On February 15, 351 Russian MPS voted in favor of submitting to president Vladimir Putin a decree recognizing the independence of the self-proclaimed people’s republics of Luhansk and Donetsk. Members of the Russian State Duma had to choose between two draft laws: one filed by the parliamentary group of communists, which favored the approach used in the case of Georgia, and a second one lodged by United Russia (Vladimir Putin’s party). The two bills had the same purpose, although advocated different approaches. The first bill, backed by the communists, stipulated the decree must be signed by the president immediately. Conversely, United Russia MPs formally insisted the president should consult with key institutions (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defense Ministry) over national security concerns before making an official decision. The United Russia bill was voted by “only” 310 Russian MPs, which meant the bill had to be fast-tracked. Even so, Vladimir Putin could still postpone his decision. But he was pressed to “demilitarize” and “denazify” Ukraine.
Less than a week since the vote in the State Duma on February 21, 2022, Vladimir Putin announced he had signed the two decrees, thus providing the necessary legal framework at home to launch what he described as a “special military operation” that had two clear objectives: “demilitarizing” and “denazifying” Ukraine. Everyone knows, however, Vladimir Putin’s appetite for more territory. What the Russian president is doing right now is rebuilding the influence Russia lost after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The way he chose to do it, however, was to bypass all diplomatic channels and use military blunt force. The worst part is that these plans had been announced by Putin himself long before they were put into action. And still the international community either ruled out the possibility Moscow should extend its military operations beyond the separatist frontiers, or they ignored this scenario altogether and went about doing business as usual with the Russian Federation. And we can’t say we hadn’t been warned. The United States exposed the Kremlin’s plans, warning against the long list of geostrategic demands of president Putin, arguing that Ukraine will be the first of many more to come.
The embarrassing consultation with the Russian Federation’s Security Council
Before signing the decrees recognizing the independence of the two separatist republics, Vladimir Putin consulted the Security Council of the Russian Federation. It was no accident the consultation was made public. The Kremlin leader shared the decision-making responsibility with his associates in order to make sure that none of them can distance themselves from this extended military aggression against Ukraine. And since the consultation was public, none of them can deny they were involved. We now have public documents for our historical archive, and this is of utmost importance. Putin hates traitors, he’s said as much countless of times in public appearances. Additionally, Putin hates oligarchs too, but understands that their financial support is crucial to his plans. Members of his inner circle know it too. People holding key positions in state institutions and who wavered over the “denazification” of Ukraine, weren’t convinced about the timing or simply didn’t want to become pariahs, were forced to express themselves so that their opinion could be noted down for public record. Therefore, in their case, this is a done deal. They cannot go back on their decision because Ukraine has been facing continuous attacks for the last six days. The oligarchs will be harder to sway. They bear the full brunt of Putin’s military operations in Ukraine. Whereas Putin’s bureaucrats in central institutions were ensnared by means of institutional mechanisms in this public decision-making process, the oligarchs are harder to keep in check. They were delivered promises that their losses will be compensated, that Russia is prepared to bear the heavy cost of war.
Russian communists disown the war effort
But what is the situation at the top of Russia’s ivory-tower politics? Are things as peachy as we’re told? Certainly not. On the ground, the situation looks pretty bad, and things are not working out in favor of the Kremlin leader, who appears to remain isolated from his close associates. Those who supported the vote on February 15 have now started to break ranks, whereas Ukraine’s resistance and Western solidarity in support of this country’s territorial integrity are gradually putting a dent in the Russian Federation’s elites as a sources of funding for Russia’s megalomaniac foreign policy.
Two communist MPs who originally got behind the bill to recognize the independence of the two republics and voted in favor, Mikhail Matveev and Oleg Smolin, have condemned the war in Ukraine and have called for a stop to the special operation. I voted for Russia to become a shield, so that Donbass is not bombed, and not for Kyiv being bombed”, Matveev tweeted. Of course, the Russian politicians’ change of heart was not in response to the West’s reactions, to the sanctions imposed on Russia, isolating it at global level. Rather, the reason they’re scared has to do with Russian politics. The communists have upped the pressure from the bottom up, and they too will be held accountable at the end. Part of their voters, who supported them in the latest parliamentary election, were part of the “smart voting” mechanism promoted by Alexei Navalny, so these are not hardline sticklers to the party’s ideology. These voters have already been lost. Denying their involvement in the war effort will do little to help these politicians. The people know who they are. And the reckoning will bring about a great deal of political uncertainty while macroeconomic variables will hit a record low, which is bound to stir a lot of social unrest.
The elites are routing and the population is forced to foot the bill for the invasion
Right now, the economy of the Russian Federation is in free fall. The process picked up speed after the public consultation with the Security Council over the recognition of the two separatist republics. Western investors are freezing or quick-selling their Russian assets in their portfolios. Imports and exports have recorded massive disruptions. Interest rates for business and real estate loans have skyrocketed.
The economic measures introduced by Vladimir Putin on the last day of February will affect a lot of ordinary folk, those who were exposed to propaganda, did not react to all these attempts at undermining democracy and remained silent all these years while Putin continued to consolidate his grip on power. Direct contracts with Russian citizens have been denounced by foreign enterprises. Natural gas deliveries hang in the balance. Social and economic policies that were fiercely advocated to keep voters loyal will also be impacted, since the state will no longer have the budget to sustain them. Moscow’s entire framework of political and economic priorities will undergo radical changes. The Kremlin leadership will have no choice but to further tighten internal control mechanisms in order to keep public outrage in check and thus endure. Finally, the fate of the entire political class will boil down to the existence of the necessary financial resources in order to keep the oppression going.
The beginning of the end for Putin?
Hence the obvious question: how long will the authorities be able to keep the level of public protests within reasonable limits by continuing to pursue the “citadel-under-siege” policy? Yes, protests are surfacing and spreading fast. Right now over 6,460 de people have been detained in large Russian cities for standing up against the war effort. Moreover, the protests will change from anti-war manifestations to social and economic anti-government actions. They will no longer advocate political rights and freedoms, but will call for basic sustenance. Therefore, Vladimir Putin will go down in history as the leader who temporarily took Russia out of an economic recession only to further sink the country into a severe crisis.
The protests of December 2011 and those that followed in May 2012 have both surprised and infuriated Vladimir Putin. It was the first time in nearly a decade spent at the helm of the Russian Federation that the people were rising against him. Putin had taken the country out of the economic recession and had provided economic stability in exchange for tighter control mechanisms over political decision-making. His mistake at the time was his failure to understand that, when you provide citizens with social and economic stability, they will come asking for political liberties and rights. In brief, they become more mindful of governance, corruption and the efficiency of public spending. And since the regime was “under siege” from street pressure, Vladimir Putin turned Russia into “a citadel under siege”, in order to divert public attention from the country’s real problems. Today, the so-called “military operation aimed at demilitarizing and denazifying Ukraine” has derailed Putin’s plans to restore the Russian Federation’s influence in the network of global relations, and the decree recognizing the independence of the self-proclaimed people’s republics of Luhansk and Donetsk has become an instrument Ukraine can use against Russia’s acts of aggression, which, to be fully honest, is merely an extended act of terrorism targeting Russia’s neighbor.
