Two groups of political prisoners have been pardoned in Belarus in recent months - and this is probably not the last such event. In a dialogue with Veridica.ro, the former Belarusian diplomat Pavel Matsukevich analyzes whether this can be related to Lukashenko's attempts to improve relations with the Western countries, what role the upcoming presidential campaign plays in this regard and why no Belarusian was included in the Russian-Western exchange of August 1 .
VERIDICA: In the past two months, Lukashenko has already released two groups of political prisoners, although he previously only allowed sporadic pardons. What do you think this could be related to? Could there be a non-public deal with the Western countries behind it?
Pavel Matsukevich: I think these pardons came as a surprise even to the Western politicians themselves. I don't think this is the result of any deal. It seems that the Belarusian authorities have reached the point where they can afford it. They fully control the situation in the country and believe that it is necessary to start unblocking relations with the European Union and the USA. Moreover, with the presidential campaign ahead, Lukashenko can count on maintaining control, perhaps trying to "reset" the regime in this way. Possibly he really wants to be recognized as head of state. Releasing political prisoners is a way for him to demonstrate his sovereignty and show that he can make such decisions despite Moscow's opinion.
VERIDICA: But if these actions are just "flirting" with the West, why don't we hear about the release of political prisoners from the press? And can we really expect the lifting of significant sanctions and a reconciliation of the parties under such circumstances?
Pavel Matsukevich: I'm not sure that lifting sanctions would be the decisive factor. They certainly made sense in terms of isolating the regime, but they did not bring all the expected results. In particular, they have led to the destruction of civil institutions - for example, environmental and animal protection organizations, which were never political. Closing them was how Belarus responded. The regime punished its citizens for protesting, but now that it has dealt with the situation, it may be looking for ways to restore relations. I think these measures are targeting a domestic audience, in an attempt to reconcile with society, rather than the West. So, I think they will keep releasing people. And if the dialogue with the West intensifies, and the West responds to this, the process could accelerate.
VERIDICA: Previously, it was clearly stated that the release of all political prisoners was necessary for the lifting of sanctions. Could these requirements be lessened?
Pavel Matsukevich: I think it will be a difficult step, because politicians will have to revise their previously stated position. However, this is not such a big problem for the European Union, the US and the UK. Agreements, including with Russia, often run counter to their common political line. So, anything is possible in this regard. Personally, I don't think it is difficult for the regime to release even important political prisoners like Maria Kalesnikava. Lukashenko has already shown that he is capable of freeing famous people. If we look at the past, all his opponents were released sooner or later. None of them stayed in prison forever. After their release, they lost their political weight or completely disappeared from the public eye. The regime has no problem freeing its opponents because it knows that it can send them back to prison any time. And those who go abroad usually cease to be a real threat.
VERIDICA: Yes, but before, when Lukashenko used to send protesters behind bars, the protests would calm down and the situation stabilize. The country would just go on with its life. Now there are no more protests, but the repression still hasn't stopped. Lukashenko is stuck in 2020 and may consider the release of key political prisoners a personal trauma.
Pavel Matsukevich: Repression is a separate topic. The crisis itself is now on a much larger scale than before. I am not saying that history will repeat itself, but there is a certain logic in what is happening. After all, we are dealing with the same people, with their established habits, which are already difficult to change. As for repression, external conditions must change for it to end. Perhaps the easing of the sanction pressure could be negotiated, where one side takes a step forward and the other side responds. For example, someone lifts the sanctions, and the other party gives up repression. But at the same time, everybody knows that both sides can always revert to their previous ways of doing things. We should not expect that an aggressive dog can completely give up biting.
VERIDICA: It is often argued that such renegotiations do not make sense, since Lukashenko can easily imprison other people after the release of political prisoners.
Pavel Matsukevich: Yes, such a scenario is possible. The key point is that we lived in a reality where people were either put in prison and served their sentence to the end or, at worst, got out of prison "feet first". We are now at a stage where people are not only imprisoned but also released. Of course, it would be too optimistic to expect any radical change under these conditions. In the event of a harsh confrontation of the regime with the Western countries, the European Union, Poland and neighboring states, we should not hope for a complete abolition of repression. However, this is precisely a matter of negotiation. The regime will not give up repression as an instrument of power. If a threat occurs, the crackdown will be activated again. But this does not mean that it always be at the maximum. We see that the regime can change its degree of brutality depending on the situation.
VERIDICA: On August 1, an exchange of prisoners took place between the West and Russia. If Lukashenko and his regime are really ready for dialogue with representatives of the Western countries, why was there no Belarusian in that group? After all, it could have been a good move for him and would have improved his image.
Pavel Matsukevich: It seems to me that everything here is quite simple and prosaic. In all the episodes where high-level Western partners came into direct contact with Lukashenko, these issues were easily resolved. This applies, for example, to the migration crisis or the release of persons. The only instance where there was no reaction was related to Macron's call in the early days of the Russian aggression. Macron wanted something from Lukashenko, but at that moment he was just watching the shooting in Ukraine from the territory of his country. Under those conditions, it was impossible. Now, I think the problem is that Lukashenko was simply not involved in the process.
I think that in this exchange of views, topics like "stop the war, stop the repression" were not on the agenda. Such important topics as sanctions and confrontation were not the subject of the exchange. These negotiations concerned only certain people. I think the Belarusians were not on that list simply because no one lobbied for their interests.
VERIDICA: This brings us back to the question of what the Belarusian democratic forces did wrong in the last four years if the interests of the Belarusian political prisoners were not taken into consideration
Pavel Matsukevich: I would call it a systemic mistake. Democratic forces have constantly raised the issue of the release of political prisoners, but mainly through the lens of increasing pressure on the regime. But here the approach is completely different - it was necessary not to pressure, but to negotiate. This is a completely different setting, different conditions and methods. If they had chosen a humanitarian approach and focused on specific individuals, the outcome might have been different.
I think that the current approach of the democratic forces in Belarus is not flexible enough. The representative office for democracy in Belarus and the government-in-exile still believe that pressure is the best mechanism for solving problems in the country, and this is still their key strategy. However, these institutions cannot offer any other option. The Tsikhanouskaya government continues to maintain a strategy focused on pressure rather than considering negotiation or a flexible approach.
