Russia doesn’t recognize Kosovo as a sovereign state, but it’s using it to endorse the “independence” of separatist/captured territories in Georgia and Ukraine: Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea and Donbas. Besides, the Serbian enclave in Kosovo, Mitrovica, can be used by Moscow as a genuine outpost on the border with a NATO-protected territory. Just like other “outposts” Putin is relying on in Europe, Mitrovica too can be useful when Moscow wants to get something done or simply wants to distract everyone’s attention – even from a war such as the one in Ukraine.
A crisis in Kosovo would benefit Russia, but NATO is determined to prevent it
What appears to be a conflict without a stake, that has to do with administrative technicalities in the Kosovo province, could pass as trivia, were it not about the Serbian enclave Mitrovica. Long story short, Pristina no longer accepts vehicles registered in Serbia or identification documents issued in Serbia, and has provided those affected with a transitional period allowing them to aquire new documents. This is virtually an eye-for-an-eye response to Belgrade’s refusal to recognize license plates and IDs issued by Kosovo, a region which it continues to regard as one of its provinces. Following violent clashes, the matter was settled with the postponement of Kosovo’s decisions for next month.
The incidents in Kosovo were also interpreted as an attempt from Russia to heat up tension in the Western Balkans in order to divert public attention from its war in Ukraine. Moreover, ever since Russia started to amass troops on the Ukrainian borders, fear started to grow in Pristina that Serbia might want to follow suit and launch an attack on Kosovo.
It’s just that Kosovo continues to host NATO forces, and the Alliance Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, has publicly stated that he won’t let things spiral out of control.
“NATO is in Kosovo with close to 4,000 troops, and that is currently our biggest military presence outside NATO territory”, Stoltenberg said in Brussels upon meeting with Serbia’s president, Aleksandar Vučić. The NATO Secretary General went on to say that “we can deploy and increase our presence, for instance, in the north, as we have done over the last weeks”.
KFOR, or the NATO-led peacekeeping mission, was created in Kosovo shortly after the end of the war in June 1999. Let us recall that Serbia had unleashed an ethnic cleansing campaign across its territory, targeting Albanian ethnics and generating a widespread humanitarian crisis. Against this backdrop, seeing all diplomacy had failed and striving to put an end to the year-long humanitarian crisis generated by the war led by Slobodan Milošević, NATO launched an air campaign against the regime in Belgrade. The operation spanned 78 days and was challenged in the UN Security Council by Russia, Serbia’s number one ally. Sergey Lavrov addressed the Security Council meeting of March 1999 presided by China in New York arguing, among other things, that “we are basically talking about an attempt by NATO to enter the twenty-first century in the uniform of the world’s policeman. Russia will never agree to that”.
Russia couldn’t stop the NATO intervention in Kosovo, nor the proclamation of independence of this province in 2008. Over the years, Kosovo remained a key piece on Putin’s chessboard. Russia never recognized Kosovo as a state and has constantly backed Serbia in this conflict. Moreover, Russia’s endorsement is one the elements underlying Moscow’s relations with Belgrade, its main ally in the Western Balkans. On the other hand, it is interesting to note how Vladimir Putin used Kosovo’s statute in all the aggressions he launched in the Black Sea region. Now, Putin refers to every international decision referring to this former Serbian territory in order to justify a purported independence for Donbas.
The Kosovo precedent, used by Russia to justify its acts of aggression and seek legitimacy for the territories it captured
Therefore, in February 2008, Kosovo proclaimed its independence, backed by the USA and the EU. By that time, Vladimir Putin had reached the end of his second term in office. The Russian president made no secret of his anger with Pristina’s act of rebellion. “It is immoral and illegal”, Putin described Kosovo’s independence, adding he has contingencies in place to respond if Western countries support Kosovo’s independence. He kept the details of his plan secret, but he did mention Russia will not follow the West’s example, which meant that Russia’s response would not involve Moscow recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
A few months later, in August 2008, Russia invaded Georgia, a former Soviet republic that had already expressed its will to join Euro-Atlantic structures. Moscow claimed at the time that Russian-speakers and Russian citizens in the separatist republic of South Ossetia had been threatened by the Georgian army (which is in the fact the same pretext he invoked in the case of Transnistria). The Russian army entered Georgia via the Roki Tunnel, basically obliterating the Georgian army. Moscow then moved on to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This was the first step towards creating the “Kosovo precedent” as part of Putin’s grandmaster plan.
Two years later, the International Court of Justice, responding to a notification submitted by the UN General Assembly, ruled that Kosovo’s unilateral proclamation of independence is not in breach of any international law.
It was the argument Russia would invoke in the case of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but also later in 2014, in the case of Crimea, when the peninsula proclaimed its independence after the Russian military intervention and a so-called local referendum. In its declaration of independence, references to Kosovo and the ICC ruling are unequivocal: The document reads as follows:
“We, the members of the parliament of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the Sevastopol City Council, with regard to the charter of the United Nations and a whole range of other international documents and taking into consideration the confirmation of the status of Kosovo by the United Nations International Court of Justice on July 22, 2010, which says that unilateral declaration of independence by a part of the country does not violate any international norms, make this decision jointly”.
The peninsula was subsequently annexed by Russia.
In April, when the UN Secretary General, António Guterres, visited Moscow in an attempt to stop the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin again referred to Kosovo, stating that the territory of a state has no obligation to ask permission from the central authorities of that state if it wants to proclaim its independence. The Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts have the same right to assert their sovereignty “given this precedent”, Putin told Guterres, asking him: “Do you agree with that?” The UN Secretary General responded that the United Nations do not recognize Kosovo. “But the ICC recognized it”, Putin replied, insisting that “once this precedent has been created, the republics of Donbas are free to follow suit”, and Russia will have a right to recognize them as independent states.
What Putin never mentions every time he speaks about Kosovo is the fact that, while NATO stepped in to put an end to the war crimes committed against a civilian population (the Yugoslav wars have proved just how bad things can get in the presence of the UN blue helmets, which in theory were supposed to provide protection), in the case of Georgia and Ukraine Moscow fueled separatist movements, then launched a military operation aimed at restoring the Soviet empire to its former glory.
Mitrovica - Republika Srpska – Hungary: Putin’s outposts in Europe
The scenario field-tested in Crimea seems to be again put in action in the Ukrainian territories invaded by the Russians. In certain regions, the organization of referendums is designed to somehow legitimize the subsequent annexation of these provinces. The problem is that Putin won’t stop here. It won’t be long before Putin sets his eyes on Moldova. Let us not forget that public consultations have already been organized in this respect in regions such as Transnistria or Găgăuzia, and “the Kosovo precedent” will continue to be the centerpiece of Moscow’s plan to create a new Iron Curtain on the outskirts of NATO. If we look at the map, this is the natural course of Russian forces. While Kosovo is currently an EU hopeful country, a territory whose statehood is recognized by a little over 50% of the UN Member States, its recognition as a sovereign state might be rushed in the current context, thus blocking Russia’s influence in the region via the Mitrovita Serbian enclave in the north. Until then, the EU is trying to arbitrate this crisis that can turn violent any second. The only ones responsible are Serbia and Kosovo, the EU’s top diplomat, Josep Borrell, said at the end of the first round of talks between Serbia’s president, Aleksandar Vučić, and Kosovo’s Prime Minister, Albin Kurti, held in Brussels. The meeting had no conclusive result. “It was not a normal meeting”, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Josep Borrell commented, adding that this was a crisis meeting. The EU is trying to get the relationship between the two countries back on track, as under the EU umbrella many of their disagreements would eventually be settled. With a large NATO military presence on its territory and a majority Albanian population, Kosovo is not a Russian outpost in the Balkans. Yet Mitrovita, the capital of a northern region with a majority Serbian population, might very well be! At the end of the 1999 war, the city was divided between the Albanian ethnic group in the south and the Serbian group in the north. After the province proclaimed its independence in 2008, tensions escalated across the city, often translating into violent clashes. The Russians might not be present on the ground in Kosovo, but they are in Serbia though, a country they support in equal measure in its conflict with Kosovo. And it’s easy and within reach for Moscow to start a conflict when it needs to strong-arm someone or to divert attention, even from a war such as the one in Ukraine. But what happens to the other Russian “outposts” in the Balkans? By that, I’m referring to Bosnia in particular. The Serbian half of the Federation, Republika Srpska, is already a “Soviet”. Increasing NATO’s military presence in the former Yugoslav republic will only postpone its break with Sarajevo authorities.
That said, September is upon us. It’s the deadline Pristina authorities have set for people to change their Serbian-issued documents. When Stoltenberg says NATO is ready to intervene if the stability between Serbia and Kosovo is jeopardized, Aleksandar Vučić says Belgrade doesn’t want to escalate tensions with Pristina. Yet at the same time, the Serbian leader does nothing to engage in a productive dialogue. Perhaps the time has come for Aleksandar Vučić to make up his mind as to what direction he wants his country to be headed: East or West?! I doubt the international community will tolerate this ambivalent power play in the near future. And I’m not just referring to Vučić here. I’m also thinking of Viktor Orban, the head of a NATO and EU state that turns out to be the Russians’ Trojan horse in Europe. His obstructive policies at EU level have been a particular source of irritation for community leaders in over a decade. Orban’s schemes of becoming a regional leader seem to have failed, but that’s mainly because Orban remained faithful to a hostile rhetoric, without ever relying on a plan B. The fact that he is now opposing European sanctions against Russia was totally to be expected, since he did it in 2014 as well. The question is just how far will the Hungarian Prime Minister be allowed to go and how long will he be tolerated? I honestly believe Viktor Orban is very close to becoming the class jester. Unfortunately, this jester has veto rights, which makes it a good idea to keep an eye on him rather than to have no clue what he’s doing behind his desk. Maybe Viktor Orban’s actions will ultimately lead to the much-anticipated reform of the European Union, although not in the sense touted by the Hungarian Prime Minister. Leading European officials as well as the European Commission president have already started talking about the time for changing the system of adopting community-wide decisions, sometimes more implied, other times less so. Were we to consider Viktor Orban to be Russia’s inside man, this would only further complicate Moscow’s plans, which would make the illiberal Hungarian strongman nothing but a bad memory.
