In 2020, the Belarusian society rose in protest against the rigging of the presidential elections. However, by deploying security forces, the Lukashenko regime managed to retain power. In response, Western countries imposed sanctions, which intensified following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Despite this, four years later, the Belarusian economy is showing growth, inflation remains low, and foreign trade is gaining momentum. Belarusian officials claim that the sanctions are making Belarus stronger, but is this really the case?
The Belarusian economy has been operating under sanctions long before 2020. Since the late 1990s, nearly every electoral campaign triggered a reaction from the West, resulting in various restrictions. Some of these sanctions were aimed at individuals involved in human rights violations, while others impacted state enterprises and entire sectors of the economy. However, sanctions were just one of the tools used by the West. For years, the EU followed a “stick and carrot” approach, so until 2020, Belarus benefited significantly from Western financial support, both directly through loans and indirectly via access to the European financial infrastructure.
The most severe sanctions were imposed following the 2020 presidential elections and Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. These included restrictions on Belarusian exporters of petroleum products and potash fertilizers, aviation carriers, and limitations on the financial sector.
The Belarusian economy has gradually begun to adapt to the sanctions imposed on it, and Minsk was even able to profit from the sanctions imposed on Russia. However, the economic growth Belarus is experiencing under these sanctions does not necessarily indicate successful overcoming of these restrictions.
Western sanctions had little impact on Belarus’ economy, as its exporters switched to the Russian market
Sanctions have been the primary tool for exerting pressure on the Belarusian authorities, as they are the most viable option available to Western countries in dealing with Minsk’s policies. Over the years, up to a third of Belarus's foreign trade has been with EU.
Sanctions have blocked European capital from entering the Belarusian market and prevented many Belarusian goods from accessing the EU market. One of the most impactful measures has been the halt of Belarusian goods transit through the Lithuanian port of Klaipeda, depriving Belarus of the shortest route for exporting potash fertilizers and other goods to third-country markets.
Since 2020, Belarusian exports to the EU have plummeted drastically. The biggest losses have been in trade with the Baltic states—Lithuania, Latvia — as well as with Poland. The hardest hit sectors are oil refining and potash fertilizer exports. Meanwhile, the import of European goods into Belarus has remained largely unchanged. This is primarily due to the fact that many of these imports are now destined for the Russian market, benefiting from the asymmetrical imposition of sanctions on Belarus and Russia.
Western sanctions on Belarus have not been imposed all at once but rather gradually, often with delayed effects. This allowed Belarus to prepare for their consequences, enabling a significant portion of its exports to be redirected to new markets, primarily Russia and Central Asia. Belarus continues its efforts to penetrate other Asian markets, as well as those in Africa and Latin America. However, statistics show that these attempts have not yet yielded substantial success. On new markets, Belarusian goods face tough competition from Chinese products, which, unlike Belarusian goods, do not encounter severe logistical challenges.
The main factor in Belarus's successful adaptation to sanctions has been its reorientation towards the Russian market. Paradoxically, sanctions on the Russian Federation have aided Belarusian producers, as many European companies have exited the Russian market, leaving niches that Belarusian goods have filled. Consequently, in 2022-2023, trade between Belarus and the Russian Federation has shown significant growth. Previously, Russia accounted for just over half of Belarus's foreign economic relations, but now it constitutes about eighty percent. Additionally, trade with third-country markets now heavily relies on the logistical capacity to ship Belarusian goods through Russia, further deepening Belarus’s dependence on its eastern neighbor.
Sanctions on Russia have also intensified cooperation between Belarusian and Russian companies. Belarus openly acknowledges that many local firms actively collaborate with the Russian military-industrial complex, ranging from light industry enterprises supplying uniforms to the Russian army to high-tech sectors such as optics and IT infrastructure.
While sanctions on Belarusian goods have had limited impact, the sanctions targeting the Belarusian financial sector have proven far more effective. The disconnection of major Belarusian banks from the international SWIFT payment system and the closure of their access to broader international financial infrastructure have been particularly painful for the Belarusian economy. Both the remaining bilateral trade between Belarus and Western countries and the trade Russia conducts through Belarus have suffered as a result. Predictably, the inability to process payments has reduced the flow of goods, even when the physical delivery of these goods is still possible.
The sanctions are causing new rifts in the Belarusian society
Sanctions aimed primarily at the economy inevitably impact the daily lives of the Belarusian population. Although there are no clear indicators that sanctions are causing a decline in income levels or widespread social discontent, some negative effects are evident. These include increased difficulty in obtaining visas for ordinary Belarusians to enter the European Union and the cancellation of direct air and rail passenger services. Belarusians have historically been among the most active applicants for Schengen visas and holders of EU residence permits, particularly in countries like Poland and Lithuania.
Moreover, the strained relations between Belarus and the EU significantly complicate life for the large Belarusian diaspora that emerged in many European countries following the forced migration after 2020. Estimates suggest that between 300,000 and 500,000 Belarusians have left the country, with the most significant presence in Poland (over 300,000 people) and Lithuania (over 70,000 people). For example, sanctions make international money transfers more difficult for Belarusians working or studying abroad. Additionally, cultural, educational, and sports collaborations between the EU and official representatives in Belarus have been put on hold.
Belarusian society holds a nuanced view on sanctions. The country is becoming increasingly polarized on socio-political issues, divided between pro-government supporters and the opposition, with a significant portion of the population remaining passive in expressing their political stance. There are supporters and opponents of sanctions in both camps.
Paradoxically, there are proponents of sanctions in both democratic and pro-government circles. Among those advocating for change, some see sanctions as an effective tool to pressure the official Minsk regime. On the pro-government side, some echo state propaganda that claims sanctions strengthen the economy.
Conversely, opponents of sanctions within democratic circles argue that they are ineffective and harm ordinary Belarusian citizens. Similarly, pro-government supporters emphasize the economic damage caused by sanctions. Consequently, the issue of sanctions further polarizes Belarusian society.
Sanctions have deepened Minsk's dependence on Moscow. However, the Belarusian society has not become predominantly pro-Russian. It remains divided, with pro-Western and pro-Russian factions, while a significant portion of the population tries to remain apolitical in an autocratic system.
Officially, Belarus seeks new allies on the international stage. The country has become the tenth member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and is increasing its engagement with African and Central Asian countries. However, these efforts have yielded more political than economic benefits. Slogans, bilateral meetings, and participation in international organizations have not translated into contracts that bring financial gains to the country. International interactions are ultimately constrained by sanctions and third countries' reluctance to risk secondary sanctions. In such conditions, the Kremlin remains Belarus's sole supporter, both economically and politically.
So far, the sanctions had little impact on Lukashenko’s regime, but they’re likely to impact Belarus on the long term
A crucial aspect of state policy remains the creation of an informational worldview that the authorities propagate domestically. With non-state media effectively purged, the information landscape within the country is almost entirely dominated by state propaganda and government-controlled media. Alternative viewpoints persist only on the internet. Any negative remarks about the government are harshly persecuted. Additionally, Russian media maintains significant influence, as the quality of the informational content produced by Moscow surpasses that of Belarusian media.
After four years of stringent sanctions, Belarus presents an interesting case to the world of how a country can cope and develop despite numerous restrictions on its society and economy. These sanctions have neither led to a change in Alexander Lukashenko’s regime nor a decrease in its repressive measures. Thanks to continued Russian support, alternative export channels, and political engagements with countries neutral towards the sanctions, Belarus manages not only to survive but also to achieve certain successes in development.
However, the economic losses for Belarus are evident, exacerbated by demographic challenges due to population emigration. Belarus is increasingly falling behind its neighboring countries in terms of living standards and incomes. Nevertheless, because negative changes do not occur abruptly, the authorities have been able to adapt. Assessing the economic losses of the country in this regard is futile, as the ultimate indicator for the ruling circles remains the retention of power. In the long term, changes in Belarus are inevitable. However, autocratic regimes rarely concern themselves with such distant prospects, preferring to focus on the here and now.
