It has become a truism to state that Romania lost at least the first battle of the hybrid war. Equally common has become the observation that there are too few facts to show that lessons have been learned from this defeat. Although the agenda of the day is dominated by the issues of the budget deficit and talk of general reform, which so far only looks like an accountant's bold dream, it would be good for the politicians of this country not to forget that the greatest danger Romania is in is the threat to its democracy. With some inspiration and a responsible Parliament, the country's financial balance can be restored fairly quickly. Much more time and political courage would be needed to restore a discredited and incapacitated democracy.
That is why it is all the more necessary to review the explanations for Romania's prostration, however disturbing and impossible they may seem to address. Sooner or later, at greater or lesser cost, at least some of these causes will be removed, even if at the moment decision-makers don’t even plan to do so.
There are at least two types of causes. The first is related to Romania's structural deficiencies, making institutions act more or less the same, regardless of the source of the danger, be it internal or external. The second, the easiest to deal with, stems from the specific nature of the relationship with Russia, the country from which the greatest threat to Romanian democracy comes today.
Lack of vision and institutional obtuseness have made Romania vulnerable
The first and most important cause is that Romanian officials find it very hard to understand that hybrid warfare is not just an attack on information systems or infrastructure. It is, first and foremost, a wave attack on people's minds and souls. Russian attacks on the technical infrastructure in Romania have been relatively few, comparable with those in the Baltic States and Poland, and even Spain, and this can be explained by the success of the Russian propaganda machine in its most important area of attack in Romania, that of consciences. Technical attacks leave traces, are trackable and above all have short-lived, albeit dramatic, effects. Those on minds leave much less evidence of guilt and produce long-lasting effects, and this is Romania's weakest point. The smoke from the crooked mirrors of Russian totalitarian propaganda must be dispelled by a vision that is as clear as it is seductive and as intelligibly communicated, but those who lead Romania have so little to offer in this direction.
The second cause is the traditional representation of Romanian foreign policy. For Romanian politicians, whatever their alleged doctrinal orientation, foreign policy is only a form of communication and promotion of national interests. Certainly, the national dimension of foreign policy is still essential and will be for a long time to come, but Romania continues to behave as if it had gained its independence as a state two decades ago, not almost a century and a half ago. Senior civil servants, the entire Romanian foreign policy apparatus continues to remain stuck in the narrow paradigm of national interests, which they often project into an ethnic dimension. Such an understanding of foreign policy, in which Romania rarely feels able to contribute, even with a thoughtful effort, to tackling global problems, means that the country's international image is, at best, faded. This situation suits the Kremlin's propaganda perfectly, as it often instrumentalizes ethnic affections and national resentments.
Such a vision is incompatible with Romania's international status and with the system of international relations of which it is part. This is precisely why, not infrequently, Romanian national interests, as represented by officials and political decision-makers in the field, are irrelevant to the issues on the high agenda, hence the limited success in promoting them. Even the situation in Moldova no longer suits such an interpretation of national interests. This explains, to a large extent, Romania's 'discreet' weight in the international decisions which paved the way for democracy in the Republic of Moldova, including the moment when Plahotniuc was 'ousted'. Perhaps the time has come for Bucharest to admit, especially at home, that Moldova is not a seasonal state. This would enable it to establish its own bridges of communication with the Russian-speakers there and even with those in Transnistria, not to undermine Chisinau but to strengthen it, and above all to better prepare Bucharest for the times to come.
Another cause, with effects in many areas, is the weak capacity of the Romanian administrative and political apparatus to collaborate with civil society. For reasons that have to do with caste and professional insecurities, the Romanian administration does not know how to open permanent channels with the various types of expertise in society, nor does it want to. The ‘hedgehog’ policy, which is pursued by the entire institutional structure, is the fruit of the stakes of the apparatus. Regardless of the nature of the problem, Romanian structures want to prove to those who decide that they can solve the problem on their own, designing solutions only within their strict sphere of competence. This being the case, any appeal to outside expertise, which usually takes place only for the sake of image and public bail, is perceived by the people of the apparatus as a professional and personal failure, likely to damage their public image.
Romanian politicians' superficiality, a major advantage for Russia
The next cause, by far the hardest to address and therefore the most dangerous, is the Romanian politicians’ poor adherence to ideas and values. Not believing in much of anything, most Romanian politicians are impossible to convince that ideas and ideologies have any power. When the cursus honorum in Romanian parties invariably begins with ‘sticking posters’, a veritable title of glory for generations of politicians, it is hard to believe that the subsequent degree of intellectual complexity in politics can surpass that of the ‘Dumb and Dumber’. That's why, for an inordinate number of people who populate the corridors of power, politics is nothing but a sum of transactions.
We have to admit that the public developments of many of Romania's top politicians and civil servants show rather a structural compatibility with the defining features of corrupt authoritarianism. These people do not believe in democracy, civilian control, justice or genuine division of powers in the state. Rather, they want stability of structures, heavily manipulated elections through electoral demobilization and use of administrative resources, and above all impunity before the law. That being so, they can quite easily reconcile themselves to the existence of a Koba whose rules they have to obey, as long as he guarantees them well-deserved benefits. This is why the nationalist anti-westernism of many of the officials and politicians of those who have joined the populist current, overt or underground, actually masks their organic hostility to democracy.
Last, but not least, it’s the chronic underestimation of the importance of education and culture in society by decision-makers. Several post-communist Romanian governments have created the impression that education and health are areas that cannot be reformed. By indulging in changes of form, from which they hoped for substantive effects, Romanian politicians felt safe and secure when they saw that willful ignorance and disinterest for the good of the community had become national traits.
Believing that they can save themselves, in the event of any changes in the geopolitical framework, Romanian politicians still don’t ask themselves why Russian propaganda has no effect in countries where media education or critical thinking are subjects of study since primary school. For Romanian officials, culture, as well as research, are millstones that they just have to carry, without understanding much of them. Although there are at least a ton of national strategies, very few politicians perceive the real impact it can have on societal challenges. With a representation of culture that seems to have stopped at the folklorism of the 1980s communist Romania, Romanian decision-makers continue to miss the political stakes of culture. Anything that goes beyond these frameworks and is related to culture is, for many, insignificant, of restricted consumption or worse, even dangerous.
Bucharest seems to be waiting for its problems with Russia to resolve themselves
In addition to the above causes, to which we could easily add others, equally important, there are those deriving from the bilateral relationship with Russia. Although the interactions between the two states and peoples have not been lacking, we understand the Russians rather poorly, and we don’t really want to know exactly how they see us. Understanding the Russians, which is possible despite the legends they themselves promote, is not a value in itself. What is valuable is a full knowledge of Moscow's sensitivities, its philosophy of action and, above all, its objectives. Crushed by its unequal geographical dimensions and marked by repeated Russian military occupations, Romania does not dare to think of its relationship with that country other than in terms of reacting to the challenges thrown at it. The attack, even when it has crossed someone's mind, has been considered a dangerous illusion, and has always been discouraged by the clever technique of comparison.
The time has come for Bucharest to realize that it cannot wait only for its allies or international circumstances to change Russia’s policy in Romania. Such a change will come to the extent that Russian strategic interests in the area we are in will be directly affected. Our neighbors Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova offer countless opportunities in this regard, and Romania's defense in the hybrid war, if it is to be successful, must take place outside its national borders. Kyiv and Chisinau, in different ways, pose pressing problems for Moscow, and Romania must be defended not only in Bucharest, but also there. Instead of broadening its horizons, Bucharest continues to wallow in the agenda dictated by the Russian propaganda machine, denying almost daily that it is preparing for war. In fact, Romania should officially admit, like many European countries, that it must seriously prepare for war and, above all, explain to its citizens that if there is a war, it will be a defense war.
Another cause is the inability of the Romanian political elites to project relations with Russia beyond the historical moment in which this country finds itself. It is possible that future relations with Russia will be built today not in Moscow, but in Berlin, Paris or Washington, where the new Russian political emigration has taken refuge. The same goes for Belarus. As long as Putin or his ilk are in power, Romanian officials' trips to Moscow or meetings with Russian officials will not do any good. Unfortunately, with a few timid exceptions, Romania is absent from this European discussion, not even being able to radically change the indirect discussion with Moscow about the Treasury, although there is no lack of inspired initiatives. This kind of inaction comes not so much from a lack of understanding of the situation as from a lack of willingness on the part of the apparatus to take decisions that it considers risky. Political risk is one of the greatest fears of those who make decisions in Romania. They are always happy to receive praise, but they are terrified of the possibility, even in theory, of being held responsible for failures.
Waiting for the problem to resolve itself and the danger to dissipate on its own, Bucharest prefers to bury its head in the sand, because no one can be held accountable for this.
