Voted by Parliament less than a week after the resignation of the Gavrilita Government, the Recean cabinet came up with a government program that focuses on security, economic development and the European integration of the Republic of Moldova. The document does not make any reference to the relations with Russia, although it is clear that Russia will continue to influence, through its people, the political processes in Chisinau and has other important levers, primarily Transnistria and the energy weapon.
The government wanted to show that the resignation of the prime-minister was not the result of internal tensions. The names of the replaced ministers, however, suggest that there were problems
Dorin Recean kept most of the ministers of the Gavrilita government, but dropped controversial or underperforming figures. Perhaps the most relevant change is the one at the Ministry of Infrastructure and Regional Development, where one of his deputies, Lilia Dabija, was appointed to replace the controversial Andrei Spanu. However, she will not hold the office of deputy prime minister, like her predecessor. Moreover, for the energy field that was also managed by Andrei Spanu - and which brought the former deputy prime minister the harshest criticism, first for the contract signed with Gazprom, then for accepting that all the gas supplied by the Russian giant reach Transnistria - a separate ministry was created, led by Victor Parlicov, the former director of NAER and a well-known expert in the field.
The position of deputy prime minister for digitalization has also disappeared. The field was taken over by the Minister of the Economy, Dumitru Alaiba. In finance, the NGO member Dumitru Budianschi was replaced by the technocrat Veronica Sirițeanu, who’d held several important positions in the ministry and at the Fiscal Authority. Also, the Minister of Justice, Sergiu Litvinenco, one of the leaders of PAS, but who was faced with some confidence issues last fall, after the Telegram leaks scandal , but also because of the slow pace of reforms, was replaced by the secretary of state, lawyer Veronica Mihailov.
Andrei Spanu, the most criticized member of the former government, was appointed secretary general of the presidential institution. This could be an attempt by Maia Sandu to show that the decisions of the former government, even the controversial ones, such as the one to give the gas received from Gazprom to the Transnistrian region (which does not pay for it) in exchange for electricity cheaper than the one from Romania, were correct. But it could also be a confirmation of the rumors about the great influence Spanu has in PAS.
Over the past few months, there have been rumors of hostile relations between Maia Sandu and Natalia Gavrilita, including a failed attempt by the president to dismiss the government in the fall. There had been talks about a potential appointment of Recean at the helm of the goverment ever since September 2022. The transfer of power was, however, a very civilized one. They all thanked each other for their support and cooperation, the former prime-minister welcomed the new one , and many former ministers emphasized the unity within the government – with a persistence that sounded a bit excessive, though.
The governing program of the Recean cabinet does not include references to Russia or the current negotiation format with Transnistria
The “Prosperous, Safe, European Moldova” governing program is focused on economic development, the need to ensure security and the continuation of the country's European path by fulfilling the accession requirements. “We want a country of prosperous citizens, with strong and transparent institutions, with a competitive business environment, for which the relationship with the state is an accelerator and not a series of obstacles. We want to live in a safe world, where international treaties are respected, where problems between countries are solved through dialogue, where there is respect for the smaller states. We want to be full members of the European Union”, the Recean government’s program reads.
The Recean government program is the first in the history of the Republic of Moldova in which there is simply no reference to the Russian Federation. The foreign priorities of the new Government relate in particular to the advancement of the relations with the EU and the promotion of the European integration goal, the development of the privileged relationship and the deepening of the strategic partnership with Romania, the expansion and deepening of the dialogue with the USA. The government also aims to “further develop comprehensive relations with Ukraine and firmly support its sovereignty and territorial integrity, ensure bilateral interaction on the issue of strengthening regional security and stability, as well as provide political support and humanitarian assistance”, but no direct reference is made to the Russian war and invasion.
Another peculiarity of the program is that it includes no reference to negotiations in the “5+2” format for the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. This format was established in 2005, but started to function de facto in 2012 and has failed to produce tangible results, especially in terms of identifying a political solution to the frozen conflict. Russia and Ukraine play the role of mediators in this format. The Recean Government is counting on the continuation of the direct dialogue between Chisinau and Tiraspol and on intensifying the dialogue with the international partners involved in the negotiation process.
Stabilizing the economy, the security crisis and the reform of the judiciary – the main challenges facing the Recean government
The Recean government is taking office at a time when the economic and energy crises seem to have passed their peak. In 2022, inflation in the Republic of Moldova stood at 30%, the highest in Europe, second only to Turkey. The Gross Domestic Product fell by 4% in the first nine months and by about 10% in the third quarter of last year. After the constant increase in the price of energy resources during the past year, prices seem to have stabilized, and the risks that the country could run out of gas in the cold period of the year or the gas become more expensive have been overcome. However, the National Bank forecasts an annual inflation rate of more than 13% in 2023, which will continue to affect low-income families, and the protest movement is expected to increase in intensity. The first protest action this year against the government took place on Sunday, February 19, three days after the inauguration of the new cabinet.
The main challenge remains the security crisis in the context of the war in Ukraine. The issue had been on the authorities' agenda for the past year, but was brought back to the fore by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy. He spoke in Brussels about the existence of a Russian plan to take control of the Republic of Moldova, and the details of this plan - which includes the use of foreign mercenaries, hostage-taking and seizing state institutions - were provided by President Maia Sandu. The pro-European authorities in Chisinau have criticized Russia's invasion of Ukraine, even though they have not officially joined the international sanctions. Meanwhile, Moscow has repeatedly criticized Chisinau for its pro-Western stances, for allegedly undermining the Russian-speaking minority, and recently, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has suggested that the Republic of Moldova would be the next Ukraine.
In October 2022, Washington imposed sanctions on several citizens and institutions from the Republic of Moldova and Russia, under the Magnitsky Act, for attempting to bring the Republic of Moldova back into Moscow's sphere of influence. Among them are people who collaborated with the former president and leader of the Party of Socialists, Igor Dodon, with the mayor of Chisinau and the leader of a new political project, Ion Ceban, but also with the fugitive politician Ilan Shor and his party, which now leads the protest movement in the Republic Moldova. Polls show that if parliamentary elections were held during this period, the three parties would get the majority of votes.
The Recean government must also manage three electoral campaigns (the local elections in October-November 2023, the presidential elections in November 2024 and the parliamentary elections in the second half of 2025), and the path that the citizens of the Republic of Moldova will take will very much depend on the last of these elections.
Another challenge is the reform of the judiciary, which is moving slowly and meeting resistance from the system. In 2022, an extraordinary process of evaluation of the members of the Superior Council of Prosecutors and the Superior Council of Magistrates was launched, and recently about half of the judges of the Supreme Court of Justice resigned after it was announced that they would be appraised. This situation risks blocking the act of justice in the Republic of Moldova.
Economic targets, difficult to reach. The main challenge for the Recean government: to convince the voters to keep supporting the pro-Europeans
With an economy extremely sensitive to regional shocks, with a demographic situation that is deteriorating by the year, with a pro-Russian secessionist enclave and a war on the border, it is difficult to imagine how the Recean Government will achieve its vision of creating “a country of prosperous citizens, with strong and transparent institutions, with a competitive business environment, for which the relationship with the state is an accelerator and not a series of obstacles”. But great challenges sometimes also offer unexpected perspectives, as happened, for example, in June 2022, when the Republic of Moldova (and Ukraine) obtained the status of EU accession candidate for which, had it not been for the Russian invasion, it should have worked hard to implement reforms and fulfil requirements for many more years.
In the current regional situation, the return to Chisinau of a pro-Russian government would no longer represent “a small disappointment” for the Western chancelleries, but a major security issue. The Republic of Moldova could become a platform for espionage and diversion behind the Ukrainian front, at the borders of the European Union and NATO. In this situation, it is expected that the West will increase its financial and logistical assistance for the pro-European government in Chisinau and even expedite the EU accession process. However, the Republic of Moldova will have to deliver results, and this means, first of all, the implementation of the reforms requested by the West.
Beyond reforms – the benefits of which can be seen over time – concrete governance results are needed, because they bring the votes that would allow the pro-Europeans to stay in power. The infrastructure development plans in the government's program could deliver those visible results, but to carry them out requires money and support from the West. And the latter will be easier to convince to give money if they trust that a pro-Kremlin government will not come to Chisinau overnight and will use the bridges, roads and security infrastructure, built with European money, to support Putin and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.