The events of early September in Ukraine may have significant consequences on Chișinău as well. The counteroffensive mounted by Ukrainian troops in the northeast, the liberation of most of the Kharkiv region, but also of southern territories previously held by the Russian military, have increased the odds of foiling the Moscow’s plans for the Republic of Moldova, at least in the short run.
The Ukrainian counteroffensive will reduce Transnistria’ wiggle room
It’s no secret that on February 24, when it attacked Ukraine, Russia actually wanted to occupy the entire northern Black Sea coast and reach as far as the separatist region of Transnistria in the Republic of Moldova.
These were the very words of General Rustam Minnekayev, the deputy commander of the central military district, who in April claimed that Moscow intends to take full control over Donbas and southern Ukraine as part of the second-phase of the so-called special military operation.
“Controlling southern Ukraine will provide a new gateway into Transnistria, where there have been reports of persecution of the Russian-speaking population. It seems we are now at war with the whole world, as we have been in the Great Patriotic War for the Defense of the Fatherland. Back then, Europe and the whole world were against us. The same thing is happening again right now. They never had any love for Russia”, General Minnekayev said.
The fact that the Russian Army was planning to reach Transnistria is also visible on the map published by Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko. By now famous, the map ended up being shown on TV, for reasons that are still unknown. It is in fact a video recording of a military map outlining the movement of Russian troops. In the background, Alexander Lukashenko is explaining something to a group of Minsk officials. One of the arrows on the map pointed to the region of Transnistria.
After Russian forces had to withdraw from most of Kharkiv and some settlements in the Kherson region, the idea of creating a corridor to the south is becoming a pipe dream with every day that passes. The separatist administration in Tiraspol, which has become increasingly reliant on Chișinău, has begun to understand this as well. In the past, Transnistria’s attempts at increasing the prices of electricity produced at the thermal power plant in Cuciurgan and sold to Chișinău failed, as the Moldovan authorities responded by refusing to issue an environment permit for the Metallurgical plant in Râbnița. Although the plant is also on the territory of Transnistria, it cannot export its products in the absence of documentation issued by Chișinău authorities.
Overall, this war has made life very difficult for Tiraspol, since following Ukraine’s decision to shut down its borders with Transnistria, all trade with the separatist region is now conducted through the territory controlled by Chișinău authorities.
In a recent interview for Radio Free Europe, the deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration of the Republic of Moldova, Oleg Serebrian, said that Russia’s war in Ukraine has tightened relations between Moldova and Transnistria in social and economic terms. According to Oleg Serebrian, 90% of the population of Transnistria has the Moldovan citizenship, whereas 70% of its trade is carried out with the European Union.
“The fact that 90% of the citizens of this region are our citizens is an extraordinary step forward. 10 years ago, the figure probably accounted for 10-15% of the population. This favors the process of settling the conflict. I believe the citizens of Transnistria want things to revert to normal and this factor overshadows, perhaps, the expectations of some countries, some of them very powerful”, deputy Prime Minister Serebrian argued.
It is his opinion that Moldova’s EU candidate status, with all the economic benefits that the Republic of Moldova will enjoy, will in turn determine the people and businessmen of Transnistria to focus more on the right-hand side of the Dniester, namely on the territory controlled by Chișinău.
Evidence of that may also be the fact that, since the war started in Ukraine, Chișinău has seen an increasing number of vehicles with Transnistrian license plates. The media reported that many young people have fled the region for fear of being enrolled in the army. It also spoke of Russia’s failure to recruit men from Transnistria to replenish the ranks of its army in Ukraine, as well as of Tiraspol’s reluctance of getting involved in this war.
Although Russia’s advance in the east and south of Ukraine has hit a strategic deadlock, Russia failing to get as farther south as Transnistria, a few days before Kyiv launched its own counteroffensive, Moscow intensified its rhetoric targeting the Republic of Moldova, invoking the Transnistrian conflict.
Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, threatened Chișinău that Moscow will do everything in its power to safeguard the interests of the Russian-speaking population in the Republic of Moldova.
“We will do everything to make sure the interests of the Russian-speaking population in Moldova are not affected in any way”, the Russian Foreign Minister stated.
Minister Lavrov also pointed out that, “apart from Transnistria, there is also Găgăuzia, which also claims a special status within the Republic of Moldova” (in fact, Găgăuzia does have a special status in Moldova). “I believe Moldovan leaders will do the right thing by refusing to play into the West’s geopolitical narrative and put the interests of its people first”, Sergey Lavrov went on to say.
The president of the Republic of Moldova, Maia Sandu, described the Russian Foreign Minister’s statement as a “petty act of provocation” meant to destabilize the Republic of Moldova.
The failure of the Russian Army in Kharkiv and Kherson could weaken the position of pro-Russian forces in the Republic of Moldova
Another consequence of Ukraine’s counteroffensive on the situation in the Republic of Moldova refers to pro-Russian politicians and parties. The list should first and foremost include the three opposition parties: the Party of Socialists, the Communist Party and Shor Party.
Representatives of the Parliamentary opposition have repeatedly blamed the current administration led by Maia Sandu for the mass price hikes of recent months, calling on the president to travel to Moscow and negotiate with the Kremlin a fair price for Russian natural gas deliveries to the Republic of Moldova.
This request was accompanied by a series of protests staged by the three parties, which called for the resignation of the current Moldovan leadership.
The parties in question have adopted an increasingly poignant pro-Kremlin rhetoric. On September 9, as the Ukrainian counteroffensive was in full swing, Shor Party issued a press release, announcing that two of its deputies, Reghina Apostolova and Petru Jardan, as well as the Communist deputy Constantin Starâș, have paid a visit to Moscow, where they met the chairman of the Russian State Duma’s Committee on International Affairs, Leonid Slutsky.
“The parties expressed concern with the attitude and actions of the current government of the Republic of Moldova, which periodically alludes it might renounce the status of neutrality or announces an increase of the defense budget to the detriment of other pressing social issues. Moreover, in recent months, an aggressive and offensive discourse against the autonomy of Găgăuzia has been noted, and the authorities have a skeptical attitude towards the peacekeeping mission in Transnistria. According to the Russian side, all that makes it difficult to come up with a solution to the Transnistrian conflict”, the Short Party press release further states.
According to the same press release, “during the meeting with the Russian high-ranking official, the Moldovan representatives also discussed ways to identify solutions to ensuring the delivery of natural gas to the Republic of Moldova this upcoming winter at a reasonable price […] The two parties also tackled the embargo on agricultural products, introduced by Russian in early August, as well as solutions to have the ban lifted. According to the representatives of the Moldovan delegation, considering that the government in Chișinău is refusing any contact with Russian Federation officials, the opposition had to get involved to come up with solutions to the current problems”, the press release reads.
It is less important that the meeting failed to produce any clear-cut solutions. What is, however, important is that pro-Russian voters in the Republic of Moldova were told on TV who exactly has their best interests at heart and looks out for the country.
Also worth noting is that Leonid Slutsky, the Russian official who met with the delegation of the Moldovan Parliamentary opposition, had claimed just a few days before that Transnistria is a territory of the Russian Federation.
Despite these statements, Shor Party announced that, following talks with the Russian State Duma, Slutsky allegedly announced that “Russia unconditionally supports the unity and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova”.
Still, as the Russian troops are facing serious difficulties on the front in Ukraine, Moscow’s support for pro-Russian forces in the Republic of Moldova might not be what the latter might have expected and perhaps still hope to receive. In the coming months, Russia’s sole priority will be Ukraine, which obviously doesn’t mean Moscow will stop promoting its interests in the Republic of Moldova.
Besides, the defeats sustained by the Russian army in recent days will inevitably affect the Kremlin’s reputation, which will indirectly impact the reputation of the Moscow-backed forces in Chișinău as well.
Therefore, the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kharkiv and Kherson will most likely mitigate the risks of a Russian aggression targeting the Republic of Moldova, will provide Chișinău with substantially more wiggle room in its negotiations with Tiraspol and might significantly reduce the Kremlin’s endorsement of pro-Russian forces in Bessarabia. In the end, everything hinges on the evolution on the frontline in Ukraine and on Kyiv’s capacity to uphold its counteroffensive.
