A century after its founding, the Turkish Republic is drifting further and further away from the secular values that formed its foundation, while ethno-religious nationalism is gaining ground.
At the republic’s centennial, ethno-religious nationalism replaces the secular values promoted by Atatürk
While new domestic and foreign policy scenarios are imagined in Ankara, many marked by the neo-Ottomanist conceit, while in Istanbul new series are produced that reflect the same conceit, Turkish society seems increasingly suffocated by the religious conservatism of the regime, which has ruled the country for over two decades. I felt this suffocation in September in Edirne, in Izmir, but also in other localities in the Aegean region of Turkey. Conversations with many people, from many professional fields and from all walks of life, revealed a growing collective discomfort with what is perceived as the authorities' aggressive promotion of Islam.
The regular and social media are dominated by the authoritarian discourse of the regime, which insists on Muslim values, always in antithesis to what the same discourse persistently describes as the immorality of the secular republican regime established by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk almost a hundred years ago. Short films are even being promoted that portray Atatürk as an immoral, womanizing and alcoholic leader. Several sources, who spoke to me on condition of anonymity, confirmed that state authorities at all levels, including Turkish diplomatic missions, are urged from the center not to promote the image of the Republic's founder. This may be precisely because this year the Republic will be 100 years old, on October 29, and it is desired to avoid associating this celebration with the name of the founder of the modern Turkish state, and associate it with the current regime instead.
I lived in Turkey for twenty years of this almost century-old republican history, starting in the summer of 2001, when the coalition led by Bülent Ecevit was still ruling the country. I therefore witnessed the effects of the policies carried out by the current regime right from its coming to power in November 2002 until I left Turkey in November 2020. In my opinion, the tension between those policies and the resistance of society, at least here, in the west of the country, is approaching a maximum point, from where things can evolve in any direction. I do not think, however, that the state founded by Atatürk can return to the secularism to which it was dedicated, at least formally, until the military coup of September 1980. On the contrary, the pressure of the conservatives, which began with the government of Necmettin Erbakan in the 1990s and has been continued by the current regime, seems to have succeeded in tilting the political and societal balance in favor of conservative, ethno-religious nationalism, cultivated for more than four decades, with rare and short intermissions.
Two significant events in Izmir
I am writing these lines from Izmir after witnessing two important events in just one week in September. On the 9th, a huge rally was held in Gündoğdu Square, attended by hundreds of thousands of people to celebrate the liberation of the city and Anatolia from the Greek occupation by the Turkish army under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, on the 9th September 1922. One year later, on October 29, 1923, the Great National Assembly in Ankara proclaimed the establishment of the Republic, on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire.
Gündoğdu Square, located in the exclusive Alsancak district, has become, since its inauguration in 2000, the favorite place for organizers of political rallies and protests of all kinds, which have become increasingly rare in recent years. The rally on September 9th this year was, in fact, one of implicit protest, with the crowd coming with placards and flags supporting the secular republic and its Kemalist principles, which today has come to mean opposition to the policies of the current conservative regime.
Protest in Izmir, September 9. Photo: Dragoș Mateescu
A week after the September 9 rally, on the 16th, the same Gündoğdu Square hosted a massive protest against the policies of the conservative regime and in support of secularism . This time, unlike the September 9 rally, the police and other security forces were much more present. The entire perimeter of the rally, a huge area by the sea between Atatürk Square and Gündoğdu Square, was surrounded by metal police fences. Access, through special gates in the huge chain of fences, was made only after each participant, myself included, had their luggage and clothes checked by civilian agents. Police officers in uniform as well as civilians, wearing only identification vests, were omnipresent and in large numbers, in addition to armed troops posted at all entrances.
Security forces deployed for the September 16 protest. Photo: Dragoș Mateescu
Participation was lower than in the September 9 event, probably also because of this form of intimidation.
Representatives of trade unions and professional associations from multiple fields, civic organizations for the defense of civil rights marched organized on the streets of Izmir, towards the square. Cultural associations were also present, including those fighting for the official state recognition of the tens of millions forming the Alevi religious minority and the Kurdish ethno-linguistic minority. There were also associations for the protection of the environment, as well as representatives of some left-wing political parties. I saw placards that also indicated the geographical origin of those groups, and the organizers also announced them on the rally's main microphone: Ankara, Istanbul, Çanakkale, Afyon, Aydin, Antalya, Bodrum, Muğla, Kuşadasi, Siirt, Diyarbakir, Denizli, Bursa and more. Basically, I saw there people from all over Turkey come to defend their secular way of life. And the placards were explicit: "Secular way of life!" (tr. Laik yașam); "Secular education!" (tr. Laik eğitim); "Equal citizenship!" (tr. Eşit yurttaşlık). "Yes to Mustafa Kemal, no to ÇEDES!" (tr. Mustafa Kemal'a evet, ÇEDES'e nayet), "Yes to the secular state, no to sects and religious congregations!" (tr. Laik devlete evet, tarikatlara ve cemaatlara hayır). Prolonged chants were also used to explicitly protest against the AKP regime and the Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs).
Photo: Dragoș Mateescu
Ethno-religious nationalism, used by Islamists to consolidate power and divert attention from the economic crisis
The general feeling was that people are fed up with the aggressiveness of conservative state policies. These, however, continue unabated. Against the backdrop of an extremely difficult economic situation for the majority of the population, the AKP government led by President Erdoğan is reluctant to adopt tough reforms that would reduce its electoral gains in the local elections due in March 2024. Instead, it continues to promote ethno-religious nationalism both in its domestic and foreign policy.
The morality (tr. ahlak) imposed by the government in the regular and social media is Islamic, intertwined with Turkish ethnic nationalism. Together, the two identity aspects automatically lead to the exclusion from the category of "good" citizens of tens of millions of people who remain attached to the Kemalist principles, adding to which are tens of millions of Alevis and Kurds. Such "unequal citizenship" increasingly becomes a matter of survival, especially when social inequality is added to it. The standard of living has fallen significantly in Turkey over the past 5-6 years, well below the situation we found here in 2001, then amid the global recession of 2000-2001. And poverty especially affects those who are denied opportunities, precisely because of their identity, amid widespread corruption. Nepotism is a common topic in discussions with people here. If you have connections in the area of power and if you promote its values, you have a better chance of employment or concluding a profitable business, including with the state.
And the signs of an improvement in the situation are not exactly credible. The new administration of the Turkish economy, starting with Minister Mehmet Şimşek and the new governor of the Central Bank, Hafize Gaye Erkan, is taking steps to increase the competitiveness and value of the national currency, including by increasing the key interest rate to 30% , an unprecedented level in the last decade . But this and the previous hikes have already begun to produce, as expected, a fast and significant increase in interest rates on business loans offered by commercial banks, which have already reached 50% on average. And President Erdoğan and his entourage do not want such an effect under any circumstances because, right before the general elections in March, it would significantly slow down consumption and Turkey's economic growth, which is excessively based on consumption, along with construction and exports. It is more likely that the reforms will be slowed down, which will lead to the worsening of the economic crisis, with negative effects for the majority of society.
The results of the general elections of May 2023, favorable to the Erdoğan-AKP regime, however, confirmed that this strategy works, in the short term, in favor of the ruling conservatives. Poverty was forgotten when the election campaign was intentionally limited to the themes of nationalism, which is also the founding ideology of the Turkish state, with ethno-religious ingredients that were gradually added, especially after the military coup of September 12, 1980. It is almost surely going in the same direction now, both in domestic politics and in the international arena.
The latest government decision, in the logic of aggressive conservatism , was published in the Official Gazette right between the rallies mentioned above, on September 15. There has been a change in the regulations regarding the duties and operation of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet). Thus, this body of the state, which for years has had a larger budget than those of many ministries and has benefited from an unprecedented extension of authority, including abroad, now also has the authority to prepare and implement educational programs for children aged 4-6, as well as for teenagers and adults. The new rules practically exclude the involvement of the Ministry of Education in the respective programs. In addition, the Diyanet now has sole authority over Islamic education centers, where learners of all levels and professional fields will be trained in the memorization of Qur'anic verses and "Islamic Sciences."
The decision is part of a much larger project launched by the government in April. Under the title "Environmentally Responsible, Assuming My Values" (Turkish: Çevreme Duyarlıyim, Degerlerime Sahip Cıkayorum; acronym ÇEDES), the government project aims to cultivate among young Turks "our national, moral, human, spiritual and cultural values ". This means the cultivation of ethno-religious nationalism with much more intensity than until now, in the almost hundred-year history of the Turkish Republic, which anyway was built on the exclusion of all other, minority cultures.
However, the barometer of future domestic developments is the policy towards Turkey's minorities, especially Alevis and Kurds. At present, the state continues to refuse official recognition of these minorities and tolerates public insults or violence against them. In the case of the Kurds, the state is actually continuing the decades-old policy whereby the security forces (police, gendarmerie, army) practically terrorize large segments of that population, especially in southeastern Anatolia, under generic charges of... terrorism. The country's laws remain vague in this area, effectively allowing any citizen to be treated as a terrorist at the discretion of the authorities. To these minorities is now added that of Kemalist secularists, treated more and more explicitly as deviants from the norms established by the regime, even Erdoğan recently derogatorily calling them "an insignificant minority". If Turkey continues in this direction, of ethno-religious and xenophobic nationalism, Ankara's ties with the Western liberal democracies and their international organizations, including the European Union and NATO, will continue to deteriorate.
Foreign policy remains subordinated to Islam as well
Beyond Ankara's apparent openness to dialogue and cooperation with traditional partners, the regime's home media, overwhelmingly dominant in the national landscape, sets the tone with disparaging texts against Washington and the United Nations. This while the leader in Ankara is obsessively presented as the savior of the world’s wronged, i.e. the Muslims. After the release of a very harsh report on Turkey by the European Parliament, which criticized the unprecedented degradation of citizens' rights and justice, President Erdoğan responded with a message that resonated well with the millions of anti-Western nationalists that support him: "we will make our own assessment and, following this assessment, we may even (decide to) break away from Europe if necessary”.
Adding to this is the postponement of the parliamentary ratification of Sweden's accession to NATO, promised in Vilnius in July and possible, but not certain, at the meeting of the Turkish legislature after October 1. The delay seems to have seriously offended the Biden administration . In this case, Turkey may have lost credibility anyway by not actually cooperating with Sweden when given the chance. The authorities in Stockholm have recently informed those in Ankara about a big criminal of Kurdish origin, requesting his extradition. "High-level" people in Turkey, however, passed on that information to the very entourage of the criminal in question. This in the context in which numerous Muslim criminals wanted by the authorities of several European countries have been taking refuge in Turkey for many years and have acquired Turkish citizenship through an investment scheme.
Ankara then avoids extraditing them. It should be noted that, in the above-mentioned case, the Kurdish identity of the incriminated person no longer mattered to the Turkish authorities, only the Muslim one. If we add the examples of Ankara's policy in the Middle East or Africa, including the support it continues to give to the Muslim Brotherhood, it can be concluded that the Turkish state seems to be moving further and further away from the Kemalist principle of secularism, having rather the ambition to become the absolute champion of Islam globally.
In such a context, it is becoming increasingly clear that Turkey's return to long-term good feelings and relations with its European and North American partners is highly unlikely. Its ruling regime stubbornly continues on the anti-Western and authoritarian line marked by a xenophobic ethno-religious nationalism. This brings important votes in every election, in a society dominated by generations of anti-Western narratives, both in educational programs for all ages and in the media. In recent years, this anti-Western stand has become more explicit, with clear reference to Islamic and ethno-national values.
Turkish ethno-nationalism, promoted by both secularists and Islamists
Meanwhile, conservative-led Turkey continues to see an alarming rise in the number of women killed by men ("honor" killings in tribal tradition) or an unprecedented decline in the republican era in the quality of education and literacy rates, according to OECD statistics . There is also an increase in the number of forced marriages of young girls, under 18 or 15 . Even at 6 years old , as was the case with the daughter of the influential leader of the Hiranur religious foundation in Istanbul, affiliated to the Ismailağa congregation. This in turn has direct and long-standing connections with the Turkish President and other important members of his entourage.
On September 16, in Izmir, representatives of the tens of millions of people who still identify with what the regime in Ankara now considers "insignificant minorities" protested together and in unison, for the first time, against these developments. Amid worsening poverty and widespread corruption, that protest may be just the beginning. The deep fractures in Turkish society are beginning to become more and more evident, and to hurt more and more.
Observers of these developments must also consider the possibility that such protests will become history. Izmir remains a strong bastion of secularism and Kemalism, but it is about the only one left among the big cities. The opposition parties do not participate in the effort to counter conservatism with an explicitly liberal discourse, about fundamental civil liberties and about the autonomy of the individual, the family and the cultural communities, in relation to the state. The dominant speech, both from the ruling powers and the of the opposition, is formulated exclusively in the key of xenophobic nationalism, with some extra religiosity on the power’s side. And the state continues to not recognize tens of millions of people who belong to ethnic and/or religious minorities.
As I found out during my 18 years of work at one of the universities in Izmir, confusing patriotism with nationalism, and the country with the state, has been perpetuated in Turkish society for generations. Thus, the protest of September 16 and any other protest that would follow it cannot lead to the collective awareness in Turkish society of the fact that its problems are much deeper than those related to the secularity or non-secularity of state institutions and policies. Its problems lie in the way this society has been indoctrinated over many generations, in the nearly century-old republic, with a xenophobic state ethno-nationalism that is essentially authoritarian towards alternative identities, which it excludes out of principle and conviction. Such indoctrination will remain the dominant background layer in the collective consciousness, making possible, through electoral mechanisms, only a Turkey hostile to otherness, both internally and externally, with consequences for both Turks and the rest of us
