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Nothing expresses Russia's attitude towards Romania better than the "Treasure in Moscow issue", and time and history seem to produce no effect in Moscow when it comes to the Romanian gold and historical valuables "stored" in the Kremlin dungeons. Whether we are referring to the 1930s, the post-Stalinist period, the years of National Communism or the three decades after the fall of Communism, Moscow has used the carrot and stick approach, constantly refusing to get to the bottom of the matter. The recent statement by Mikhail Shvydkoy, Putin's "special representative" for "international cultural cooperation", during the St. Petersburg propaganda show, that "Russia owes nothing to anyone" should mark the beginning of a time of deep reflection for the Romanian authorities. Although as far as Moscow's position is concerned the statement in question does not change much, for Bucharest it should lead to a serious change of perspective on the matter.
Russia uses the Treasure to extract concessions from Romania, but they have no intention of returning it
As a member of the "government commission for the issue of the Romanian gold", which Putin's representative was talking about, but also of the commission of historians from the two countries, I had the opportunity to observe on the spot the absurd piece of Russian "argumentation" on the topic, as well as the sequence of political montages, one more bizarre than the other. In fact, whether the relations between the two countries were calm or tense, Russia’s representatives have never bothered to bring to the table any solid argument or to formulate reasonable claims.
Regardless of the nature of the regime in Romania or the profile of the rulers in Bucharest, the Russian stand on the matter has varied between "we don't know anything about this" and "yes, but this is something else entirely." The stupid "amnesia", the attempt to link the issue of Romanian valuables with the war reparations or the value of the armaments left in Romania by the Bolshevized imperial army or the simple refusal to discuss the matter, by ignoring the Romanian diplomatic messages, are proofs of the deep contempt that Russia has had towards Romania and Romanians.
Russian propagandists and officials are certainly not among the most cultured of people, but it is clear that they do not lack imagination. The endless stream of lies about Ukraine and Ukrainians, some of which are intensively circulated in Romania as well, are proof of this "talent". In the case of the discussions related to the Romanian valuables, the absence of any creative effort is indicative of the fact that to Russia’s representatives Romania is a country incapable of responding effectively to the humiliations that they think they are administering through such attitudes. Unfortunately, so far, reality has proved them right. For years, Romania's representatives have tried, through polite discussions and historical arguments, to have the “thief” admit the deed and above all have them promise that the stolen goods would be returned. On the other hand, Russia has turned the issue into a bait, asking for various petty political concessions from Romania. Almost shockingly primitive and repetitive, such an approach starts from the Russians’ solid conviction that the only thing they need to do is to tempt Romanians with something, and they would easily change their policy and especially their beliefs.
The very different way in which the USSR managed two famous restitutions, that of the Dresden Gallery, in March 1955, and that of Romania’s “historical treasure”, in June 1956, shows that the Russians’ attitude towards Romanians is an older political construct. Although both moments were relevant to Moscow's foreign policy agenda, the way they were staged showed a significant difference in perception. As far as the German Democratic Republic is concerned, the restitution was the "gift" upon the completion of one year of recognized independence, and the decision was formalized by a report submitted by Vyacheslav Molotov to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which read that the return of the collection to the GDR was a "just political decision". Of course, the Soviets were not really concerned with the morality or the justice of the situation, but only with the consolidation of their political transplant, which they had come very close to giving up, two years earlier, for the sake of a unified but "always neutral" Germany.
In the case of Romania, the genesis of the decision to restore the "historical valuables" is rather unclear, but it certainly relates to Khrushchev's efforts to strengthen his position in the communist countries and especially in Romania. The enthusiasm of Dej and those who surrounded him was so great that the Romanian delegation that went to Moscow to receive the "gifts" offered by the Soviets was not given the time to make a parallel inventory of the returned goods. The organization of an exhibition on August 23, 1956, meant to mark the "Romanian-Soviet brotherhood", was much more important than the on-site inventory of the returned goods, and once the goods were returned to the country, the need for such an inventory disappeared. We still have to take the Russians at their word and rely on their record. The Soviets' "investment" would prove more than inspired. Only a few months after the "return of the historical treasure", as the Soviets claimed, in the fall of 1956, Dej resorted to the vilest of tricks to get the leaders of the Hungarian Revolution out of the country, thus facilitating their transfer to Moscow, where they were subjected to interrogations that were as violent as they were humiliating. Obviously, Dej and his "guys", among whom Walter Roman, who played an important part, did not participate in the degrading skit for the sake of the Pietroasa Treasure. Like the Soviets, the Romanians were equally terrified by the anti-communist turn that events in Hungary had taken, but Romania's attitude seemed to fully justify the Soviet imaginary.
From then until Ceaușescu came to power, the "Treasure issue" was removed from the bilateral agenda. Ceaușescu's reference to the Treasure, during his first visit to the USSR, in September 1965, did nothing but annoy the Soviets, without changing anything in their attitude towards the problem. Abandoned until after the fall of communism, the issue was brought back in 2003, on the occasion of the signing of the famous "basic treaty" with the Russian Federation. Presented as a thrilling success of Romanian diplomacy, the joint commission managed to establish, throughout its activity, only the fact that Romania's gold reserve and other historical valuables had been transported to Russia, having therefore the merit of having kept the issue on the bilateral agenda. Such a success could be considered important, but only if it involved a state that fulfils its international obligations. Russia, like the USSR, does not and it also doesn’t hide its contempt for them, but that does not mean that it does not owe us anything, as the senior Russian official claimed.
If it wants the Treasury back, Romania must openly stand by and support Ukraine and demand at the end of the war what Russia owes it
Romania assumes, and in some cases knows exactly, what happened to the country's treasure stored in Russia, but that does not change the reality, namely that Moscow is in debt. The report of the former director of the International Sector of Gossbank, Vitaly Slavovich Korobkov, drawn up in 1930, while he was in the "care" of the NKVD, reproduces in luxurious detail part of the operations of the Soviet state bank with Romanian gold. In fact, the failure of one of them, namely the one carried out in 1928, regarding the sale of a significant amount of Romanian gold, with the aim of extending credit lines granted by the American banks Chase National Bank and Equitable Trust Company, contributed to Korobkov's arrest. In lavish detail, Korobkov recounts how, although the shipment was organized in such a way as to exclude a possible Romanian objection, it was eventually sent to Germany, in Reichsbank’s warehouses, to avoid interception, following objections from the National Bank of France to the American authorities.
Admitting that the sending of "foreign" gold to the USA was done in a hurry to finalize the financial arrangements with the American banks, Korobkov proposed that in the future the operations be prepared more thoroughly, including by melting the gold and applying the Soviet marking. Thus, he pointed out, the true provenance of the gold would become impossible to establish, and the objections formulated everywhere by the "anti-Soviet" Bank of France would have been easier to counter. The failure of the operation, though Stalin had high hopes for the resumption of economic collaboration with the USA, was a blow to the Soviet policy of attracting American capital into the trap of Soviet concessions. Moscow's anger was so great that upon the return of the Soviet delegation from the USA, the head of Gossbank, A. Sheiman, decided to emigrate to Germany, where the Romanian gold "saved" from the attempts of the French banking authorities to intercept it had also arrived.
Now, Putin's representative for international cultural cooperation - whatever that means in today's Russia - says that "Russia owes nothing to anyone", including Romania, because the latter has the "audacity" to support Ukraine and in general to join the Western stance in international affairs. In a certain sense, beyond the brutal manner of expression, Mikhail Shvydkoy is almost right. In fact, the battle for the Romanian gold has moved from the barren halls of the joint commission to the Ukrainian front.
The transformation of the treasure into an enforceable debt, as proposed by the National Bank of Romania, is an initiative designed to radically change the terms of the discussion. The introduction of this particular Romanian issue into the post-war negotiation package cannot be done through diplomatic approaches alone. Such a perspective must be built during the fighting and supported by Romanian initiatives that are as refined as they are effective in proving to Russia and the world that it’s not just a heritage matter, but especially one of principle. Moscow's desperate attempts to undeservedly take possession of historical assets from Ukrainian museums, such as the famous "Scythian gold", or the theft of heritage from museums located in territories temporarily occupied by the Russian army, suggest that historical assets and Russia’s usual way of approaching such matters can represented a solid alliance platform between Romania and Ukraine.
The war freed Romania from the need for diplomatic precautions in the matter and above all from the illusion that Russia could directly or indirectly acknowledge its debt. Regardless of how "discreet" the authorities in Bucharest are about their support for Ukraine, Romania and Russia are already on a collision course, at least politically. Russian attempts to destabilize Moldova, which are currently in the accumulation stage, will only add more tension, and threatening Russian statements against Romania will not be long in coming.
In the relationship between Putin's Russia and democratic Romania, there is no room left for tactical discursive responses or procedural approaches, and the statement of Putin's representative amply shows it. The time of fact-finding and historical arguments, about which no one can say with certainty when it was, ended the day the first Russian bomb fell on Kyiv. It’s time Bucharest prepared thoroughly, politically and visually, the introduction of its goals into the package of negotiations at the end of the war, doing everything it has to so that the victory belongs to those who richly deserve it. Compensating Romania for its loss is a moral and technical matter. At the same time, in order to reach this outcome, a whole scaffolding of public perceptions and political theses is needed, which can only be built on the solid foundation of Romanian employment alongside the country that opposes the Russian aggression. Otherwise, any Romanian claim of this kind, no matter how fully argued, will at best pale in the face of the moral needs of a country hit by Russian aggression, and it might be even interpreted as opportunism.
