On February 8, the Baltic states completely disconnected their power grids from Russia’s and switched to the European grid. Contrary to concerns, this transition did not cause any major complications.
The move was years in the making, but that didn’t stop anxiety over its impact from growing
Those concerns have not been groundless: Russia has shown time and again its willingness to use economic and energy leverage as a tool of pressure.
Estonia had been preparing for this move for several years, recognizing its energy dependence as a national vulnerability. Following Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine, Estonia, together with the other Baltic States, stopped buying Russian energy, but they kept the grids connected nonetheless.
However, amid political turbulence, reports of severed cables in the Baltic Sea, and rising electricity prices, energy security has remained a key domestic issue.
Since January, media and social networks have been filled with anxious warnings about the need to prepare for a crisis. As February approached, tensions grew, fueled in part by government statements that did not rule out large-scale power outages.
“In the best-case scenario, nothing will happen. The second possible scenario is that we will have to decide which consumers to disconnect for a few hours on a rotating basis. The third scenario is that the entire power system will need a restart, which could take up to 72 hours,” Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal stated at a press conference. However, he emphasized that this unlikely scenario would only occur if simultaneous large-scale attacks targeted the Baltic energy infrastructure. Estonian security forces were prepared for such risks: on the eve of the desynchronization, critical energy infrastructure facilities were placed under military and police protection.
Although authorities reassured the public that a worst-case scenario was improbable, some residents actively prepared for winter without electricity and heating. Social media was flooded with advice to unplug electrical appliances to prevent damage, stock up on candles, a week’s supply of food, batteries, and other essentials. In January, sales of generators in stores surged by several dozen times. In supermarkets, five-liter water canisters were swept off the shelves, and house owners began seriously assessing the extent to which apartment heating systems depended on electricity.
The (pro)Russian propaganda tried to spread panic
The mood was particularly anxious in the border city of Narva. "This was noticeable in supermarkets — not as drastically as in the early days of the pandemic, but people were eager to stock up on everything from the Rescue Department's checklist. In addition to food, candles were in particularly high demand," Narva journalist Sergey Stepanov told Veridica.
According to him, activity significantly increased after notices appeared in residential buildings, stating in the very first paragraph that power would be cut off for at least three days. "This worked better than any government statement. Additionally, in Narva, the fact that about 80% of residents watch Russian TV channels more than the Estonian ETV+ played a cruel joke. Russian news coverage of the BRELL disconnection was extremely negative, promising an impending apocalypse," he said.
The recommended precautionary measures largely aligned with standard rescue advice for emergencies such as heavy snowfall or storms which sometimes cause power line failures. However, panic began to escalate to the point where authorities grew concerned. Some suspected a Russian influence: Jurate Stankuviene, director of the Lithuanian media monitoring company Mediaskopas, stated in an interview with Lithuanian Public Television that the number of propaganda pieces on this topic had doubled. "Russian media falsely claim that the Baltic states have traded a 'reliable partner' — Moscow — for instability and now face an energy crisis," she said.
The Latvian publication Re:Baltica conducted a fact-check, publishing an article titled “Online platforms fuel panic that power will be lost after disconnection from BRELL”. After Estonian media outlets reprinted it, Estonian opposition MP Aleksandr Chaplygin from the Centre Party stated that journalists were searching for trouble where there was none. "Actually, Prime Minister Kristen Michal said just yesterday that the BRELL disconnection could leave us without electricity for three days. Is Michal also spreading panic?"
Opposition politicians actively discussed not only possible power outages but also price increases after desynchronization. The latter, however, had a solid basis: the Estonian system operator Elering reported that maintaining a stable frequency in the country's power system after disconnecting from the Russian grid would cost approximately 60 million euros per year, and part of these costs was planned to be directly passed on to consumers.
In the comments under a related post by MP Aleksandr Chaplygin, local users did not hold back their emotions. "When will something finally improve for us? When will this government, which shamelessly and openly robs its people for their own comfortable living, finally be overthrown?!!!" wrote one of them, gathering nearly 300 approving likes.
The Apocalypse that never came
According to journalist Sergey Stepanov, the main issue was that government communication in the lead-up to desynchronization, not just in bordering with Russia Ida-Viru County or Narva, was unclear. "It was largely replaced by messages from various specialized agencies, which also contributed to panic," he explains. "For example, the energy company stated in multiple interviews that the likelihood of failures was low, yet at the same time, a bank issued a press release advising people to stock up on cash for several days since payment terminals might not work in case of a blackout. This was useful information, but it drowned out the message that the risk of outages was minimal."
Stepanov also noted that continuous messages about local governments' crisis preparedness created a false impression of what was actually going to happen on February 8 and 9. “Residents were literally overwhelmed with information about crisis preparation and readiness, which led to a mistaken perception of the disconnection process. It created an impression of an inevitable apocalypse”, he states.
However, the end of the world did not happen. The last power transmission line connecting Estonia to Russia was ceremoniously disconnected live on air, and the next day, synchronization with the European power system took place quietly and with almost no incidents. Electricity prices in Estonia did indeed rise afterward; for instance, on February 22, they were 61 times higher than in Finland. However, considering that the country had not been purchasing energy from Russia for nearly three years, these events were unlikely to be directly related.
“This entire process essentially served as a valuable exercise in crisis preparedness”, concludes Sergey Stepanov. “Today, we see that local governments have done serious work. Narva authorities were 100% prepared for various scenarios despite the flood of local disinformation.” He believes the process would have been calmer if authorities had openly informed residents about their crisis preparations. “If the secrecy surrounding crisis commission decisions were lifted, it would give people confidence that they wouldn't be left alone with their problems”, he argues. “But the crisis didn’t happen, and now everyone has retreated into their shell again, drafting plans for other situations. Transparency in this process is close to zero.”
