Alexander Lukashenko’s health problems have reminded Belarussians that the dictator is a human being after all. Who will succeed him – will it be a member of the current administration, a representative of the opposition or someone appointed by Moscow?
Lukashenko’s health problems have shattered the myth of the “eternal” leader
At the May 9 military parade in Moscow, Alexander Lukashenko was unable to walk 300 meters to the tribune, so Putin’s personal guard had to bring around the car to transport the Belarussian leader. Over the next five and a half days, Lukashenko made no public appearance. This string of events triggered an avalanche of discussions. As expected, the media was flooded with speculation regarding his absence, some saying he is seriously ill, others even suggesting he passed away. All this time, the president’s press office and his inner circle refused to comment. This prolonged silence stirred numerous debates online, also raising a major question: who will be replacing the old authoritarian leader in case of his untimely death? To what extent will Luhashenko’s regime survive him and who will succeed the man who ruled Belarus for nearly three decades?
In any personalist dictatorship, the leader’s health plays a crucial role. After all, when the country’s political life depends on the decision-making of a single person, the elites start asking dangerous questions. For this reason, Lukashenko always sought to prove he is in very good shape. It’s an easy way of telling his supporters: I’m alive, I’m healthy and in my prime. As long as the authoritarian leader is healthy, no dignitary in his entourage, no power structure underlying the regime will be able to talk openly about what happens “after” the eternal leader is gone. They will never ask who is going to be there to take over. They won’t start reconsidering their political ambitions or set their eyes on specific positions. As long as the dictator is alive and still clings to power (albeit by using repression or with support from Russia), taking any posthumous scenario into consideration is tantamount to murder. Even thinking it is nothing short of treason.
Apparently, in order to prevent such thought crime, Lukashenko’s press office decided not to issue any public statement regarding the president’s health. And it was a mistake. The Belarussian president eventually came forward, announcing he had been suffering from an “adenovirus”. By then, talks surrounding the president’s health had spiraled out of control. New memes appeared daily on various websites, while the media had published dozens of articles. At the same time, experts had already started discussing possible successors. Most likely, the extended period of silence also determined the country’s leadership to consider a number of options. Belarussian elites were able to draw the logical conclusion: the regime will be fine without the man who had for years claimed the opposite. And since Lukashenko is mortal like everyone else, susceptible to illness and weakness, we might as well prepare for what happens when he’s gone.
Predicting who might take Lukashenko’s place when he dies is like coffee fortune-telling. Never before had this happened in the history of independent Belarus. And the possible scenarios that can play out if Lukashenko dies are too many to consider, just as there are too many variables that can influence the outcome. Still, let’s discuss some of the possibilities.
Preserving the status quo could open up a rivalry between political forces and power structures
During his 29-year term in office, Alexander Lukashenko consolidated his near-total grip on power, completely eradicating political opposition. On the other hand, the constant reshuffles in the state apparatus have prevented any single politician for gaining particular visibility. Lukashenko plans ahead and is adept at preventing others from gaining influence. As expected, as a result of his control over his rivals, there’s no figure of remarkable authority left in the political class, not even among the elites.
On the other hand, we can imagine a scenario where Lukashenko dies at a time of relative calm for his regime, when the opposition has been all but repressed, no protests are in sight, and there’s no one outside the regime capable of taking on the power reins. In this case, the Belarussian Constitution dictates who takes over: the president’s prerogatives are passed to the chairman of the Council of the Republic (the upper chamber of the Belarussian Parliament). Right now, the position is held by Natalya Kochanova, who is loyal to the current president. Kochanova is yet to display any political ambition. On the contrary, she pointed out that only with Lukashenko in office “can we hope for a future for our country”. Should power however pass to Kochanova, even a person utterly loyal to the regime such as herself could suddenly develop a desire to rule the country.
At the same time, we should consider a different scenario. Sometimes, authoritarian leaders try to establish a political succession, but the leader’s death still leads to infighting and a power struggle among the loyal elites. According to a decree Lukashenko signed in May 2021, in the event of his violent death, the power would pass to the Security Council. Such a scenario would make it very difficult to find a successor. After all, even if Lukashenko dies of natural causes, representatives of power structures – the so-called siloviki – might immediately try to question it. Should they succeed to consolidate their position, they might claim Lukashenko died a violent death and thus have Natalya Kochanova removed. Of course, Kochanova herself could also try to surround herself with high-ranking officials and become the de facto leader of the country. But are Belarussian officials truly capable of reaching consensus? How will the siloviki react to such a scenario? We can’t say for sure.
Nor should we rule out the possibility that other players could come out of the woodwork with claims of their own. Following Lukashenko’s death, politicians who haven’t yet expressed their ambitions could see the leader’s death as a timely opportunity, which they could seize to accede to the supreme position in the state. Nevertheless, regardless who the lucky winner will be, his accession will depend on specific circumstances, including the challengers’ capacity to tap into their survival instincts and mobilize their supporters quicker than everyone else.
Democratic forces will be met with resistance even after Lukashenko’s death
Of all the scenarios on the table, there is one however that we could discuss with a higher degree of certainty. After the 2020 protests that fractured Belarussian society, it is very unlikely the siloviki will agree to relinquish the power to a bunch of people whom they keep throwing behind bars. Lukashenko is well known for his ability to make his subordinates fear him. He has repeatedly pointed the finger at protesters who wanted to “divide and tear the country apart”, scaring his supporters with the possibility of “massacres” and “civil war”. It is quite possible the fear of repression and Lukashenko’s endless statements about the hostile intentions of democratic forces representatives could have taken root deep in the mind of the Belarussian siloviki. Evidence of that is the continuous brutal arrests among the Belarussian population, despite the fact no public resistance is currently active, as well as the hateful rhetoric disseminated by media channels close to the siloviki. Moreover, after 2020, even the lower-ranking security officers were given near-total freedom of action. It seems Lukashenko is willing to give them free rein for the sake of his personal security: such a goal would justify the violation of any law. This carte blanche, which the Belarussian leadership uses to keep the siloviki in the fold, would definitely be revoked by the opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, currently in exile, in case she is the one to replace Lukashenko. It’s what any other representative of the democratic opposition would do. But you can’t help wonder why the siloviki would talk to people who would restrict their existing “rights” or would send them to prison for acts of violence.
Tsikhanouskaya said democratic forces however have prepared an action plan in case of Lukashenko’s early demise, although she did not specify the details, which is why its odds of success cannot be ascertained.
The democratic camp has other known representatives: the Kalinoŭski Regiment. This is a well-established group of Belarussian volunteers fighting against Russia on the side of Ukraine. Kalinoŭski combatants have repeatedly talked about the possibility of standing up to Lukashenko.
“Kalinoŭski Regiment volunteers believe Russia is the common enemy of Belarus and Ukraine. The liberation of Ukraine from Russian occupiers will inevitably weaken Russia and hopefully spell the beginning of the end for Putin’s regime. This will [also] be the end of Lukashenko’s regime in Belarus”. This is the mission of the Kalinoŭski Regiment: the liberation of Belarus by liberating Ukraine”, the organization’s webpage reads.
We should not forget however that the regiment is now an integral part of the Ukrainian army. Obviously, Kyiv has no intention of creating a new hot zone on its northern border. For the time being, chances regiment members accomplish their plans remain low.
The Russian factor: Moscow will try to impose its own successor
Belarussian political analyst Artyom Shraibman says that democratic forces need four elements if they hope to succeed: unity and determination, a state of confusion across the political system and among the siloviki, Russia’s non-interference, and finally, people’s readiness to take to the streets. Quite predictably, the Belarussian expert argues that one of the main problems is that Russia won’t be able to stay away. And this presents a major obstacle to Belarus’s hopes of democratic progress.
“If Lukashenko disappears and democratic forces start gaining ground, I can’t imagine a reason that would determine the Kremlin to simply stand by and watch how forces hostile to Moscow take over the power in a major military bridgehead. […] And I’m just as reluctant when it comes to the likelihood of mass street protests, considering the current mood of society, with the sole exception of the possibility that, for whatever reason, the new authorities call an amnesty and take drastic measures against the siloviki. I don’t know what would prompt them to do that. The conclusion is that, even if the best-case scenario plays out for democratic forces, which on the one hand means having a regime on the brink of chaos, while on the other hand having unity among these political forces, there would still be two major obstacles to their success”, Shraibman argues.
The Russian factor undoubtedly plays a key role in the current context in Belarus. The Kremlin has surely already decided who would be the best suited candidate to promote Russia’s interests in the event of Lukashenko’s death. And it is very likely Moscow will force Belarussian elites to accept its choice. At the same time, it is still rather unclear whether Belarussian officials and siloviki will have enough political will to unite and defend their own candidate against Moscow’s, one that would be capable of talking to the Kremlin as a true leader would. There is, of course, an important factor that might influence Russia’s future capacity of influencing evolutions in Belarus: the war in Ukraine. A decisive defeat for Moscow’s forces might put an end to Vladimir Putin’s dreams of dominating ex-Soviet space.
The designation of Lukashenko’s successor will therefore depend on a number of variables, including the reaction of the Belarussian people and democratic forces, the actions of political actors inside the system and developments on the international stage. Following Lukashenko’s term in office, Belarus could get a slightly modified version of the former regime, but it could steer on a completely different path, towards democracy and cooperation with other democracies. One thing is for certain: any destabilization of structures in an autocracy opens up completely new trajectories for the country’s political future.
