Greece and Turkey have a long history of confrontation and more than once have seemed ready to go to war, as they almost did in January 1996. Reasons for the dispute ranged from the 1923 population exchange to the Istanbul pogrom (1955), the crises in Cyprus and the delimitation of the economic exclusivity zones around the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea. Some of these topics are still on the conflict agenda, along with the issue of refugees or Turkish dissidents seeking refuge in Greece or, via Greece, elsewhere in Europe.
In recent years, the question delimitating the economic space has become more and more thorny, now also in the eastern Mediterranean. The dispute escalated in 2021, when the two states would pester each other through exploration vessels carrying out maneuvers in maritime spaces contested by the other side. The climax was reached in December 2022, when Ankara threatened Athens with war if Greece expanded its maritime control area around the Aegean islands and if it continued to explore for hydrocarbon deposits in disputed areas of the Mediterranean.
Over time, the conflict situation has fed nationalism in the two countries, and that has massively influenced the electoral episodes. The latest elections in Turkey confirmed this idea, with anti-Western and, in some speeches, explicitly anti-Greek nationalism being the favorite theme of the winners. But things did not happen in the same way in Greece. The anti-Turkish themes existed but did not decisively tilt the balance, the electoral campaign being dominated by concerns much closer to economic and social realities. And the political maturity of the voters has been evident. After the dramatic financial crisis that erupted in 2008, successive governments in Athens have implemented the reforms demanded by the European Commission and international financial institutions, which financed the recovery.
The effort paid off. The economy has recovered and Greece is now a stable member of the European Union and NATO. By contrast, Turkey is facing a serious economic crisis, has been sliding down the slope of authoritarianism for years, and its politicians have shown hostility to the West more than once. Turkey is moving further and further away from the EU and is becoming an increasingly uncomfortable member of NATO. Greece, with its economic recovery and good relations with its Western partners, looks set to replace Turkey as the southeastern pole of liberal democracy within the Union and of stability and security within NATO.
Greece: investments in defense, increased military cooperation with the US, a growing role in the region
Greece concluded the latest electoral process with the announcement of the results of the June 25 parliamentary elections. These are important not only for the future of the country, a member of the European Union and NATO, but also for developments in the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. Despite a turnout of just over 50%, the results indicate significant support from the Greek electorate for Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis and his New Democracy party. This support is therefore also for the Mitsotakis government's policy so far. Domestically, the reforms started will continue. Externally, Mitsotakis' policy has translated into an alignment within the European Union and productive cooperation with the United States, as well as "active prudence" in relation to the regime in Ankara. Prudence manifested itself in efforts toward dialogue and de-escalation when Turkey appeared poised for conflict. I describe this prudence as "active" because the Mitsotakis-led government, resisting the Turkish aggressiveness in the Aegean and the eastern Mediterranean, kept implementing the extensive program of modernization of the armed forces. A key part of that program is the acquisition, by 2028, of the latest generation of F35 multirole aircraft. Adding to the purchase of Rafale multi-role aircraft and the modernization of the F16 generation to the Viper level, this effort significantly raises the level of competitiveness of the Greek military aviation, which should deter potential threats. It is significant that all this comes in the context in which Greece and the United States concluded, in May 2022, the Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement and against the background of increasing Turkish aggressiveness in the region. The agreement also facilitates the expansion of the US military presence in Greece , from one base operated by both sides since 1969 (in Souda Bay on the island of Crete) to three more: Georgula in Volos province, Litochoro north of Larissa, and another military base in the area of the strategic port city of Alexandroupoli. All this while Turkey has been excluded from the F35 program due to the purchase of Russian S400 missile systems and, overall, has the worst relations with Washington in decades.
The new Mitsotakis government now enjoys a larger majority than it won in the previous election. Getting more than 40% of the vote, it takes advantage of a change in the electoral law that allows a bonus in seats for the winning party. The New Democracy Party will thus occupy more than 155 of the 300 seats in the Athens Parliament, which will allow it to govern alone. But the promotion of some radical reforms, which entail constitutional amendments, will require collaboration with the other parliamentary parties.
Mitsotakis, a 55-year-old politician from a family with an illustrious tradition in Greek public life, has amassed significant political capital and a reputation as a cautious professional. Capital and reputation will help him continue to govern, as he stated, along the path of "economic growth and political stability." His new government has a similar composition to the pre-election one, which indicates the determination of the government team and of Mitsotakis himself to implement reforms, especially in healthcare, education, governance of justice, urban planning and greening policies.
As for the foreign policy, the government will go in the same direction as before, taking the path of "active prudence", especially in the relationship with Turkey. Giorgos Gerapetritis, former minister for infrastructure and transport in the pre-election team, took over the foreign relations portfolio from Nikos Dendias. Gerapetritis, a 57-year-old politician close to Mitsotakis, is a graduate of Edinburgh and Oxford universities and professor of constitutional law. Over time, he has taught European law and comparative law at Oxford and the University of London, among others. He is also a practitioner in the field, both at the State Council of Greece (the supreme administrative court), as well as at the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights. It remains to be seen how such a head of Greek diplomacy will interact with his counterparts from Turkey, Egypt, Cyprus, Israel, but also from the EU. The stakes, especially in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean, remain extremely important for all of us, especially in terms of energy security.
Turkey: After the election, the Erdoğan regime seems determined to maintain an aggressive foreign policy line
Meanwhile, after the victory in the parliamentary and presidential elections held in May, the Erdoğan-AKP regime in Ankara seems to be maintaining the aggressive line of the last years. The new Turkish foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, has headed the national intelligence agency MIT for the past thirteen years (Millî İstihbarat Teşkilatı). Having Kurdish origins, Fidan has all these years been one of the main confidants of the president, who even described him as the “black box” of his entourage. After a career as a non-commissioned officer in the Turkish army, between 1986 and 2001, Fidan served for a time as director of the Turkish Development and Cooperation Agency (TIKA), contributing to its success as part of the president's foreign policy strategy. He stood out among the artisans of military actions against Kurdish parties in northern Syria and Iraq, which Turkey treats as terrorist groups. He is also recognized as one of the strategists of Turkish policy not only in Syria and Iraq, but also in Azerbaijan or in Africa, including Libya, where diplomacy went hand in hand with the military component of foreign policy.
Replacing Hakan Fidan as head of MIT was another old close friend of President Erdoğan: Ibrahim Kalin. He was the president's spokesperson and chief adviser without interruption since he first got the post in 2014. At the same time, Kalin has seconded Erdoğan all this time also as vice-chairman of the Security and Foreign Policy Council of the Presidency. He holds BA, MA, and PhD degrees in history and Islamic studies, and has taught in the religious studies department at the College of the Holy Cross in Worcester, Massachusetts. Along with others, he founded and was the director of the Political, Economic and Social Research Foundation (SETA) in Ankara (2005-2009), which promotes the foreign policy lines of the current regime. Accused by critics of being the product of an Islamist movement financed by the regime in Tehran, Kalin has stood out over time, in countless public situations, through his explicitly anti-Western speeches. Some analysts with sources in Ankara's presidential palace circles see Kalin's appointment as head of MIT as a guarantee that the country's only intelligence agency will continue to serve the regime's domestic and foreign policy as it has so far.
All this could mean continuity in the aggressiveness of Turkey's foreign policy in several directions. It is evident in the policy of unconditional support for Azerbaijan in the conflict with Armenia. It is evident in the policy of occupying some territories in northern Iraq and Syria and in the fight against the Kurds there, but also in Turkey. It is evident in the policy of supporting certain camps against others in Libya or Sudan, as well as in promoting the export of weapons, including the already famous Bayraktar drones, sold including in risk areas, seriously affected by conflicts. The same aggressiveness, towards the West, is evident in the relationship that Ankara will certainly continue to grow with the numerous diasporas from some Western countries, especially Germany, but also with governments of countries with important Muslim populations in the Balkans.
Ankara lacks the economic muscle to support its regional ambitions
But Turkey's foreign policy has already become extremely expensive, both politically and economically. In Africa, for example, Turkish companies' investment and business figures are in the tens of billions of US dollars. Companies make profits but the Turkish state spends enormous amounts, which are never made public, on promotion and security. According to most media reports, Turkey currently has 37 military missions in Africa and a military base worth more than $50 million in Mogadishu, Somalia. The number of Turkish embassies on the continent has increased from only 12 (2002) to 42, and the number of bilateral trade cooperation councils has increased from only six to 46. Many analysts, including the author of this text, believe that a foreign policy of such scope has already become unsustainable for a country of Turkey's level. The underlying problem here is the unprecedented weakening of the economy. It has suffered, especially after the establishment of the presidential system, due to the unorthodox measures of the government in Ankara regarding monetary policy, but also due to the economic growth model, based excessively on exports and construction.
The changes in the composition of the government, after the elections in May, did not restore the market’s and investors’ trust. Although the new Minister of Finance and Treasury, Mehmet Șimșek, is a respected person, who has been in this position before, as well as in that of Deputy Prime Minister, there is no guarantee that he will be allowed to actually lead the financial policy. There are fears that problems will also persist in the area of monetary policy, where Central Bank experts have not been listened to for the past five years. The sustained reduction of the key interest rate, at the insistence of President Erdoğan, led to the rapid and unprecedented devaluation of the lira. The former leadership of the Central Bank no longer listened to its own experts and instead implemented the will of the president. He publicly insisted, contrary to international theory and practice in the field, that a low interest rate stimulates economic growth through exports, which would lead to a gradual decrease in inflation.
Now, the 44-year-old Hafize Gaye Erkan has been appointed to lead the Central Bank, the first woman to occupy the position of Governor. A graduate of Bosphorus, Harvard and Princeton universities, Erkan initially gave the impression that she would somehow manage to convince the supreme leader in Ankara that the key interest rate cut was now the main cause of the lira's devaluation and rising inflation. The first monetary policy meeting of the Central Bank, on June 22, ended with an increase in the key interest rate from 8.5 to only 15%. Turkish and foreign experts were expecting over 20% and the markets reacted immediately. The lira quickly lost even more value, depreciating by 25% in the last six weeks alone and reaching a new all-time negative record against the US dollar (26.45 TL/1USD).
Under these conditions, given the unprecedented deficits, as well as the increasing debts of the Turkish state and private Turkish companies, it is difficult to imagine that the government in Ankara will be able to continue with an aggressive and expensive foreign policy. Against the background of an official inflation of around 40% - but there are estimates that, in reality, inflation would be around 100% - the standard of living of the population continues to decrease. Even if another key interest rate increase is expected at the Central Bank's next meeting on July 20, it may still be too little and come too late. Markets, businesses and citizens are simply losing faith in a country that also has the fundamental problem of turning the rule of law and freedom of speech into slogans with no correspondence in real life. Under these conditions, society can no longer function normally from an economic, political and cultural point of view.
Therefore, we can expect that, on the eastern shores of the Aegean, issues will multiply and worsen, with increasingly serious social effects. This while on the western shores, in Greece, a more cautious but active government enjoys stability and is committed to continuing the successful reforms so far, with the support of the EU and other European allies, states and organizations of states, and North America. The Greek economy, recapitalized and reinvigorated by reforms, has overcome, for several years now, the terrible crisis it went through immediately after 2008, now continuing firmly in the same direction. This in the conditions, sine qua non, in which in Greece liberal democracy works, observing principles such as the separation of powers, the rule of law and freedom of expression. The Turkish state, economy and society seem to be heading in the opposite direction, towards the turbulence announced by experienced analysts since the establishment of the presidential ruling regime. It subordinates the economy, political system, justice, public culture, education, individual liberties and national security to the decisions of a single person.
It is to be watched, with great attention, whether the two neighboring but increasingly different countries will return to a normal good neighborly relationship under these conditions or will continue to harass each other in the Aegean Sea and the eastern Mediterranean. There, bilateral relations remain complicated also due to the dispute regarding drilling rights for natural gas around the island of Cyprus, a matter on which Athens has a big say, being involved in projects that are also important for the agenda of the European Union, alongside regional heavyweights such as Egypt and Israel. Efforts to reduce dependence on Russia make the significant reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean a viable alternative, provided investors can find conditions for investment, and security of those investments, in the long term. The normalization of Ankara's relations with Athens but also with Nicosia, in this context, is crucial.
Is Greece becoming more important than Turkey in NATO?
After the election victory on June 25, Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis was congratulated over the phone by President Erdoğan. According to official statements, in that conversation both voiced hope that their victories in this year's elections represent an opportunity for deeper relations between the two countries. But no official visits have been announced to Athens and Ankara, respectively. Such visits are, in diplomatic practice, the best way to "deepen" bilateral relations. Instead, the two leaders would meet at the long-awaited NATO Summit in Vilnius, on July 11-12. There, however, Putin's war in Ukraine and Sweden's accession to the North Atlantic Alliance will undoubtedly be the most important topics. And Erdoğan's Turkey could repeat the strategy of recent years, to use an important event for the Western world to impose its own imperatives through aggressiveness.
If Ankara insists on opposing Sweden's admission to NATO, the gesture will surely be interpreted as undermining the Alliance and, more generally, the West's effort to oppose Russia. As an unstable and unpredictable Russia continues to threaten Europe, undermining the security bloc that protects our continent is not what is expected from a reliable ally. And Greece will surely use such an opportunity to remind all parties involved that, unlike Turkey, it remains a politically and economically stable liberal democracy, and an ally that Europe and NATO can rely on. Turkey remains important, especially in its role as guardian of the Straits. But the historical role of a bridge between Asia and Europe will be shaken. This bridge should have strong roots in the two worlds, and it ceases to be so if it tilts ever more obviously to the east while treating the west with hostility and indifference to its strategic needs.
The situation in the Eastern Mediterranean should be read in the same key. By obstructing, for reasons related to the logic of economic nationalism, the logistical development projects for the energy transfer networks (gas, electricity) from that region to Europe, Turkey practically prevents access to alternative resources to the Russian ones. And Greece is an active part of those projects (East Mediterranean Gas Forum, EastMed pipeline, EuroAsia Connector) that already have the status of priority projects on a European energy agenda already deeply troubled by Putin's war in Ukraine and also by the challenges of climate change. It is solely up to Ankara whether it will continue in this direction or not, but at the moment, after the elections in the two countries, the contrast between Erdoğan's Turkey and the liberal-democratic and Euro-Atlantic Greece is becoming more and more obvious.
