It finally happened. Donald Trump called Vladimir Putin, setting off a chain of reactions both in Russia and across the world. The Russian stock market surged, meanwhile, in Europe, leaders expressed a mix of frustration and realization — this new state of affairs Lithuania’s Prime Minister even called a “well-deserved kick in the rear” for Europe to wake up. Despite being antagonistic to the US, the Kremlin craves Washington’s attention, just as the Soviets and the Tsars did in their time. And Putin suddenly finds common grounds between his regime and Trumpism. But what really do these two leaders have in common, and how does this affect the complex and ambiguous perception of America in Russia?
Trump’s Return and the Kremlin’s Mixed Feelings
Donald Trump’s return to the Oval Office has sparked ambivalence within the Russian political elite. The first time he won, back in 2016, the reaction in Moscow was euphoric. Russian state propaganda celebrated his victory over Hillary Clinton, who they portrayed as the face of the so-called “American deep state.” Some Kremlin loyalists even joked about waving American flags in Moscow, so ecstatic were they about Trump’s triumph.
But optimism quickly faded. The anticipated thaw in U.S.-Russia relations never materialized. Sanctions remained in place—and, in some cases, even intensified. By the time the 2024 election rolled around, the Kremlin was no longer as enthusiastic about Trump as it had been in 2016. This time, it faced a difficult choice: an inconvenient but predictable Joe Biden or an unpredictable Trump.
Yet, Russia’s obsession with U.S. politics remains strong. The level of attention that both the Russian political class and the general population pay to American elections is unusually high, often surpassing interest in their own domestic politics. This fascination has even made its way into Russian folklore, producing phrases like “Trump will come and restore order” or countless caricatures in state-run media.
“Pennsylvania and Michigan haven't counted yet”
A Historical Obsession with America
Russia’s intense focus on U.S. politics did not start with Trump. It is deeply rooted in historical precedent, stretching back to the Cold War and beyond. The ideological standoff between the Soviet Union and the U.S. defined much of the 20th century, but even before that, Imperial Russia had its own complex relationship with America.
During the American Revolutionary War, Russia refused to support Britain against the rebellious colonies. Later, during the U.S. Civil War, the Russian Empire notably sided with the Union, sending naval fleets to American ports in a show of support.
Throughout history, Moscow and Washington have been situational allies, coming together against a common enemy—be it Britain, Revolutionary France, Nazi Germany, or, more recently, aspects of globalist liberalism that both Trump and Putin oppose. Yet, despite these fleeting moments of cooperation, Russia has never been America’s equal in economic power—especially after the collapse of the Soviet bloc.
There was a time when Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union could, at least, position themselves as competitors to the U.S. in terms of industrial output or global influence. But today, Russia’s economy is nowhere near America’s in scale or significance.
Yet, while the economic contest is long over, the geopolitical rivalry remains, fueled by ambition rather than capability. This dynamic is particularly evident when Trump and Putin are in power simultaneously, as both leaders thrive on populist, nationalist rhetoric and seek to restore a “golden past” for their respective nations.
Two Leaders, One Nostalgic Narrative
Both Trump and Putin are charismatic, populist leaders who have crafted their political identities around the promise of returning to past greatness.
For Trump, this is embodied in his signature campaign slogan: “Make America Great Again.” For Putin, there is no direct equivalent, but his policies are filled with references to the “glorious” Soviet era and even Tsarist imperial ambitions.
Neither leader sells a progressive vision of the future. Instead, they market a return to an idealized past, appealing to older, conservative voter bases who feel left behind by modern economic and social changes.
The Economic Roots of Populism
The economic underpinnings of this nostalgia-driven populism are well documented. Economist Branko Milanovic’s famous “elephant curve” offers insight into why Trump’s rhetoric resonates with his base. His 2013 study, co-authored with Christoph Lakner, revealed that while globalization has massively benefited middle classes in developing countries (especially Asia) and the global elite, it has left behind the lower middle classes in developed economies like the U.S..
This explains the anger of Trump’s voter base, many of whom lost economic ground due to globalization. Similarly, in Russia, segments of society that suffered during the chaotic 1990s often look to Putin as a restorer of stability and past prosperity.
Putin’s billionaires vs. Trump’s billionaires: the former got rich after their boss came to power
Some similarities in the governance practices of Trump and Putin actually have fundamental differences upon closer examination. Both Trump and Putin surround themselves with ultra-wealthy elites, but the nature of their billionaire circles is quite different.
Under Trump, many cabinet members were already billionaires before entering politics—a sign of the pre-existing power of wealth in America. In contrast, Putin’s billionaires became rich after he took office, accumulating wealth largely due to their ties to the Kremlin.
This contrast highlights a key difference in their systems: while American plutocracy is built on inherited wealth and corporate power, Russia’s plutocracy is deeply intertwined with the state, making it a more controlled, politically dependent class of elites. This fundamental difference is precisely why sanctions against Russian elites have failed to deliver the expected impact in the West.
Anti-Liberalism: Russia’s Long Game
Much of today’s anti-liberal, anti-globalist sentiment—which is now mainstream in parts of the U.S. and Europe— was already in Russia over a decade ago. What was once a marginal ideology in the West has gained traction, proving that authoritarian regimes can often outlast liberal democracies by simply waiting for global trends to align with their narrative.
Similar historical shifts have happened before. For example, Bolshevism was initially dismissed as a fringe ideology, yet by the mid-20th century, its influence had spread worldwide, forcing Western nations to adopt more socialist policies to counteract its appeal.
Similarly, the leaders of the United States and Russia, often positioned as antagonists, can swiftly find themselves as pragmatic allies, to the surprise of their respective supporters.
Europe is now recovering from the shock of Trump’s transactional approach to new global order and deal policies, while in Russia, nationalists who just recently marched through Moscow with anti-Washington rhetoric are now being sidelined as the Kremlin is pushing a new narrative of improved relations with the United States. However, such rapprochements between Washington and Moscow have historically been situational and short-lived. The dissolution of the wartime alliance after World War II, the cooling of relations following the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the renewed tensions after Afghanistan — all serve as reminders that moments of apparent understanding and cooperation between the two powers are often fleeting.
Russia’s Psychological Complex: Messiah or Victim?
One of the most insightful interpretations of Russia’s contradictory attitude toward the West comes from philosopher and legal theorist Vladimir Pastukhov. It allows us to look at Russia's attitude to the United States from a different angle. He describes a duality in Russian political identity—a combination of messianic ambition and an inferiority complex.
On one hand, Russia sees itself as a unique civilization with a special historical mission. On the other, it suffers from deep-seated resentment toward the West, perceiving itself as unfairly excluded from the global order. This fuels a policy of antagonism mixed with a desperate craving for Western validation.
Russia as the World’s Unwanted Lesson
Reflecting on this geopolitical cycle, one cannot ignore the prophetic words of Pyotr Chaadayev, the 19th-century Russian thinker who once remarked:
“We belong to those nations that seem to exist only to give the world a great lesson.”
Chaadayev believed that while Russia should learn from Europe, it would ultimately serve as an example of how not to govern—a nation doomed to demonstrate historical mistakes for others to avoid.
One thing is certain: for Russia, the road ahead will be long and painful, with or without Trump in the White House, and even regardless of who will be in the Kremlin.
