In the months that have passed since the start of Russia’s massive attack against Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky has turned out to be a remarkable leader. He didn’t flee, didn’t betray the people who put him in office, said no to illicit dealings and didn’t trade off the sovereignty of his country. The Russians tried to reach him during the first hours of the invasion. Is Moscow afraid of president Zelensky and the ideas he stood up for even before the war broke out?
Zelensky and the American model
The American model of political administration, which attributes an increasingly stronger role to ordinary citizens in comparison with Russia, poses a threat to the people who went to great lengths to build the current power vertical in the Kremlin. Zelensky, Moscow leaders believe, is someone who took over these “dangerous” practices and is capable of turning them into a model of democracy for the Russians, through the proper attitude and behavior. Obviously, Russian manipulation and propaganda have painted a terrible portrait of Zelensky, projecting it onto the minds of people watching public television in Russia. They portray Zelensky as a “fascist” who cherishes American values, incapable of managing domestic and external affairs, a Jew with fascist and decadent urges. A comedian turned jester in the court of America.
Russians were more concerned with the way the USA is functioning and the values it upholds rather than their own military strength. Russia thought it could rely on its military capabilities alone. But what about principles and values? What about a stronger economy, based on an economic model that values private property? How do you reach out to your own population as long as it craves for the lifestyle (and politics) of America?
There are constant references to America in the discourse of opinion leaders trained by the Kremlin: the White House doing this or that makes it alright for us to do the same thing, of if possibly, even more. But when you get into the essence of things, delving deeper into the arguments, the representatives of the political elites merely reveal their frustration and destructive plans for Russian society with every public appearance. Any frustration results in the reallocation of the country’s resources (both economic and financial) in order to fight an external enemy that has not just military weapons, but also democratic ones. And what should Moscow do about the elections it needs to organize so often? What should Russian leaders do if they’re ousted even for a short period of time? How should they keep using the administrative resource in order to hold onto what took so much time and effort to achieve?
Once he took office, Zelensky never forgot where he came from and what he thought about his predecessors, Petro Poroshenko in particular. It’s not his achievement, but that of a critical mass of people who supported reforms and the structural transformations of the judiciary and the economy. Even though he despises journalists who entrap him and gets criticized by civil society, Ukraine’s president listens to what his people have to say. And by “his people”, I don’t necessarily refer to his inner circle, his advisers, but to ordinary citizens who are entitled to an opinion, a stand, a critical attitude towards the leadership, whose freedom of assembly and expression is observed. There are things that fall short in Ukraine as well. But that takes a toll on the political elite. Ukrainians can be quite inventive in this respect. They know how to make themselves heard from the bottom upwards and use their anarchic side to remind political leaders about their existence
Zelensky took a step back and toned down his discourse when he talked to disgruntled people. This became transparent on numerous occasions. The time he accepted discussing about the Steinmeier formula, but also when the people demanded he should stop signing any documents that would betray the interests of Ukraine. Zelensky stopped and he stopped his own people. Can you imagine the same thing happening to Vladimir Putin’s entourage? I doubt it. On the contrary, only a handful of people from the Kremlin leader’s inner circle had the courage to explain that this “special operation” might spell the beginning of Putin’s end at the helm of the country.
How the Russians tried to prevent the “Westernization” of Ukraine
Putin’s clientele in Moscow found it suitable to fuel public hatred towards everything that might be derived or influenced by the West, and against everything pertaining to the democratic transformation of Ukraine, one that it couldn’t erode from within nor sabotage by means of exerting political, economic, social or military pressure. Let give a brief overview of how Russia has been subverting decision-making in Kyiv for the past 30 years.
- It supported political figures with business interests in Russia, who in turn promoted the status quo and the partnership with the Russian Federation (prior to the Euromaidan protests) even after the annexation of Crimea. Pro-Russian politicians used their own resources to serve the interests of foreign groups. There are additional political actors who disregarded the promises that got them elected, namely they didn’t contribute to building an independent justice system or adopt genuine reforms, or they tacitly supported embezzlement schemes or kept doing business as usual with Russian energy sources and encouraged top-level graft – which is another nearly infallible weapon.
- It made use of economic and energy resources as instruments of external political pressure. It encouraged certain energy projects that diminished the role and status of Ukraine as a transit country and promoted Nord Stream 2, blocking trade on the Azov Sea and taking Ukrainian ships hostage. Also worth mentioning in this respect are the decisions that supported trade with the separatist regions in a more or less visible manner.
- It produced and spread disinformation, propaganda, manipulation – for instance by criticizing the measures taken by Ukrainian authorities in order to protect the information space (closing down televisions owned by pro-Russian politicians). Social media turned out to be a highly effective means of promoting disinformation in order to encourage the collusion between citizens and decision-makers.
- It violated the ceasefire agreements by supporting separatists and imposing unacceptable solutions to the conflict in eastern Ukraine. This line of action includes Russia’s sabotage of negotiations talks. And it’s not just the trilateral contact group on Ukraine, but also the Normandy format, which after December 2019 convened only at the level of presidential advisers or foreign ministers of participant countries.
All these efforts have significantly slowed down the actions, strategies, reforms and the implementation of public policies in Ukraine. But they didn’t cancel them altogether. It was virtually impossible for Russia to do so, because it neglected the element of analysis, failing to comprehend the bilateral relation between Ukrainian citizens and their political representatives. Or maybe because it deliberately rejected this element in order to avoid a similar approach in Russia.
Zelensky preferred European integration to NATO accession
A quick bird’s-eye view of Volodymyr Zelensky’s term in office will provide those who follow his achievements an opportunity to observe Zelensky’s persistence in promoting the European integration of Ukraine. Zelensky was and remains unwavering in his relations with Ukraine’s European partners. It was Zelensky who supported the idea that Ukraine should become a member state of the European Union, barely after a year in office. Anyone who thought different was advised to reconsider their rigid position towards Kyiv. Every bilateral talk Zelensky had in Brussels was reshaped in order to promote the European integration of Ukraine. Russia watched with concern as Ukraine’s foreign policies were redirected to create solidarity among Europeans and Ukrainians and eventually took action. It used third parties to foster the idea that Ukraine was incapable of managing its domestic affairs, that it was systematically violating the rights and freedoms of minorities, that it was sabotaging a resolution of the conflict in Donbas, describing the Ukrainian side as a threat to the safety of the population in the two breakaway regions. The discourse about Ukraine’s bid to join NATO, which was included in official documents after 2014, was rather an element used to adjust its position and aggressive rhetoric against the White House. Of course, both of Ukraine’s foreign policy goals are extremely dangerous and threaten Russia’s interests in the region, although the structure of Russia’s official narrative proves that certain fears revolving democratic processes are stronger than any frustration linked to foreign policies.
In his public appearances and discourse as president, Zelensky did not fall in line with the Kremlin’s perception and its well-defined interests for Ukraine. On the contrary, he continued to create regional platforms whereby he sought to discuss the annexation of Crimea and the violations of human rights in the peninsula, to promote Euro-Atlantic integration and encourage an active type of diplomacy, capable of slowing down the implementation of the Nord Stream 2 project. Moreover, Zelensky was audacious enough to disband the pro-Russian information network, something his predecessors were unwilling to do for various reasons, most likely having to do with their standing in the election. Thus, Zelensky turned from comedian and jester president to “fascist Jew” in official Kremlin rhetoric, which makes him “undesirable” to the Moscow “Tsar”.
