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For weeks, the Middle East has resembled a powder keg, and the regional expansion of the war in Gaza and the lower-intensity conflict on the Israeli-Lebanese border seemed all but inevitable. Prominent pundits expected a significant military response from Iran and its allies (or rather through proxy groups) against Israel after the July 30 assassination in Lebanon of Fuad Shukr, the military leader of the Lebanese Hezbollah, followed on July 31 by the killing of Ismail Haniyeh, the political leader and main negotiator of Hamas, right in Tehran. Sources claim that the Ayatollah himself would have ordered a direct strike on Israel. On August 21, Iran's UN representative told the Wall Street Journal that Iran has time on its side and is meticulously planning a response that Israel won’t see coming. In turn, Hezbollah has stepped up its belligerent rhetoric, while Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria, which had taken a significant lower profile after the attack on Tower 22 US military outpost in Jordan in early 2024, have made it clear they are willing to take up arms again by launching missiles at a US base in western Iraq, also targeting US objectives in Syria.
For its part, Hamas gave a fairly clear answer: it elected 61-year-old Yahia Sinwar, a notorious military commander, as its political leader, perhaps the most radical of all options. Sinwar is one of the militants recruited in the 1980s by the founder of Hamas himself, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. With the election of Sinwar, some experts foresee the dawn of a difficult era, preventing any resolution of the conflict. Israel will never be able to negotiate with Sinwar, the man for whose capture it was willing to offer a 400,000-USD reward in December 2023, and for whose elimination vast Israeli and American resources are now being channeled. This is exactly what Hamas seeks to achieve: closing down all vistas towards direct peace negotiations. Hamas now being led by a man much closer to Iran than Haniyeh and avowed advocate of armed struggle against Israel rather than peace, many expect the conflict to intensify and even spill to the wider region.
Erdoğan's Turkey has added more fuel to the fire, despite its NATO membership. Although the White House, through the voice of Secretary of State Blinken, called on all its allies to urge Iran not to contribute to the escalation of the conflict, the Turkish ambassador to Tehran did the exact opposite. Clearly conveying his president's message, the Turkish diplomat said that it is not just Iran that bears the responsibility for a firm response, thus implying that all countries in the region should “act” alongside the Iranians. Such a call, I think, only confirms Ankara’s perpetual state of panic, as Turkey feels abandoned and adrift amidst regional developments.
In addition, Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, at the end of July said he could order his army to intervene in Israel to defend the Palestinians in Gaza. No word on exactly how he would do that, however, and how such an intervention would help the Palestinians. Instead, the Turkish government called a day of national mourning for Palestinian Haniyeh and banned all access to the Instagram platform from Turkey for several days, claiming this was in response to blocked messages on Instagram honoring Haniyeh and Hamas. President Erdoğan made several statements in which he blamed Israel for the killing of “brother” Haniyeh.
Beyond the bellicose statements, serious efforts were also made to prevent a wider escalation. The West and regional states have engaged in an intense diplomatic effort. The United States have strengthened their presence in and around the region to deter Iran. The Americans already have two battlegroups deployed to the Eastern Mediterranean, with at least one aircraft carrier carrying F35 jets (USS Lincoln now in transit to replace USS Theodore Roosevelt) and have also deployed a submarine with propulsion and nuclear capabilities (USS Georgia). Adding to all that are the fixed military bases in the region (Levant, Gulf) as well as those of USA’s allies (take, for instance, the British regiments in Cyprus). Such a force would be powerful enough to deter any major response from Tehran. Admittedly, beyond geopolitical and strategic calculations, other things are just as important in the Middle East, such as the honor of leaders, who like to keep their reputation clean.
Iran and Hezbollah have avoided a major war with a much stronger Israel
The worst-case scenario much discussed throughout August envisaged a coordinated attack on Israel by Hezbollah and Iran, with massive drone and missile launches, reinforced by attacks by the Houthis and militias from Syria and Iraq. Israel's response (possibly backed by the United States) would have been commensurate with the attack, and things might have gotten out of hand further down the line.
Hezbollah did attack on August 25, but its strike was much less intense than many experts had feared. The massive pre-emptive strikes launched by Israel that same morning on Hezbollah targets in Lebanon can certainly account for that (Israel said it had destroyed thousands of missile launchers). Although the Islamist group's strikes were Shiite, both its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, and Tehran, seemed pleased, so tensions deescalated. Obviously, this does not mean that the risk of a wider conflict has disappeared, just that it has significantly toned down.
It should be noted that, despite its threats, Tehran was in no rush to attack either. Contrary to the expectations of observers inclined to see everything in black and white, Iran is not an actor that wants a direct war with Israel, not now, nor in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, a major blow to Israel would do nothing to help the Palestinians, and would instead be seen as a swift retaliation for the assassination of Haniyeh, who was not even an Iranian citizen. Rather, the economic crisis Iran is experiencing must be taken at face value, as well as the increasingly negative public perception of the ruling regime's religious conservatism. The internal context in Iran doesn’t exactly favor a confrontation with an external enemy that has proven too strong for the current military capabilities of the Islamic republic. This is precisely why a moderate such as Masoud Pezeshkian won the presidential election, promising a kind of reset of relations with the West and a wiser approach to economic and social issues.
Israel was, is and will remain a hard nut to crack for any adversary in the region. It enjoys net superiority in terms of military manpower and equipment, benefiting from the unconditional support of the USA and other states, especially in the event of a direct attack. Let's not forget that, after the Abraham Accords of 2020, the signatory Arab states are also part of the coalition that pledged to observe Israel's sovereignty and security. In the case of the April 13, 2024 missile attack on Israel, security was ensured by Israeli forces in cooperation with contingents of the US Amy, but also with Saudi Arabia and Hashemite Jordan.
Furthermore, the greatest unforeseen but ever-present threat is the nuclear weapon. No one will dare attack a state known to possess a nuclear arsenal. Reckless threats made by extremists in Jerusalem, for instance that Gaza should be wiped off the face of the earth with nuclear weapons, are perceived in Tehran as a potential threat. Although the minister's verbal threat was immediately condemned by several ambassadors and politicians, including Netanyahu, such statements could be used for a shift of doctrine on both sides. If Israel actually shifts from its traditional ambiguity to an aggressive policy regarding its nuclear arsenal, this could also prompt Iran to openly address a military nuclear program.
Engaging in diplomatic dialogue remains the only solution, and some analysts believe that a peace deal and ceasefire in Gaza could lead Iran to even relinquish a significant attack on Israel.
It should be noted, in this context, that on August 15, Qatar and Egypt signed a statement with the United States calling on Israel and Hamas to negotiate, observing the principles indicated by the White House on May 31, 2024 and accepted by the UN Security Council (essentially a ceasefire, a spaced-out withdrawal of the Israeli army from Gaza, and prisoner exchanges). The August 15 document also has the explicit support of European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen and of other European leaders, and negotiations continue in Doha and Cairo.
However, extremists from both camps stand in the way of negotiations, wielding tremendous influence, which, right now, seems to outweigh the moderates.
A game of stand-by negotiations: Netanyahu looms as the number one problem
Any strand of extremism owes its existence virtually to another type of extremism, at the opposite end. One loses its significance and legitimacy in the absence of the other. Sinwar seems to understand that Netanyahu's decision to play the card of Israeli extremism will cost him his political career, and is thus likely ready to do whatever it takes to push his rival in exactly that direction. Netanyahu, on the other hand, seems oblivious to the actual stakes, always reacting recklessly. Instead of working hard to achieve peace and the recovery of Israeli hostages, he insists on eliminating Hamas. Meanwhile, the radicals in his government even push harder for the evacuation of Palestinians from Gaza and the establishment of Israeli control over the Strip. Under these circumstances, a smart move on Yahia Sinwar's part would be to play the negotiation card and wait. And he appears to be doing just that at the moment: at first, Hamas announced it was not pushing for a fresh start to negotiations (which would have completely nullified all the reconciliation efforts accomplished so far). Instead, it demanded a set of clear-cut measures for the implementation of the May 31 Biden plan and the withdrawal of all Israeli troops from Gaza.
Netanyahu also pretends to play the same negotiating card. His government initially promised to be a part of this process, thus prompting American, Qatari and Egyptian mediators to feel optimistic. In fact, however, it is becoming increasingly clear that the Israeli Prime Minister is actually doing the exact opposite: pressing for the continuation of the war, which seems increasingly to be his own, and not the State of Israel's. This plays well into the opposition’s criticism: in order to steer clear of serious corruption charges, the Israeli Prime Minister chooses to prolong the war, instead of trying to get hostages home and ensure a peaceful resolution of the conflict.
The White House’s last-resort effort on August 19-21, through Secretary of State Blinken's ninth diplomatic tour after the October 7 attacks, seems to have been thwarted by none other than Netanyahu himself. The Israeli Prime Minister’s actions and statements continue to fit the logic of the complete elimination of Hamas, although he had indicated that he accepted the initial American plan for negotiations. On August 19, Hamas responded that it no longer accepts the Biden-Blinken plan, because Israel has already altered the negotiation agenda, adding unforeseen elements to Washington’s original proposal. More specifically, Hamas objected to Netanyahu's insistence that Israeli troops continue to control parts of Gaza, especially the Netzarim military corridor separating northern and southern Gaza, and the Philadelphia corridor on the border with Egypt, which harbors tunnels Hamas militants use to receive reinforcements, weapons and ammunition.
Obviously, this detail cannot be accepted by Hamas and Palestinians in general, for whom the Israeli army is an illegitimate occupier, already responsible for the killing of tens of thousands of people. That is why the liberation of Gaza has been Hamas’s burning objective since the start of peace talks. And Secretary of State Blinken firmly stated on August 21 that “the United States do not accept any long-term occupation of Gaza by Israel”. Another US official from Blinken's team shared Washington's irritation to journalists, arguing under the protection of anonymity that “such maximalist statements [by PM Netanyahu] are not constructive”.
Despite the radicals of both camps pressing forward, the escalation of the conflict cannot be extended indefinitely, and Sinwar and the Hamas leadership seem to understand this better than Netanyahu, who seems to be losing much of his approval at home. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant explicitly opposes the policy of eliminating Hamas, dismissing it as “nonsense”. Other members of the government, even from Netanyahu's negotiating team, seem to have had enough. Under the protection of anonymity, one such source explicitly condemned the counterproductive statements of the Prime Minister and his apparent plan to sabotage the negotiations.
Biden and his advisers also seem fed up with Netanyahu's tactic of prolonging the war just to save his career. Should the Harris-Waltz team win the November election, as most polls now seem to indicate, irritation and pressure from the White House will further grow, extending into that four-year term. The USA will continue to support Israel's security, but is likely to adopt a firm stand against the current leader in Jerusalem and the extremists around him. And that could isolate Netanyahu to the point of his demise. With Netanyahu gone, that doesn’t mean Israel could lose an extended conflict in the region, if Iran and its allies (Hezbollah, Hamas, Iraqi Shiite militias, Houthis, etc.) would somehow launch a major attack on Israel.
Conversely, there are indications that a new Democratic president at the White House will focus more on completing the Biden plan for the Middle East, which would crown the efforts started in 2020 under the Trump administration with the Abraham Accords. This is the so-called USA-Israel-Saudi Arabia trilateral agreement project, the only realistic and feasible plan currently in the works, blocked by the current confrontation between Israel and Hamas, and indirectly by Iran.
A global project, currently blocked by extremists
Joe Biden's initiative is a carry-over of the Abraham Accords, by means of which the sovereignty of the State of Israel was recognized by the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, followed by Sudan and Morocco, all accepting the normalization of diplomatic relations with Israel. Another two regional states, Egypt and Jordan, had already recognized the independence of Israel in 1979 and 1994, respectively. The Biden project now seeks to achieve the ultimate goal in the Middle East: the normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia.
American diplomatic efforts have already paid dividends, as the agreement has entered an advanced phase of negotiation. It seeks to recognize Israel's sovereignty, normalize bilateral relations, but also recognize the independent Palestinian state. The Saudis are promised American security guarantees, which would put their kingdom on the same level of US relations as Japan, South Korea and, of course, Israel. Saudi Arabia will receive armaments, technical assistance, as well as transfers of conventional security and energy technologies. In exchange, the Saudis are asked to distance themselves from China, especially in terms of arms purchases and other forms of military cooperation, as well as increasing oil production in the long term. This final term is critical to countering Putin (cheap oil prices) and controlling inflation in the USA and at global level.
Security guarantees for Saudi Arabia would also send a strong message with a huge political impact in the Arab world, where mistrust or even hostility towards the West is fueled to a large extent (although not exclusively) by the fact that the United States has chosen to engage in a security partnership with Israel, not an Arab country.
From the point of view of Riyadh, but also other countries in a similar situation, options such as BRICS remain open, but they remain of secondary importance, as Western guarantees are far too solid not to involve priority commitments, as in the case of most states in Eastern Europe. The culmination of all diplomatic efforts, from the Abraham Accords to the trilateral under discussion, would be to integrate Israel into the Arab world, to which it belongs geographically but with which it has been politically and militarily at war since its foundation. It is up to the reader to ponder the value of such a goal for the Middle East in particular and international politics more generally.
The biggest problem with regard to negotiations for an immediate peace and, in the medium and long term, for a Washington-Riyadh-Jerusalem agreement, remains the extremism of the two actors: Israel under the leadership of Benjamin Netanyahu, whose political future is uncertain, and Hamas under the leadership of Yahia Sinwar.
Tehran's efforts to block the integration of the State of Israel into the Arab world cannot continue indefinitely. Iran lacks both the resources and the legitimacy among the Sunnis who dominate most Arab countries. But a major blow by Iran to Israel, even indirectly, via Hamas, Hezbollah and other allies listed above, would only effectively legitimize the belligerent policy of the Prime Minister and the “deep state” in Israel, without helping in any way the cause of Palestinians in Gaza. Seeking to put a stop to the process of normalization of relations between Israel and the Arab states in the region, Tehran-backed Palestinian violent extremism plays well into Israel’s own extremism. Both camps seek only to maintain the state of conflict precisely to legitimize themselves and the policies by means of which they attach the security-threat label to issues that are otherwise politically solvable. We must keep this logic in mind when analyzing developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as other conflicts in the Middle East.
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