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Russia needs weapons and people from allies like North Korea to keep the war in Ukraine going, says the Russian independent international relations expert Pavel Luzin.
Western sanctions have significantly diminished Russia's ability to produce high-performance armament
VERIDICA: It looks like the Western sanctions have not managed to prevent Russia from continuing the war. Do they still make sense?
PAVEL LUZIN: Sanctions turned out to be a long and gradual "strangulation" of the Russian economy. The final planning of the sanctions policy remains unknown, but their impact is evident in the long-term weakening of the economy.
They’ve hit military production the hardest, significantly increasing costs and isolating Russia from international technology and cooperation. Practically Russia has excluded itself from the world system, definitively losing access to the global division of labor. Currently, the equipment arriving in Russia from China cannot replace the supplies of high-quality products from Germany, Japan, South Korea and America, which supported the Russian industry for decades. Although Russia today boasts an increase in the production of metalworking plants, this increase is largely a fiction, since their output is far inferior in value to the Western one, imported in the past. This indicates the use of low-quality components from China and other countries that are brought to Russia. These are assembled disguised as domestic products.
With rising costs and reduced access to quality resources, the Russian industry is facing serious problems. As new workshops and production units are established in Russia, the question of who will provide them with equipment and staff training remains unanswered. Rising manufacturing costs and pressure from sanctions are driving up the cost of production, especially for high-tech products such as military equipment developed since the 1970s and 1980s. Russian industry’s high-tech products inevitably become less qualitative and complex due to the use of outdated equipment and technologies.
VERIDICA: What is the current state of Russia's military-industrial complex?
PAVEL LUZIN: It largely runs on Soviet stocks, which are processed to meet government orders. Much of this equipment was produced in the 1990s and then stored without being used by the troops. It is these stocks that make it possible today to maintain the defense indicators, as they serve as a source of tanks and other equipment, although we are talking about outdated and obsolete models.
Resource issues are also clearly visible in missile production. In the early years of the war, Russia was able to use up most of its stockpiles, but in the third year, production was cut by about half. North Korea has become an important partner for the Russian military, supplying between 50 and 180 missiles that are actively used on the front line. This confirms that Russia's own capabilities are limited and that external support, including assistance from Iran and China, is needed to maintain production. The Russian military is already starting to use Chinese components, which underlines the serious problems of its own production.
In terms of command and interaction within the Russian government, actions in crisis situations show significant dysfunctions. An example is the incident when the Ukrainian army entered Russian territory: in the Kursk region there were no structures on the ground capable of prompt reaction. The problem is compounded by the fact that the Russian leaders do not take the initiative, but wait for orders from above. This means it takes time for approvals to come through and shows organizational inefficiency.
In essence, the Russian state is institutionally weakened, which may even be beneficial for the international community, as a weak state is less able to threaten other countries. However, for Russia itself, this means the need for painful reforms to restore the functionality of the state system and regain confidence in the institutions of power. Such a path requires long-term changes, which not everyone in Russian society is ready to accept.
The Russian nuclear arsenal should be taken seriously, but the risk of nuclear war should not be exaggerated
We should note that if Russia is technically capable of using nuclear weapons, this possibility will always exist - tomorrow, a year from now or ten years from now. This is not a hypothesis, but a fact on which policies should be based. We should do the same thing we did during the Cold War, when no one doubted that the Soviet Union was capable of extreme measures. However, it seems to me that the media talk on the nuclear threat overdramatizes the situation.
Quite a few countries besides the US still support Ukraine. They are unlikely to want to be the losing side in this war. However, as in other protracted conflicts, much depends on the will to fight, not just the amount of material aid. The example of Israel, which has been fighting Hamas and Hezbollah for years, shows that just supplying weapons does not fundamentally change the situation.
Military action requires not only equipment, but also human will and commitment to an idea. Even if Russia runs out of significant resources, the war will not end there. We should also not imagine that a new arms shipment to Ukraine could change the course of the conflict. The situation continues to evolve gradually. Ukraine, despite the war, is successfully implementing reforms that contribute to improving the organizational structure of the army and rearming it, as well as supporting education, culture and healthcare. This support allows the country to exist at a higher level even in the face of war.
"The last time the DPRK fought a major battle was during the Korean War"
VERIDICA: The North Korean army appears to be coming to defend Russia. How will this change the situation on the front?
PAVEL LUZIN: It is not easy to predict how the North Korean army will behave in the current conditions, because its actual combat capability and level of training are unknown. This is an army that has not been in combat for over 70 years and has largely retained a rigid command structure close to slavery. The last time the DPRK fought a major battle was during the Korean War, and even then, its survival was ensured by the support of the USSR and millions of Chinese volunteers.
Given North Korea's possible involvement on the Ukrainian front, it is difficult to predict whether this will prove effective. However, the mere fact that Russia has turned to the DPRK for support highlights the extent of the difficulties is facing. North Korea's involvement in the military conflict can be seen as an attempt by Russia to fill resource gaps. And it is a forced decision rather than a strategic choice. All of these indicate serious internal problems when available funds have already been exhausted and external sources and unpredictable measures are needed to continue the conflict.
