A ghost is haunting Europe - not a red one, like communism used to be, but an orange one this time. Donald Trump is present in most of Brussels’ institutional discussions, but not in the European leaders’ (official) statements. The radical measures and positions, sometimes scandalous and inconsistent, adopted by the American president in the most different of fields, from artificial intelligence to Gaza, have blocked the European Union these days in a kind of expectant consternation. It is true, the European Parliament discusses all kinds of resolutions on this issue, but everybody knows how important they are when it comes to geopolitical stance. Essentially diplomatic, pacifist and procedural, Brussels, as one of the major political venues in the world, is probably the most stunned and deadlocked right now, and this is not due to conjunctural reasons or the presence of some character in one position or another. It is about a deep, ideological difference between Trump's way of doing and seeing things and that of the European Union.
When does the European Union speak? When it’s about law and the international legal balance
Europe's first critical or outright adverse reaction to Trump's decisions appeared as late as February 7. It was Ursula von der Leyen's post on X, an unequivocal reaction to the sanctions imposed by Trump on the International Criminal Court, because the Court had issued an arrest warrant for Benjamin Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Israel, and the former Israeli Minister of Defense, Yoav Gallant. Ursula von der Leyen was joined by António Costa, the less-known new president of the European Council of country leaders. The statements of the President of the Commission and the President of the Council are synchronized and represent much more than the unofficial, political or local views expressed by European politicians so far. Not coincidentally, both messages on X are about law and international legal balance. The European Union is a governing system based on science and equity, a union of "welfare states", interested in the "rule of law”. Challenging an authority like the International Criminal Court means, for Brussels, challenging the world order, based on consensus and rules.
Donald Trump's different mindset and negotiating positions
Donald Trump and Trumpism represent a very different mentality, which was called transactional by John Plender in the "Financial Times". Of course, this characterization starts from the American president's business background; in the logic of trading, the optimal understanding is the one that is dictated by negotiation and possibly by the law of demand and supply, and not by moral principles such as equity or the effort towards a common good, in view of which one of the parties (business actors in the transaction itself, states in geopolitics) can "let it go" on some matters (spend on/ accept narrower borders than those to which their military capability would entitle them, etc. in the case of states).
Transactionalism has another characteristic that is lethal for the European Union: it is to a very large extent bilateral, even if it may involve consortiums or other business alliances. In geopolitics, the concept of bilateralism (direct relations between countries) takes multilateralism - primarily in the form of supranational institutions, such as the UN or the EU - out of the equation.
To the USA, the European Union is a negotiation (transaction) partner from whom it cannot expect much and, moreover, it does not have a particular propensity to negotiate with, because negotiation can be done with the member states, bilaterally, which is otherwise very convenient.
The limitations of Trump's "transactionalism."
What I called Brussels’ consternation or hesitation is therefore not a specific attitude or the fault of one of the above-mentioned characters. It is given by the very questioning of the old geopolitical customs. The ideas launched by Donald Trump, such as the annexation of Canada or Greenland, emptying Gaza of Palestinians or seizing the Panama Canal, are so far from the fairways of international politics that there is simply no diplomatic response to them. You can't tell an American president that he's out of his mind in a high-level meeting or in an official statement. Much has been discussed about the weight of Trump's words: is he serious or is it a simple negotiation tactic, where you ask for a lot because you’re actually fine with less?
The answer to the question is not very conclusive. What can be seen with the naked eye is that many of the US president's "worldwide" initiatives are seriously threatened by geopolitical reality. Of course, both Canada and Denmark (who owns Greenland) have opposed the annexations, and Colombia only caved as a last resort on the immigration issue after Trump threatened with "tariffs" (this is called "unilateralism", in relation to those said above). Moreover, the peace in Ukraine, which Trump promised would be achieved within 24 hours, has not been concluded even three weeks after the inauguration of his presidency. It seems that Trump will be forced by reality to return to political ideas that have more common sense, and this can give us hope that we will witness a return to a "normal" international order, as defined by international law.
But what does "normal" order mean? The same John Plender notes that Trump did not invent or propose transactionalism in international politics. A big promoter of it is the Chinese leader Xi Jinping. In fact, it is a matter of a more simplistic attitude, rather typical of the 19th century, before the global consensus attempts of the past century. With or without Trump, today's world no longer resembles the utopia of the early 1990s, in which Francis Fukuyama prophesied "the end of history," that is, a uniformly democratic, fair, legalistic, and prosperous world. Unless Trump confirms, while in power, the miraculous political skills that unexpectedly propelled him to the top of the US again, we will have, on the international stage, a discredited America, with a discredited president. This in a situation where the USA is not very willing to play the role of world peacemaker in the old unipolar world, in which they were the world superpower, after the collapse of communism. And, it is known, populists very rarely confirm their abilities, once in power.
Is the European Union liberal democracy’ last stand?
What does this mean for Europe? Its respect for law, equity and everything else can also be called adherence to the model of liberal democracy. With America in a state of uncertainty and, in any case, moving away from the "universal" values (with or without inverted comas) and preferring the local ones, even though the local scale is that of a continent, the European Union is somewhat alone in a landscape populated by selfish transactional mini-superpowers (USA, China, Russia) and haunted by armed (Ukraine, Middle East) or economic conflicts (US-China economic war, other "tariffs" or import taxes decided by Trump). Not at all militarized and not very economically competitive lately, lagging behind in top industries such as chips and artificial intelligence, the European Union will probably be able to be proud that it is the last bastion of liberal democracy, of the rule of law, of one of the happiest and most successful arrangements, where prosperity has been combined with justice. But as we know, after "the last" comes "nothing".
