Russian propaganda narratives targeting the election campaign in Romania

Narratives identical or similar to those fostered by Russian propaganda have also been circulated in the current election campaign in Romania. They transpired not only in the rhetoric of far-right parties, which for years have internalized such theses, but also in the statements of certain politicians aligned to Romania's pro-Western course.

Romania needs a strong leader [like Putin]

One of the main narratives adopted by several candidates is that of the authoritarian leader, someone whom the people love, fear and respect, seen as the only answer to Romania’s struggle to break free from Western oppression. For instance, Viktor Orban and Robert Fico are upheld as examples of patriotic but also pacifist leaders, who refuse to crack down on people's rights and “finance” a war “that isn’t theirs” - the war in Ukraine. References to the two European leaders are mere allusions to the true “leader of the free world”, Russian President Vladimir Putin, whom the top ideologue of the extremist AUR party, Sorin Lavric, describes as the embodiment of the ideal, unwavering politician who would never compromise when it comes to the well-being of his own people.

Putin's name is hardly mentioned per se, although Romanian MEP and senatorial candidate Diana Șoșoacă, the leader of the extremist party SOS Romania, posted photos of her next to Putin and the US president-elect, Donald Trump, promoting “peace” – or rather its Russian ‘version’. Diana Șoșoacă enrolled in the presidential race too, but the Constitutional Court invalidated her candidacy.

Politicians who protect Romanians’ Christian-Orthodox identity against the onslaught of “progressives”

While statistics show that, despite an overwhelming majority of the population identifying themselves as Christian, only a little over 20% of believers attend mass on a regular basis. Thus, messages that appeal to the “thousand-year-old faith of the Romanian people” sit well with an audience that resist any major change in approaches to religion. Romania thus remains a deeply conservative country, an ideal target of false narratives invoking attacks perpetrated by a “shadowy cabal” against Christianity in general, and Orthodoxy in particular. It’s actually one of the main narratives of the propaganda war waged by Moscow against the EU and NATO, by means of which it seeks to prove the West is “morally decadent and has strayed from Christian values”, a space at odds with the type of Christian-Orthodox values that Russia preserves and nurtures. The aforementioned Diana Şoşoacă invited two Romanian Orthodox priests to “sanctify” the headquarters of the European Parliament. While traveling to Brussels, the three prayed and sang religious hymns, shouting “Satan walks among us!”.

MP wannabes often bring up their “confessors” in interviews and statements; they flaunt Christian symbols, such as the cross or rosaries, and attend large-scale religious events. By means of such artifices and techniques, any event, no matter how insignificant, becomes an opportunity to showcase true faith. Similarly, narratives about the “persecution of Christians” are often integrated into political discourse when candidates either resort to ambiguous and allusive terminology or leave out information. Nearly all candidates have openly promoted "family and faith as the basic values of Romanian society” or at one point were heard saying “I believe in the Christian family and the education it represents”.

In the name of the Orthodox faith, politicians who emulate the narratives of Russian propaganda (whether purposefully or not) thus call for the elimination of women’s right to abortion (“I am pro-life”), a ban on same-sex marriages (the majority claim they voted in favor of amending the Constitution in the 2018 Family Referendum), or the restriction of the rights of sexual minorities - because transgender women are “male perverts”, as Cristian Terheș, an MEP known for his anti-abortion, anti-vaccine and gender identity views.

Romania, a Western colony – a Russian propaganda thesis picked up by Bucharest politicians

The overwhelming majority of Romanian politicians argue they are no longer willing to tolerate “foreign interference” in state affairs. Such “interference”, surmised or otherwise explicit, is allegedly carried out by Brussels in particular, which often cautions Bucharest with regard to the observance of community rules and standards.

“We won’t sell our country” is a slogan that several voices claim was first uttered by former Securitate officers. It was around this slogan that Romania’s economic advancement was slowed down, empowering a series of former Securitate officers and politicians to plunder the country's economy in the ‘90s. Picked up by Russian propaganda as well in various forms, the slogan antagonized Romanian society, leading to the (re)surge of extremist-nationalist movements, supporters of primitive and very toxic strands of patriotism, who challenge Romania's accession to the Euro-Atlantic community and the bodies that govern the Western world, especially the European Union and NATO.

Thus, shifting the blame for the bankruptcy of large businesses in the communist period on “hostile foreign forces”, candidates who advocate Kremlin-inspired sovereigntist narratives also campaign for a near-total isolationist economic policy, where (much like in Russia) the state exerts exclusive control over resources and economic chains, whereas foreign trade is restricted solely to goods that Romania cannot possibly produce.

The war in Ukraine and (in)direct ties with Russia

The invasion of Ukraine and Moscow's attempts to legitimize its actions were fully adapted to the local ethos by politicians with pro-Russian affinities, who rolled out narratives accusing Kyiv of violating the rights of the Romanian minority in Ukraine or of poisoning the population of Romania through the grain that flooded local markets. Some went as far as claiming Romania itself was being invaded, after a sea mine was discovered in Romania’s territorial waters, or during and after the dredging works of the Bystroye Canal and the Ukrainian side of the branch of Chilia, in the Danube Delta. Also, an increasing number of figures from the sovereigntist and pro-Russian political spectrum insist that the financial assistance and material aid provided to Ukraine sustains the war, and will inevitably involve Romania in the conflict, turning the country into a theater of military hostilities between NATO and Russia, with casualties reported chiefly, if not exclusively, among Romanian troops.

Some politicians took part in protests in front of the Ukrainian Embassy in Romania and even tried to cause incidents during President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit to Bucharest. Moreover, under the guise of the “struggle for peace”, AUR MEPs voted en-masse against further aid from the EU (not Romania) to support Ukraine. Diana Șoșoacă invoked the same “struggle for peace” in order to justify her recurrent visits to the Russian Embassy in Bucharest.

The figurehead of the sovereignist current has become, in the last two weeks, Călin Georgescu, a candidate whose a candidate whose governing program echoes nearly every narrative of Russian propaganda. His ties to pro-Russian groups is not new at all – in November 2016, for instance, he was nominated for the position of Prime Minister of Romania by the “Romanian Civil Society” Federation, one of the organizations that congratulated Russia on the annexation of Crimea, claiming this territory had been “returned to the motherland”.

In the current electoral campaign, Călin Georgescu has questioned the fact that the war in Ukraine exists (a false narrative promoted quite a lot at the beginning of the conflict in order to deny the brutal actions of the Russian army, and related to Moscow’s thesis regarding a simple “special military operation; both have been largely abandoned even by the Russians), he also promised that he would fight for peace (so, after all, a war is going on). Georgescu also said that he would suspend Romania's assistance to Ukraine and block Ukrainian grain exports through Romania. All these ideas appeared in interviews for the international media, which shows that they are not being expressed solely to attract Romanian votes.

The sympathy is mutual: Moscow appreciates Romanian "patriots"

Russian propaganda channels, such as Sputnik, have long expressed their admiration for exponents of sovereignism such as Diana Șoșoacă, AUR or Călin Georgescu. The latter's victory was received with satisfaction by the pro-Kremlin press, which welcomed the fact that Romanians voted for "a supporter of the alliance with Russia".

However, the Russians did not limit themselves to statements of support: as investigations by the Romanian press and intelligence services have shown, they directly mingled in the electoral process to support their favorites.

Also read on Veridica Russian narratives promoted by pro-Georgescu influencers on Instagram and TikTok