The transition to the next stage of Russia's development is possible only through a violent civil conflict, Russian independent political analyst Alexander Morozov claims. Veridica.ro has talked to him about the reasons why Russians support the war in Ukraine, possibilities regarding Putin's regime change and what Russia will look like once he’s gone.
“Russian Propaganda comes up with new criteria for drawing a rigid division between us and foreigners”
VERIDICA: Many believe that Russians still widely support the war due to poverty, poor education and harsh propaganda. Two and a half years have passed since the outbreak of the full-scale war. Have these reasons changed? What do you think?
Alexander Morozov: I distinguish three circumstances with regard to how Russians feel about the war. First, I agree with the analysts' conclusions that people rally behind the flag. Sociological studies show that, while attitudes were heterogeneous in the first year of the war, two and a half years later people have begun to get used to what is happening. A significant part of the population associates their well-being with the actions of the authorities, so support for the government and for Putin is growing. This is the first circumstance.
The second reason is that a significant part of citizens remains neutral. We’re talking about people who say, “We won’t talk about the war, it is none of our business. We can't influence the war, so we'll mind our own business”. This is the viewpoint of a wide spectrum of people who continue to live and work as they did before the war.
The third important factor is represented by the emergence of new groups of war beneficiaries. We can already notice there are people for whom economic adjustment to war has spelled benefits. They deal with cryptocurrencies, gray imports and exports, the rapid production of goods that have all but disappeared from the market. People in this category are actively gaining wealth, consolidating their position. At the same time, there are people who’ve had a lot to lose from the war and who tend to adopt a position of adversity towards the war.
VERIDICA: Why do such attitudes manifest themselves through inaction and oblivion towards the war, instead of opposition to the regime?
Alexander Morozov: First of all, as Putin’s dictatorship slowly rose to prominence, it managed to create a system that disallows all forms of public expression of political opinion and consolidation. This becames particularly transparent in times of war, as strict rules are put in place to restrict any public activity aimed at freely expressing opinions. It is obvious that, in times of war, there are rules in force corresponding to a state of emergency. Rallies, picketing and any expression of objective information about the war are prohibited. Those who opt for escapism realize that they cannot have a significant impact on the situation, only to be subjected to repression, lose their loved ones and put their families at risk.
VERIDICA: You have been monitoring sociological surveys in Russia. Can you tell us how opinions about the war in Ukraine differ across age brackets in Russia?
Alexander Morozov: The age bracket breakdown of surveys shows very clearly that young people under 25 have a negative attitude towards the war, because they fear mobilization and losing exemption from military service. The greatest support for the war comes from people over 55-60. And the same division applied before the war: young people have always been more progressive, they focus on modernization and link their future to the development of industry in big cities. Conversely, the older generations relate to their life experience and sees modernization as a threat to their well-being, therefore they support the current line of decision-making.
VERIDICA: What about propaganda? How does it impact Russian support for the war?
Alexander Morozov: In peacetime, the Kremlin's narratives played an important role, providing different social categories with images of the world. Today, these narratives work very rigidly, creating an ideological “transponder” that divides people into “us” and “foreigners”. That helps Russian bureaucrats get a firm grip of the situation, although it makes people pay less attention to the propaganda. The more critical it is, the less attention it gets from the general population.
In times of war, those in charge with shaping the Kremlin's ideology come up with new criteria for drawing a rigid division between “us” and “foreigners”. For instance, the terms “foreign agents”, “extremist”, “terrorists”, “Anglo-Saxons” and “unfriendly states” are predominantly used. They are integrated into the educational and cultural system, increasing escapism among the population. I think we can now identify three narratives that endure regardless of the effectiveness of propaganda:
- The West is held accountable for the war. The majority population will believe that the war was caused by Western countries.
- The responsibility for what is happening is shifted towards Putin's collaborators, yet not Putin himself. Should economic problems arise, specific officials will be blamed instead of the president.
- A state of confusion surrounds the Russian identity. In the 30 years since the collapse of the USSR, no clear national identity was formed. This is a problem that will persist after the war, regardless of its outcome.
“There are two possible outcomes: destabilization and chaos, or stability and stalemate”
VERIDICA: The democratic society in Russia is either entrapped or has already left the country. Arrests and repression continue with little hope remaining for successful protests. Given the stability of Putin's regime, can anything be done to improve the situation?
Alexander Morozov: I think there is only one answer to this question, and it is obvious. It all depends on the generation that was born 20-25 years ago. They can trigger a change. In big cities, young people continue to aspire towards three main goals.
The first is access to global communications. Young people want to stay in the country, but also to be able to work freely in global markets, study abroad and develop the industry in Russia. Putin's politics and war are taking the country in the opposite direction, so it is only a matter of time until they clash. It is unlikely the Russian Federation will slip back into an agrarian economy, completely cut off from the world, because Russia has 15 large cities, home to a third of the country’s population. These cities are focusing on modernization, and this generation will demand an end to restrictions on global communications.
The second important aspect concerns a wider representation. Young people would like to be involved in the organization of their communities at the local level, and by that I refer to municipal administration, property owners' associations, non-profit structures and charitable organizations. The current will insist on representation and self-organization.
The third aspect concerns justice and the judicial system. Putin's overtly repressive state is deeply at odds with the modern way of life. All three aspects mentioned above could be achieved in a moderate electoral autocracy post-Putin. That doesn’t mean Russia will aspire towards a full-fledged European democracy, but young people will encourage global communications, seek representation and an independent judicial system, contributing to the modernization of society.
VERIDICA: To a greater or lesser extent, we are talking about the future, about post-Putin Russia. Are we currently dealing with a stalemate, with no good solutions in sight?
Alexander Morozov: Yes, unfortunately, we have entered that phase of Putinism where it is impossible to imagine a transition towards any modernization policy. Right now, there are two possible outcomes: destabilization and chaos, or stability and stalemate. No one is discussing the prospects for political liberalization or the end of war.
One important conclusion stems from that: the transition towards the next stage of Russia's development is possible only through a violent civil conflict. It will lead to a new situation, after which a new Constitution and a new political project will be shaped. Such a transition is only possible following serious post-conflict changes and compromises that will generate the circumstances for democratization.
VERIDICA: Are you referring to a conflict between the young generation and the old elites?
Alexander Morozov: We don't even know exactly how things will turn out. In part, we could witness a struggle with bureaucracy, it might be territorial disputes with neighboring regions. This has happened before, and the Kremlin managed to successfully navigate the challenges. However, as Russia’s power wanes, anything is possible. The conflict can arise due to the weakening authority of power structures.
It’s hard to make accurate predictions, but it is clear that, right now, Russian society does not have the capacity to transition towards a new Constitution and a new political project.
“Over the next 20 years, Russia will have to carefully and consistently overcome the consequences of its aggression”
VERIDICA: Do you see any possibility of Russia ever returning to the civilized fold of the international community, where international standards and the rule of law prevail?
Alexander Morozov: This is a complex question. Vladimir Putin and his entourage have caused a great conflict by demanding a change in the global framework. The world’s top players want to operate on global markets and have no desire of destroying the international framework. This is true of Saudi Arabia, Iran, China, India, Southeast Asia and Latin America. These are all are interested in economic development and upholding international standards that guarantee the stability of economic relations.
Russia's return to international standards will be possible after a coup. Once Putin is ousted, the new leadership will be able to quickly gain the support of major economies in Europe, the United States and neighboring countries. The new regime will be able to resume negotiations on arms reduction and other international treaties, working in the spirit of good-natured cooperation. Such a transition would be the easiest way to bring Russia back into the civilized fold of the international community.
VERIDICA: For now, this all sounds like a fairy tale. But let's assume the wish eventually comes true: Putin is ousted. How do you see Russia post-Putin?
Alexander Morozov: For the next 20 years, Russia will have to carefully and consistently overcome the consequences of its aggression. But it’s something that is perfectly possible.
If Russia embarks on a process that meets the expectations of new generations regarding the judicial system, representation and freedom of communication with different parts of the world, it can identify a formula quite quickly, within five to seven years, allowing it to become a great regional economy. Russia can participate in various alliances in Asia and Europe, remain a large commodity-based economy, and be active in all international organizations.
As for the political system of post-Putin Russia, it will remain a de facto unitary state. I agree with those who believe that Russia can evolve from a super-presidential republic to a presidential-parliamentary one. This would significantly reduce the role of the president, transferring this role to a government appointed in the wake of parliamentary elections. All post-Soviet societies, including Belarus, are ready for such a transformation. This will allow the political struggle between parties to lead to the formation of governing coalitions and governments based on parliamentary elections. Such a solution is possible for Russia as well.
