A good relationship with Russia would help the US isolate China. But Putin's decision to continue the war in Ukraine could convince Washington that Europe remains its most important partner.
A normalization of US-Russia relations could isolate China, but deals with the Russians are risky
Beyond uncertainties and especially the acute sense of continuous improvisation, into which the Trump administration has thrown the world, a few certainties are beginning to emerge. The first and perhaps most important of them is that America seems to have realized the risks of the effort to save the Putin regime. The warnings the White House sent to the Kremlin, initially through intermediaries, although they left the impression of an act, show that the illusions of the Trump administration are beginning to fall apart, although not irreparably.
Despite this, Trump's fascination with Putin is as genuine as can be and certainly more lasting than that with the "rocket man", later transformed into a "friend", and then quickly forgotten. Like those who in the 1930s were captivated by the progress of Mussolini's Italy, by the rapid effects of fascist productivism, a good part of the American administration is now attracted to a Russia governed by informal mechanisms, devoid of any legal or moral constraints.
Putin’s Russia is truly a police corporation, which from the outside looks rationally and functionally organized, but which in reality only delivers seriously in terms of image and propaganda. Although it constantly displays planetary aspirations, when discussed in concrete terms, the Russian leaders make specific claims typical of a regional power. Planned to be an impressive prelude to the real moves aimed at restoring its superpower status, Russia’s Ukrainian adventure turned into a trap that had the gift of bringing Russian leaders back to earth. As a result, the more the geopolitical horizon of the Putin regime shrank, the more concerned it became with its immediate neighborhood. That is precisely why, in the Trump administration’s vision, Russia qualifies perfectly for the role of America’s minor ally in the future effort to limit Chinese influence. Russia's traditional obsession with having a belt of vassal states on its European borders seems a small price to pay for such a big gain. Russia still retains many of the characteristics of a superpower, from the occupied space to its wealth and its nuclear arsenal, and its claims seem downright limited.
Seeing things this way, like the character Captain America from the Marvel productions, President Trump was tempted to come to Putin's aid, giving him the opportunity to come out honorably from a war that he had essentially lost. Just like Putin, Trump knows that the main threat to the Russian regime comes from the deteriorating economic situation and the alarming decrease in foreign revenues. The dwindling resources, which are shared by the few family clans that control the Russian economy, seriously threaten political stability. The wars between factions grouped around families such as Patrushev, Timchenko or Rotenberg, for the takeover of various assets, tend to quickly turn into political fractures, and even Putin and his repressive apparatus cannot control this indefinitely.
Ideologically and socially, the regime's stability is undisputed for now. In today's Russia, not a single idea is heard, let alone an ideology, that would crack the wall of obsessions and hatred built by official propaganda. In addition, Trump's "revolution" has managed to quickly reduce interest in the actions of the Russian opposition in exile. Yulia Navalnaya, Vladimir Kara-Murza or Ilya Yashin have disappeared from the Western agenda, and the repression in Russia seems to no longer concern many people today.
Bringing Russia to the US’s side in the effort to stop Chinese plans to assimilate the Arctic and especially to create a complete transport infrastructure that would connect East to West but would not cross the territory of a great power is an impossible mission. Although he is clearly attracted by the prospect of being Trump’s minor ally, Putin cannot deliver on expectations. Russia cannot extricate itself from China’s energetic embrace, which began long before the war with Ukraine. 40 percent of Russia’s international trade is with China, while the trade with the US stands at some 3 billion dollars annually.
Putin, determined to continue the war. Will Donald Trump continue his rapprochement with Moscow, or will he opt for restoring relations with the US's European allies?
The second certainty is that Putin has decided to continue the war, hoping to achieve the Ukrainian maximalist program. Such a decision, although it brings additional complications, carries fewer risks to the stability of the regime than an attempt to conclude an American-mediated peace, which would displease both the seniors in Beijing and the radicals in Russia.
Potential US sanctions could still do a lot of damage to the Russian economy, but not enough to hinder its war efforts in the short term. In the medium term, a possible Russian economic and political collapse is not in America's interest at all. Once it happens, the US will have to manage both the nuclear risks and the effects of a possible handover of Russian resources to China.
That is why Russia’s demands to accept the ceasefire in the Black Sea are about the oil trade, although they are poorly disguised by the discourse on world “food security”. Russia’s oil trade is now suffering from the deep discounts it has to make, against the backdrop of an already low general price, as well as the high associated costs, i.e. those of transport, insurance, unloading, etc. Putin needs Trump’s mediation to obtain the relaxation of some European sanctions, but the timing is extremely inopportune, as Brussels and Washington have already exchanged a round of tariff pleasantries. The recent announcement by the foreign ministers of Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Poland and the UK, joined for the sake of decency by officials from the European Commission, shows that the main European countries are not willing to give Putin the benefit of good intentions, nor do they agree to a peace that puts Ukraine in a position of capitulation. The expected rejection of the draft US-Ukrainian agreement, in which President Trump managed to outdo himself, further complicates the situation, at least in terms of image.
The third certainty is related to the fact that the American president is facing important foreign policy decisions, which he cannot postpone for long. He may escalate tensions with European allies, stating that the Ukrainian leader and Europe are opposed to concluding a ceasefire agreement, thus opting for a more than risky alliance with Putin. No matter how many business projects Kirill Dmitriev proposes to Trump's emissaries, Putin cannot fulfill his part of such an agreement, but at least the annexation of Greenland would be part of a general logic of events. In such a context, stopping military and logistical aid to Kyiv and accelerating the process of lifting sanctions against Russia will probably be the first concrete measures that could be announced.
If President Trump decides to continue relying on old allies, he will once again raise the flag of a fair and stable peace in Ukraine and Europe, asking European allies to seriously increase their defense efforts. In a first phase, such a decision will bring with it a massive increase in military aid to Ukraine, but also a risky increase in the intensity of the war, without the US receiving much in return. Such a situation entails other costs for the administration's image in front of its own electorate, but it would certainly make European positions on a number of economic and political issues much more elastic, thus easing the task of reforming NATO. Judging by the way the US president's foreign policy has been shaped so far, despite the feeling of betrayal it would produce in Europe, the first option seems very consonant with the announced objectives and certainly beneficial, but only in the short term.
The third option, somewhat more cautious, but which would only postpone the inevitable, would be for Washington to express its dissatisfaction with both sides engaged in the war for the time being, by presenting each, and also Europe, with a series of new, this time somewhat more rational demands. Given the US's engagement on so many fronts, on so many levels, the contagion effect of any of the potential decisions is difficult to calculate with precision. The third option would certainly give Washington some more time to carefully consider its decisions, but not much.
President Trump did not have a plan when he launched his offensives, only a series of intuitions and absolute confidence in his negotiating skills. It is too early to say whether any of his major initiatives will succeed or fail, but it is clear that the cult atmosphere with which the MAGA movement surrounds the American administration tends to seriously affect its ability to perceive the world objectively. The time for easy successes, such as changing maps and deporting illegal immigrants to the prisons of the “coolest dictator in the world,” is over. It is time for major decisions and risks that will shape the international system for decades to come.
