Are Latvians getting weary of Ukrainian refugees?

Although almost half of Ukrainian refugees in Latvia have admitted that they have faced verbal insults and there is hate speech on social networks, these cases are sporadic, and not systematic. However, the state currently needs to develop a long-term program to integrate those Ukrainian refugees who want to stay in Latvia, experts say.

The number of refugees in Latvia is constantly changing

The exact number of Ukrainian refugees in Latvia is unknown. Many came to Latvia without registering in any Latvian institutions, moving in with friends, family members, acquaintances or just regular Latvians.

The Register of Natural Persons of Latvia mentions that on January 1, 2024, 43,430 Ukrainian citizens were registered in Latvia with a temporary protection status. Some 25,650 of them were actually staying in Latvia, and that figure amounts to 1.2% of the country’s population.

Oleksii Zarichansky, a well-known Ukrainian journalist living in Latvia, who is covering Ukrainian life and perspective in Latvia, and knows many Ukrainian expats in person, told Veridica that there are around 25,000-26,000 Ukrainian residents in Latvia and another 20,000 who periodically enter or leave. At the same time, new refugees who have never been to Latvia before continue to arrive, mostly from the east and south-east of Ukraine. These are either territories occupied by Russia or the territories where a war is ongoing, like the regions of Kharkiv, Kherson, and Zaporizhia.

Hostility against Ukrainians, from social media to the streets

In October 2024, the Latvia-based think tank “Providus” presented a study on how the local society has accepted the Ukrainian refugees and how specifically pro-Kremlin social media channels are reflecting the arrival of Ukrainian refugees in Latvia. The authors emphasize that they cannot measure how does social media content influences the opinion of their consumers, but they can identify the most popular channels and analyze their content. These channels were in the Russian language.

In the survey conducted by Providus, in which 457 Ukrainian civilians participated, 44% said that they felt unsafe in Latvia. For example, a woman heard negative remarks on public transport because she spoke Ukrainian with her child. There have also been negative comments from work colleagues or at school, where children have been ridiculed. Latvian media have also repeatedly written about cases of physical violence against Ukrainian residents. For instance, a case in Liepāja, one of Latvia's largest cities, was widely publicized. There, probably due to national hatred, a local beat a 63-year-old Ukrainian citizen, who became disabled as a result. This case is still on the desk of the court.

The Providus study concluded that negative views of Ukrainians were based on the idea that they are privileged. For example, Ukrainians in Latvia can work in certain professions without knowing the Latvian language, locals cannot. There is also an assumption that Ukrainians will increase the number of crimes and do not want to work because it is easier to receive benefits.

Such, even episodic cases, limit the integration of Ukrainians in Latvia. Even a small incident hinders access to a place to live and health care, and it increases social tension.

The study emphasizes the special role of social networks, which strengthen the hostile attitude toward Ukrainians. Researchers list several websites or social network accounts that spread negative messages about Ukrainians, Ukraine and sometimes also Latvia and the Baltic States, accusing them of supporting Ukraine. They feature a mix of sarcasm, insults, and disinformation narratives typical to Russian propaganda such as “Ukraine is a Nazi state”, “Ukraine is the center of modern Nazism”, “Support for Ukraine causes problems for the West”, “Ukrainians are aggressive and unwanted refugees”, “prone to terrorism, a threat to Russian speakers”, etc.

The study identified 20 Russian-language Telegram, YouTube, and Tik-Tok channels that focused on anti-Ukrainian topics and were aimed at a Latvian audience. These channels were identified by three characteristics: direct links to Russian media or official structures, quoting pro-Kremlin sources, and propaganda-like vocabulary. Sometimes their names already indicated the direction of these channels. For example, “Антифашисты Прибалтики” (“Baltic Antifascists”), “Трибалтийские Вымираты” (“Three Baltic Emirates” – a reference to the three Baltic states), “Латвийская кочка” (“Latvian Swamp”). After obtaining data on publication frequency, audience response, and number of consumers, the study authors identified four main sources:: “Антифашисты Прибалтики” (“Baltic Antifascists”), Алексей Стефанов “Alexei Stefanov”), “BaltNews” and “Шпроты в изгнании. Новости Латвии” (“Shprotes in exile. Latvian News” – a reference to canned fish produced in Latvia and popular in the former Soviet Union).

The authors of the study indicate that a more thorough monitoring of Russian-language social networks can be a solution. War propaganda and hate speech are violations of Latvian and EU laws.

“Providus” points out that there is greater support for the war refugees among those living in Latvia who get their information only in Latvian or in Latvian and Russian. While only 11% of the population that get information only in Russian fully support the admission of Ukrainian refugees and 28% rather support it, those numbers go up for those getting their news in both Russian and Latvian – 18% and 32% - and are even higher among the population that only reads Latvian 29% “fully support” and 42% “rather support”. Within the research, by term “information” all kinds of sources have been included: social media, traditional media, based in Latvia, and elsewhere unless they are in Latvian or Russian language.

Differences are also visible in personal initiatives to help Ukrainians. 10% of those who obtain information only in Russian have helped and are still planning to do so. Another 9% have helped morally or materially, but do not know whether they will do so in the future. 4% are considering doing so, while 59% have not done so and do not plan to do so. The rest do not know. Among those who obtain information in both Latvian and Russian, 16% have helped and are still planning to do so, while 25% have done so, not knowing whether they will continue. In comparison, 32% have not helped and will not do so. Among those who obtained information in Latvian, these figures are as follows: 26%, 37%, and 13%. It is important to note, as a representative of the most well-known Latvian NGO “I Want to Help Refugees” working with refugees Ingmars Freimanis stresses, that not all Russians are consuming information offered in the Russian language. Thus, the line should be not between Latvian and Russians but between the language in which the information has been provided.

Journalist: Insults are episodic; more and more Ukrainians remain in Latvia

Ukrainian journalist Oleksii Zarichansky feels that the attitude of most people in Latvia is positive. He points out that those who have been offended have experienced this in exceptional cases. This is not an everyday life occurrence, claims Zarichansky, who thinks that the highest degree of hostility towards Ukrainians is among those people whose attitude towards Russia’s invasion of Ukraine can be characterized by the words “not everything is clear-cut” (in Russian, a popular expression “ne vsjo tak odnoznachno”, which describes the Russian-speaking people attitude in which they see both Russia and Ukraine as causing the war). Zarichansky recalls that many Latvian residents have invited Ukrainians they do not know personally to their homes.

According to him, the situation is not critical. On the other hand, he also suggests paying more attention to social network monitoring and organizing social events where Ukrainians and local people can see each other more than now. Sure, Ukrainians must study the Latvian language.

Moreover, most Ukrainians take jobs that the locals do not want. Therefore, the journalist points out that the accusations of crowding out of the labor market are unfounded. In most cases, these are low-paid jobs, for instance, in factories or hotels. Many Ukrainians are not working in their professions. However, the study suggests that the job market is not the only field where, according to pro-Kremlin channels, Ukrainians could have a bad influence. The propaganda also claims that the level of criminality will rise, and that Ukrainians have an aggressive tendency to insist on their rules and traditions in the countries where they just arrived, and they are responsible for the aggression, and “genocide” of Russian-speakers in Ukraine.

Freimanis thinks that most Latvians are sympathetic to the Ukrainians. “We speak about a vocal minority,” he explains. According to him, some people do believe that because of Ukrainians the load of taxes becomes more and more heavier. However, because of the historical experience with Russia and the Soviet Union, people in Latvia understand Ukrainians better than those coming from other parts of the world. In addition to Zarichansky’s' recommendations, Freimanis predicts that Ukrainian refugees would gain even greater support if more stories of Ukrainian refugees' experiences were in the public sphere. This would increase empathy in Latvian society.

The long-term proactive integration program is needed

Nevertheless, more and more Ukrainians are choosing to stay in Latvia. Zarichansky says that the Ukrainian refugee community could be divided into three equal parts. The first part is the people who have decided to start a new life in Latvia. They have jobs, their children are studying in Latvian schools. Most of them are people who lost their homes and all the households in Ukraine. They have nowhere to return. The second group is about people who are still eager to return. They are waiting for the right moment. And, finally, some people are between those two parts. But, as Zarichansky says, their number is reducing. At some point, people have to start a new life, work, and think about their children’s education in Latvia. The longer the war, the greater the probability that more Ukrainians will remain.

Ingmars Freimanis concludes that Latvia has done a good job in providing support to Ukrainians. However, it was more of a response to what happened than a long-term action, which is needed now. The war had recently passed the 1,000 days mark and there are no signs that it will end soon and even if it does, Ukrainians will not immediately return to their homeland. Thus, a long-term approach to the Ukrainian refugees issue is needed. This means targeted teaching of the Latvian language, and not with a seven-month break as it happened when the state-funded courses were canceled.

Oleksii Zarichansky predicts a new challenge for Ukrainians and Latvian institutions. When the war ends, all the refugees will lose their status, because if there is no war, one cannot be a refugee. At the same time, he is sure that institutions will find a solution. Like other European countries, Latvia is interested in attracting a Ukrainian workforce.

It is expected that the number of Ukrainian residents remaining in Latvia will continue to increase, which means that language courses and other integration tools should be more targeted than they are currently. Furthermore, it is not ruled out that as the war drags on, new refugees will arrive in Latvia, especially from regions occupied by Russia or where war is taking place. This, in turn, means that the issue of Ukrainian refugees and the attitude towards them, including expressions of hatred, will remain in Latvian public life.