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One factor signaling the fact that the stake of the developments in the Republic of Moldova has gone up is the fact that Russian propaganda is revisiting the issue of Romanian-Moldovan relations. Even so, many of Putin’s admirers in Romania, fascinated by the Kremlin’s metaphysical propaganda, more often than not pretend to fail to realize the contradiction between the loud patriotism they advocate and the boorish anti-Romanian rhetoric Russia’s representatives often express.
History “taught” by Putin’s propaganda: made-up quotes, lies and imperialistic chauvinism
I’m not referring to the missile attack threats professed on a daily basis by such figures as Solovyov, Popov, Gurulyov, Medvedev of Peskov. Such threats sooner address a domestic audience. Rather, external audiences are fed such arguments as the theory about “poking the bear”, turning him into a ferocious predator, instead of leaving him consume his prey in peace. Our “protagonist” is Putin’s adviser, the former Culture Minister, Vladimir Medinsky. Tasked with managing “ideological problems” within the Presidential Administration, Medinsky can be “commended” for succeeding in turning culture in Russia into cheap propaganda. Like a bona fide Torquemada of Russian imperial dogma, Medinsky devoted himself heart and soul to the task of rehabilitating Stalinism, turning Russian tsars (and their generals, in particular) into glorious heroes, as well as spreading a historical pseudo-culture based on made-up quotes and interpretations exploiting the ignorance of the audience. All that feeds into a specific narrative, namely Russia’s preordained quest for empire and its equally eternal totalitarian vocation.
Putin’s official historiography cannot be found in books or research studies. Its main sources are films, documentaries, exhibitions, multimedia, vlogs and press statements. It bears no limit to the amount of gibberish that can be uttered, particularly without providing any piece of evidence. And most importantly, this type of historiography is not the remit of historians. As more resources are channeled into institutional prevarication and the number of followers of imperialist propaganda grows, the nonsense itself gets even more sophisticated. Under Medinsky’s leadership, the Russian Society for Military History, an organization that brings together a group of amateur historians (usually ex-army) and half-dumb bureaucrats posing as refined intellectuals, has in recent years managed to evolve into a sort of Ministry of Truth, which issues “truthful approvals” for every cultural product with historical references. After the USSR officially owed up to the crime, this “society” suddenly told us that the Polish prisoners in Katyn were “actually” executed by German, not Soviet troops. Not before adjudging beforehand, first through the voice of Medinsky, later Putin, that Poland is to blame for the outbreak of World War II. It was the same society that called on the authorities to “investigate” the lawfulness of the activity of “Memorial”, an organization that documented and investigated Stalinist crimes, later taking down memorial plaques and monuments reminiscent of the millions of people who had fallen victim to mass cleansing. The author of Russia’s latest history textbooks, without ever writing a single volume himself, Medinsky, like most propagandists, is an impostor, pretending to be good as his job. His power stems precisely from his lightweight reading and his absolute lack of critical spirit – Medinsky is capable of uttering the most preposterous hogwash, pretending to share secret wisdom. His public appearances ooze Russian imperial chauvinism and an ultimate disdain for everyone who is not mesmerized by All-Russian culture. His history “lessons”, posted on a YouTube channel titled “The Dostoevksy Lecture Hall”, are genuine factories of historical sentences, replacing debates and arguments with postulates delivered in authoritarian fashion.
Putin’s history expert says “Moldo-Wallachians” were Slavs, and Russia saved the Austro-Hungarian Empire before it even existed
In recent months, Medinsky, Putin’s adviser and the chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee for Historical Education (set up in 2021), has been displaying a growing interest for the Republic of Moldova and Romania, as expressed in his “Dostoevsky” lectures. Evidence of the political importance the topic stirs, the two episodes on Bessarabia and Romania are presented by Vladimir Medinsky himself, who had previously reserved his appearances on the YouTube channel to discussions about Russian tsars. The first episode, “Greater Moldova or Greater Romania”, is an impressive pack of falsehoods and historical mystifications which go beyond the classical narrative about pro-Russian Moldovenism, commonplace to most Russian intellectuals, regardless of their political orientation. In truth, the episode calls on “Moldovans” to willfully bow down to Moscow. The promise, in the end, is to restore “Greater Moldova”, following the impending partition of Romania in the wake of the war that is bound to come. It’s quite clear such a platform needed a comprehensive historical theory at its foundation, designed to substantiate its “objectivity”.
Medinsky theorizes that Moldavia and Wallachia were “historically” on a path to being integrated into the Russian Empire, as a result of the approaching Time of Troubles and “particularly” in light of the ethnic, linguistic and religious similarities shared by the “three peoples”. The cultural reset of Moldavia and Wallachia, Medinsky argues, occurred in mid-19th century, after the withdrawal of Russian troops from the two principalities, especially as a result of France’s targeted policy of “attracting elites” from Moldavia and Wallachia. In fact, Medinsky’s theories are self-sufficient, requiring no further sources or documents for validation. For this reason, Medinsky tries to account for the Westernization and Latinization of the Moldovan people (whom he describes as Slavs, simply because they spoke Slavic at Stephen the Great’s court) by pointing to their “visits to French universities”, where their “traditional pro-Russian sentiment” was numbed. “As a result of his will to have Austria as an ally”, Medinsky argues, “Nikolai I lost Orthodox Moldova and Wallachia… The sensible thing to do was to let the Austro-Hungarian Empire fall apart, which is what would have happened had the Russians not intervened in the Hungarian Revolution of 1848”. Without further commenting on what he refers to as Nikolai I’s “strategic mistake” – the decision to call back Russian troops from the two principalities -, it is clear that, despite his sustained efforts to feign scholarship, Medinsky is nothing more than an obnoxious simpleton. A basic search on the Internet, even when using Russian search engines, would have helped the Kremlin “expert” learn that the Austro-Hungarian Empire couldn’t have collapsed before ever being founded. The rest of Medinsky’s discourse is riddled with quotes that were never written, nor spoken, once again proving that the top ingredient in the Kremlin’s propaganda recipe is self-standing stupidity. For instance, when he refers to Cantemir, Medinsky says he was “knowledgeable about Ottoman music”, which is otherwise true, except that Medinsky fails to mention Cantemir’s passion for historiography. It shouldn’t come as a surprise, considering Cantemir himself wrote extensively about the Latin origin of the Romanian people and the ethnic and linguistic identity of the inhabitants of Moldavia and Wallachia. In fact, echoing the Soviet propaganda of the 1930s, Medinsky ignores the fact that Wallachia was also known as “The Romanian Land”, focusing instead on the fact that the majority population was Orthodox, making no effort to explain their ethnic origins.
Under the pretext of fueling “Moldovan revisionism”, the Kremlin uses Medinsky to address not just pro-Romanian nostalgia in Moldovan society, but also Russians and other imperial minorities in Bessarabia. Russian propaganda promises these so-called “import Moldovans” to restore historical Bessarabia as the rightful heir to Greater Moldova, yet within the borders of a new Russian Empire. Ending his disgusting rant, Medinsky unsurprisingly wishes the “historical Moldovan people” to fulfill its “dream” of seeing “Greater Moldova” restored. “Better to have Greater Moldova than Romania…”, Medinsky concludes, a visible expression of contempt on his face. This time again, Russian propaganda is the hostage of its own lies and political logic, which are subject sooner to the psychiatric department instead of the history department. Although the 1812 occupation of Bessarabia was not to the detriment of Moldova, but rather of the Ottoman Empire, Medinsky argues, the annexation to the Russian Empire made Bessarabia the rightful heir to historical Moldova, which was lost after Romania acquired its statehood.
Lest he should be perceived as outright predictable, Medinsky also launches a Russian version of the narrative on Romania’s “gold reserves”, its treasure. Putin’s adviser claims the matter was already “settled”, with Romania’s approval, in 1945-1946, when Soviet and Romanian authorities agreed that the gold Romania moved to Russia in 1917 should be subtracted from the total value of war reparations Romania was supposed to pay the USSR. Of course, Medinsky does not present a single Soviet document to substantiate his claim. Such “negligence” proves that the new version of this narrative is rather a vexed and belated reaction to the European Parliament’s resolution published this spring. As usual, when no other explanation is available, the Kremlin will adeptly deliver barefaced lies.
Post-Soviet cultural uncertainty and Moldova’s vulnerability to Russian lies
The second episode, devoted to the participation of Moldova in World War II on the side of the Red Army, is meant to serve as further argument in favor of Bessarabia’s historical predestination as a part of the Russian Empire, although it merely rehashes previous Soviet leitmotifs. Furthermore, the episode provides an ideal pretext for reiterating Soviet narratives about Romanian servicemen who fought for the USSR, based on falsehoods promoted by Soviet propaganda. When he refers to the 22 heroes of the USSR in Soviet Moldova, Medinsky throws a fit of modesty and forgets to mention that none of these individuals were Bessarabian ethnics, just as he overlooks the fact that the brigades of “Soviet partisans” in Bessarabia, who were in fact fewer and the memorial plaques erected in their honor after the war, comprised no Romanian nationals.
Beyond the usual circulation of Russian lies concerning Romania, we ought to recognize the fact that Medinsky’s history videos may have a huge impact on Moldovan citizens, given the strained political climate. Unlike Romania, where Medinsky’s impudent drivel is virtually unknown, in Moldova such siren songs can appeal not just to the heirs of imperial colonists, given the Moldovan people are bent on learning Russian just as they did in the Soviet era. Whether they pine for the Soviet past or aspire to European integration, many Moldovans are eager to preserve their “cultural specificity”, which often amounts to a disproportionate mix of civilizations, yet only in connection to Romania and the Romanian people. In addition, in the absence of a Romanian policy designed to counter Russian propaganda in Moldova, unrelated to Chișinău’s political goals, Bucharest is only indirectly contributing to the consolidation of this trend. However, such post-Soviet cultural uncertainty makes for an ideal framework for circulating Russian narratives about the organization of Europe.
