(Pro-)Russian propaganda seeks to convince the world that Russia is unstoppable. However, the parliamentary election in Moldova showed that, when facing smart opposition, Moscow cannot win the hybrid war — not even against a country with infinitely smaller resources. The lessons Moldova offers may prove valuable for both NATO and Romania.
Moldova’s two revolutions vs. Russia’s hybrid war
Maia Sandu inflicted a painful defeat on Putin — a victory built not on luck or international context but on a vision implemented with courage and determination. The parliamentary election in the Republic of Moldova marked the culmination of the country’s geopolitical realignment and, in effect, a census of Moldovans who have embraced a Western identity.
Amid the ongoing war in Ukraine, which turned Moldova into a front line of Russia’s hybrid war against Europe, two revolutions are in fact unfolding — intertwined and mutually reinforcing. One is national, asserting a Romanian and Western identity that continues the movement begun in the mid-1980s but halted by Russia through the Transnistrian conflict. The other is civic, driven by the organic evolution of Moldovan society, seeking to pull the Republic out of the post-Soviet sphere and set in on a political path anchored within Europe’s borders. The absence of nationalist overtones in Chișinău’s politics and the framing of its conflict with Putin’s Russia strictly in terms of democratic values had a stabilizing effect on Moldova’s interethnic relations, despite Moscow’s efforts to inflame them.
This has opened the way for Moldova’s Russian-speaking population to take part in the civic revolution. The so-called “Russian World,” on which Putin built his strategy of keeping former republics trapped in the post-Soviet political purgatory, is starting to fall apart. It did so in Ukraine, at the start of the war, and continues to facture in Moldova and Kazakhstan — the result of equally courageous but distinct strategies and goals.
How to counter Russia’s hybrid operations: takeaways from the election in Moldova
Beyond the euphoria and the calm brought by the election results, these events also generated a set of lessons — not only for Romania, but for all countries involved, willingly or not, in Russia’s propaganda and cognitive war against the West.
For the first time in European practice, Moldovan authorities conducted their entire campaign to counter Russian influence in the election process as if it were a military wartime counterintelligence operation.
Showing foresight and courage, but especially a capacity to actively anticipate Moscow’s moves, Chișinău struck decisively the key nodes underlying the Kremlin’s diversion strategy. The banning of pro-Kremlin media outlets and the partial dismantling of the electoral corruption network in Găgăuzia, at just the right moment, not only reduced the effectiveness of Russia’s destabilization campaign, but also forced Moscow’s local proxies to resort to counterproductive political improvisations. With concrete and full support from the intelligence community, Moldova’s justice system managed to send a strong signal to those who deemed themselves shielded by Moscow’s networks through the swift trial of Evghenia Guțul, sentencing Ilan Șor’s Găgăuz intermediary to seven years in prison. This sharply curbed the enthusiasm and efficiency of the electoral corruption network and exposed to even the most radical opponents of Maia Sandu that the supposed power of Putin’s “cardboard millionaire” ally is nothing but a myth perpetuated by Russian propaganda.
Despite its reputation for learning from mistakes, the Kremlin’s strategists acted arrogantly and clumsily in Moldova, making Chișinău’s task considerably easier. Moscow’s public promises of “monthly aid” for Găgăuz pensioners, the heavily publicized visits by Evghenia Guțul, and the amateurish propaganda videos from Irina Vlah and Victoria Furtună accelerated political polarization and significantly deepened Moldova’s political trenches.
Despite political risks entailed by such actions, Chișinău’s measures to discourage participation in electoral corruption targeted not only the puppeteers, but also the puppets themselves. Fines imposed on those who organized or accepted vote-buying (many of whom probably already had a political option) reduced Russia’s ability to stage protests and fake the appearance of a society on the verge of explosion.
Against this backdrop, the Moldovan government communicated clearly and consistently — presenting facts, names, and places rather than speculation. By significantly reducing the number of polling stations in hostile territories (Russia and Belarus) and tightly controlling routes between the two sides of the Dniester, Chișinău’s goal was not to restrict the voting rights of Moldovan citizens in these territories, but to limit Moscow’s proxies from freely transporting groups of “voters”. Thus, Chișinău authorities demonstrated that democratic procedures can be constitutionally adjusted to effectively defend democracy — without descending into questionable decisions like those seen in Romania.
The most important takeaway (one Romania should examine carefully) concerns the preservation of the diaspora’s political engagement. As in the presidential election earlier this year, the Moldovan diaspora played a key role in securing the victory of democratic forces. Despite Russia’s efforts, the Moldovan diaspora remained aligned with the two ongoing revolutions at home. Unlike Bucharest, which has an arsenal of tools it could deploy, Chișinău relied solely on the president’s popularity and her ability to offer Moldovans abroad a credible vision. Moldovans in the diaspora resisted the temptation of Putin’s “anti-establishment” populism and the Kremlin’s nationalist siren song. The conclusion: a cognitive crisis, much like the one affecting many Romanians, cannot be fought with technical tools alone — credible leadership is the decisive part of the solution.
Unable to control Moldova through due election process, Moscow will try destabilization and a coup
Despite these recent victories, as long as the war continues, Russia will attempt to destabilize Moldova. As a first step (until it rethinks its strategies on the ground), Moscow will try to delegitimize the new Moldovan government, claiming — across all available media — that the election was rigged. Since the election showed the limits of Russia’s propaganda base, the Kremlin is expected to shift its focus toward coup techniques, cultivating social unrest and interethnic tensions to shake Moldova’s internal balance.
At the same time, Moldova and president Maia Sandu will be targeted by a broader European propaganda framework, designed by Moscow and its proxies in various countries, to suggest that the world is on the verge of a historic bargain between Russia and the USA, one involving the fate of the former communist bloc. Within this narrative, former Soviet republics are framed as Russia’s “natural” sphere of influence — the aim being to intimidate, demoralize and even threaten leaders who resist Russian intrusion.
The goal of Kremlin propaganda: to convince the world that restoring Russia’s sphere of influence is inevitable. The election in Moldova proves the opposite – Russia can be stopped
In fact, through its aggressive propaganda, Russia is trying to conceal its economic and demographic struggles — and above all, its strategic political failures. The current situation at the borders between China, Kazakhstan, and Russia — which has severely slowed down Russian imports of dual-use Chinese technologies — shows that Moscow has failed to build an anti-Western alliance with the Global South, especially with China.
Although Russian leaders are often credited with strategic foresight, Putin seems intent on proving the opposite. Russia has staked too much on this war to withdraw without risking the regime’s stability. Except for the highly unlikely scenarios of capturing Kyiv or destroying independent Ukraine, none of the war’s possible outcomes are politically safe for Putin. Thus, the Kremlin’s main line of attack against Europe (the largest financial supporter of Ukraine’s war effort, for the time being) will be to paralyze NATO mechanisms. Repeated airspace incursions, GPS interference and various diversions within NATO countries — calibrated carefully to create tension without triggering collective defense — will seek to undermine trust at NATO level and weaken the conviction that Allies will stand together. And such actions are bound to multiply.
Once confidence in NATO erodes, Russia expects European politicians, particularly in former communist countries, to look for “alternative” security arrangements — effectively accepting negotiations that reestablish a recognized Russian sphere of influence. This is a long-term and risky plan, but for now, it is the only one Moscow can pursue without threatening regime survival. That is why the first and most important takeaway from Moldova’s election is this: Russia can be stopped.
