After that, the two ultras were persecuted by the regime enforcement agencies: while Andrei was able to flee to Poland, Siarhei was arrested and sentenced to 6 years in prison.

Aliaksandr Suzko – a Slavia Mazyr fan – spent almost 3 years in prison for taking part in the peaceful protests in his native city. Before that, he also worked as a mascot of Slavia on matchdays. The club never commented on the situation and didn’t offer any help to Aliaksandr, who after serving his full term had to flee to Poland because of the threat of being imprisoned once again (such situations happen with Belarusian political prisoners, especially famous ones).

As the governments’ crackdown increased following the 2020 protests, many football ultras had to leave the country. Many chose Poland, as there were good contacts between Belarusian and Polish ultras. For example, the BATE Barysau ultras are friends with those of Piast Gliwice, the Tarpieda Minsk and Legia Warsaw “firms” are connected and so are Nioman Hrodna and Jagiellonia Białystok. Besides Poland, there were two other neighbouring countries that ultras fleeing political persecution flocked to: Lithuania and Ukraine.

Fighting for Ukraine to liberate Belarus

The Belarus government supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by allowing Russian troops to use its territory to launch an attack from the North. However, many Belarusians supported Ukraine, and ultras were among them. Some defended Kyiv from the very first days and became the founders of the Kastuś Kalinoúski regiment – the first Belarusian formation in the ranks of Armed Forces of Ukraine. The most famous of them is Ihar Yankou, whose call sign “Yankee”. He is currently a machine-gun operator at the Belarusian Volunteer Corps, which is a part of the Foreign Legion in Ukraine. A fan of Dinamo Minsk, Yankou is very popular on social networks – his Instagram account has over 218 thousand followers. Initially he got famous for showing his action and daily life at war as well as chat-roulette pranks of Russians supporting the war. 

Another famous figure in the ranks of football ultras on the frontline is Vitali Piharaú, nicknamed Puma, who is one of the leaders of the Dinamo Minsk ultrase. Puma has a long story of fighting against the Lukashenko regime. He was jailed in 2016 for “dissemination of pornography” after his shared on his VK social network account a condom commercial that had won a silver medal at the Cannes Lions International Festival of Creativity. Apparently, the charges were politically motivated and he was targeted because of his growing influence and his contacts with football ultras from Ukraine. During the two and a half years Piharaú spent in prison, Dinamo ultras boycotted the matches of the team inside the country.

A centre of support for Belarusian volunteers fighting in Ukraine is currently operating in Warsaw. It is gathering aid for the armed formations of Belarusians and also helping people who would like to join them. The organization is managed by Paviel Kuchta – call sign “Villy” – a veteran of war in Ukraine, who can’t be on the frontline any more because of his health. He is also an ultra and, more importantly, he is the brother of Mikita Kryúcoú. He couldn’t hide his emotions, when he spoke about the creation of another detachment in Kastuś Kalinoúski Regiment – “Mikita Kryúcoú UAV squad”. Now the formation, named after the fan killed by the Lukashenko regime, is fighting against Russian invaders backed by the Lukashenko regime.

“For something to become possible in Belarus, we must defeat the enemy here… I think that the war will continue for a long time. But after that, I would like to have the opportunity to come to a free Belarus or liberate Belarus. This option also suits me,” – Yankee said in a 2023 interview. That’s one of the common messages of Belarusian ultras fighting against Russian invaders in Ukraine: we have a common enemy, so we’re fighting in Ukraine for liberating Belarus as well.

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