The February 6 quake could deal a heavy blow to the administration led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, commonly seen as the man responsible for the disregard of building safety codes. The Turkish president came under heavy criticism for the authorities’ sluggish response to this disaster, which affected primarily the Kurds and the Alevi. The quake might equally exert a heavy toll on Turkey’s foreign policy, considering that Ankara’s traditional enemies have shown solidarity with the Turkish people.
The impact of the quake – amplified by its low depth and state’s civil engineering policies
I am intimately familiar with Turkish quakes. For twenty years I lived in Izmir, a city with over 4 million inhabitants on the Aegean Sea, where I’ve had hundreds of experiences with such tremors. My time in Turkey actually came to a close with a similar quake. On October 30, 2020, at around 3:30 PM, a 6.8 Richter-scale quake shook the area for nearly a minute. The building where I lived was seriously damaged, and later had to be demolished.
Earthquakes in the Anatolia area are much scarier and more dangerous than those in Romania, precisely because they occur at much lower depths. For instance, the 7.4 Richter-scale earthquakes in Romania of 1940 and 1977, with the epicenter in Vrancea County, both occurred at 100 km below ground. In both cases, the tremors killed under 2,000 people and caused significant damage, although at a much lower scale compared to Turkey.
The two quakes of February 6, 2023 have killed over 50,000 people in Turkey and Syria.
They measured 7.8 and 7.6 respectively on the Richter scale and were followed by a few dozen aftershocks. Both occurred at shallow depths under 30 km, which resulted in powerful seismic shocks above ground. Add to the mix the precariousness of Turkish buildings and you will have explained this terrible tragedy. Although some experts, and even the Turkish president, insist that February’s quakes are an unprecedented cataclysm, never before recorded in Turkey’s history, the authorities’ policies on civilian constructions are also part of the root cause. And the media (both international and Turkish) have been providing an increasing amount of evidence, including academic research, which prove that the situation has taken a turn for the worse particularly in the last 20 years, which coincides with the Erdoğan-AKP tenure.
Turkey toughens censorship in quake-hit areas and blocks the access of certain NGOs
Other serious allegations have targeted the Erdoğan regime. On February 7, the country’s president declared a state of emergency in the disaster area, covering ten provinces which account for 10% of Turkey’s population (tantamount to some 13 million people), adding to which are millions of refugees from Syria. This decision translates into draconian measures restricting on-scene media reporting, in a country where the legislation in force already encroaches upon freedom of speech and press freedom. As a result of that, more and more international observers, including the Reporters without Borders organization, have raised the alarm regarding the fact that Turkish and international journalists are simply prevented by the authorities to report on factual developments and the situation in disaster-struck areas. Not only were Twitter and TikTok blocked, but the authorities did their best to restrict access to the area for any journalists who had failed to obtain the teal accreditation card. These cards are issued by the Communication Directorate, which reports directly to president Erdoğan and is led by Fahrettin Altun, the unofficial spokesman and communication adviser to the Turkish president. Le Point’s Istanbul correspondent was expelled after reporting on the disaster. In a nutshell, the Turkish government is using the state of emergency and the quake in order to identify and sanction anyone voicing criticism in public of the state’s authority and policies. While journalists are the primary targets, the policy also hampered search and rescue operations, whose success hinged on the swift dissemination of information.
Another allegation has to do with the fact that the intervention of the AFAD state agency, which was supposed to quickly respond to rescue survivors, was inexplicably ineffective, and government authorities prevented other non-governmental entities to intervene. The most sonorous case is that of the AHBAP (which translates as “Friend”) non-government organization, founded and coordinated by rock artist Haluk Levant. Shortly after launching its operations to assist the quake victims, AHBAP became the target of an unusually high (over 400,000) number of cyber-attacks concerning its online services. It became clear who had ordered these attacks, when voices in the government accused AHBAP and Levant of having no right to use the large sums of money raised from donations, urging the authorities to seize the funds and transfer them to AFAD – the state-run disaster management agency.
The authorities also obstructed the relief efforts of other organizations, particularly those that are directly or indirectly linked with political parties of pro-Kurdish or pro-Alevi organizations. The number one target was the pro-Kurdish party HDP, the third-largest in the Turkish Parliament after AKP and CHP. Despite media restrictions, there are still countless reports of relief transports seized by local or central authorities, some of which were subsequently redistributed to the population as if the operation had been organized by AFAD or by other government agencies. AFAD itself was allegedly involved in such operations.
The Turkish authorities – criticized for their poor emergency response. How much will this cost the Erdoğan-AKP regime in the upcoming election?
The scale of the disaster and the state’s response paint the image of a massive debacle which comes at a critical time in the history of modern Turkey, just shy of a 100 years. If we are also to consider the serious economic difficulties caused by huge foreign debt, the negative trade balance, the sharp drop in living standards and the unprecedented deterioration of relations with Ankara’s neighbors and traditional Western partners, the Erdoğan-AKP appears to be responsible for the darkest chapter in the Turkey’s republican history. The fiercest of critics have all this time accused the conservative government of having deliberately weakened AFAD’s capacity to act. They have warned that the budget of this institution was shrunk significantly in recent years, to the point of being 4.5 times lower today compared to the budget of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (the Diyanet). Conversely, the latter has for many years been the focus of the government’s attention. And it’s probably no coincidence that the current AFAD executive is a man without any sound training in this critically important field of activity, but rather a graduate of theology, a close friend of the administration who served previously only as a Diyanet official.
The effects of these decisions could be crucial, particularly in the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections slated either for May 14, as the president wanted, or on June 18, as per Constitution provisions. We have already seen the first signs that the approval ratings of AKP and the president have been affected. The Justice Minister and AKP MPs were booed and turned around when trying to visit quake-hit areas, and some of the protesters were detained. Fans of one of the most popular football teams in Turkey have called for Erdoğan’s resignation from the stands.
There’s also an additional aspect that could carry weight in the forthcoming elections: the cultural identity of the region, which is home to a predominantly Kurdish and Alevi population, has not once been mentioned by representatives of central authorities. The HDP opposition party has recently voiced explicit criticism over the authorities’ obvious reluctance to use the word “Kurdish” when referring to the disaster-struck area. It is quite significant, in this respect, that the only mention of the Kurdish identity can be found in a message of solidarity, conveyed in Turkish, Kurdish and Arabic by Germany’s president, Frank-Walter Steinmeier. It is worth mentioning that not just HDP, but also Erdoğan’s AKP had a substantial pool of voters in the region. HDP’s results in the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections are expected to improve, whereas the current government’s score would be seriously impacted.
Ankara’s hostile rhetoric towards other countries, undermined by their relief efforts
Ankara’s foreign policy will probably also take a hit. Among other things, the events of recent weeks have undermined one of the favorite narratives underlying the system of government of the Erdoğan-AKP regime, which since the 2015 election has formed an alliance with the MHP ultranationalist party. According to this essentially nationalist and populist narrative, foreigners and Europeans and Americans in particular are plotting to overthrow the current administration and thus destroy Turkey, scheming together with other countries in the region. The entities that were targeted by this aggressive strand of discourse are the USA, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, France, Germany, Greece, Cyprus, Armenia or Israel, NATO, the European Union, the Council of Europe and its European Court of Human Rights. The list of major entities spared by Turkey’s hostile rhetoric includes Russia, China and predominantly Muslim countries, in particular Qatar, Pakistan and Azerbaijan. This friendly-unfriendly breakdown largely corresponds to Moscow’s own map of geopolitical interests.
Israel has in the meantime improved its standing with Ankara after the recent progress reported in diplomatic ties between the two states. But the tragedy of recent weeks has also shown signs of Turkey toning down its aggression towards Greece and Armenia. Turkey’s relations with Armenia have been less than cordial for years, and Turkey played a key role in helping Azerbaijan win their 2020 war against Armenia. But that hasn’t prevented Yerevan from dispatching expert teams to support Turkey’s search and rescue operations in the wake of the February 6 quakes. In fact, for the first time in three decades, a checkpoint on the Turkish-Armenian border was reopened, albeit only to humanitarian transports from Armenia headed to the disaster-struck areas. Greece was also among the first countries, alongside the Netherlands, Romania, Israel or Armenia, to offer swift and substantial aid to Turkey.
These gestures were followed by certain diplomatic exchanges, fueling hope that Turkey could dial down its hostility towards Armenia, Greece and Israel. If so, the tipping point here would be not Ankara’s change of policy, but the relief efforts of the abovementioned partners. This simply undermines the logic of Ankara’s hostile and ultranationalist rhetoric, with potentially critical outcomes.
The same cannot be said of Turkey’s relations with other entities that have offered help. The United States have stepped up only two days after the incident, sending an aircraft carrier and dispatching military units specializing in rapid response. A number of other Western countries also reacted quickly, as well as the Kurdistan autonomous entity in northern Iraq or the Turkish republic of Northern Cyprus. Overall, some 70 countries and international organizations, including the EU and NATO, pitched in to provide multiple forms of support, including emergency financial aid.
The only problem is that Turkey’s response to such acts of kindness has often fallen short of expectations. For instance, Austrian and Slovakian search and rescue teams complained about security issues in their areas of operation, eventually choosing to leave because the Turkish authorities failed to provide them with the appropriate support to carry out their missions. Turkish leaders, in particular the ultranationalist Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu, have preferred to accuse international teams of being hostile to Turkey in their statements. An investigation by a team of journalists with the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung has shown that relief aid arriving on Adana airport was applied the AFAD label and then redistributed under this false identity to the Turkish quake victims. Turkey’s Foreign Minister, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, flouted diplomatic etiquette when he thanked the states, organizations and other foreign entities who provided support. Deliberately or not, the Turkish official forgot to extend his gratitude to the Kurds and the Kurdistan autonomous region in Iraq, who had contributed to search and rescue operations and the overall relief effort.
Turkey’s mismanagement of the quake aftermath antagonizes the Turkish population of Northern Cyprus and may throw off Turkey’s policy in the Mediterranean
Perhaps the saddest quake-related story, which could have major consequences for Turkey’s international standing, is that of 35 Turkish nationals in Northern Cyprus, who perished in a collapsed hotel in Adiyaman. These were mostly children, members of the volleyball school team, accompanied by their parents and family. Public opinion in Northern Cyprus moved from optimism to desperation and then outrage within the space of a few days. Originally, people hoped the children and their loved ones would be found alive. Other members of their families were flown to the island. However, once they reached the site they were shocked to see no search and rescue operation were ongoing. The Turkish authorities had done nothing. The first operation was launched by a team dispatched by Northern Cyprus, except that the aircraft transporting the team did not allow the transport of heavy equipment, which were essential to digging through the ruins of the collapsed hotel. These were provided by the Turkish authorities only three days later. Optimism thus turned to outrage as the media on the island spoke no longer of a natural catastrophe, but a massacre caused not just by the quake, but the Turkish authorities’ negligence. Not only did they allow the flouting of basic building codes for years, but they also failed to intervene in due time to save the victims. To seemingly fuel Northern Cyprus’s bitterness, Turkish authorities also introduced a ban on any reporting on the investigation into the Adiyaman tragedy, in what has now become a habit for the Erdoğan-AKP regime.
Considering other developments, including the depreciation of the Turkish lira (the main currency in the area, alongside the Euro), as well as Ankara’s increasingly authoritarian interference with island policies, it wouldn’t come as a surprise if the local population would opt for a different political path and break with their northern brothers. Such a scenario would have a clearly negative impact on Turkey, the Eastern Mediterranean as a whole, the Middle East and northern Africa (the Libyan connection), where Ankara’s aggression has already become a thorn in the spine of many regional actors. Yet before having to deal with such consequences and others at local and international level, the Turkish people must face perhaps the biggest earthquake catastrophe in the country’s history. The authorities are still searching for the bodies of missing people under the debris, and a major epidemiological catastrophe is shaping up. There will definitely come a time for analysis, but only as wounds will have at least started to heal. The road ahead is difficult, and Turkey and its people will need all the help they can get for a long time to come.
